


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**FOREIGN
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JPRS Report

Soviet Union

International Affairs

Soviet Union

International Affairs

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18 July 1989

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**Letter to Editor Urges Joint NATO-Warsaw Pact
Armed Forces**

52000055 Moscow *MOSCOW NEWS in English*
No 23, 11-18 Jun 89 p 4

[Letter from I. Barabanov, candidate of engineering sciences, Mirnyy, Arkhangelsk Oblast: "Attention, Policy Makers!"]

[Text] The problem worrying everyone at the moment is how to avoid a catastrophe that could destroy humanity. Individual states can hardly protect their populations from such a catastrophe; the concerted efforts of mankind are needed.

I therefore propose that:

1. The guaranteed inviolability of existing national borders be ensured by a system of international legal, political, economic and military measures.

2. Joint NATO-Warsaw Treaty forces be set up preventing possible aggression against individual countries or groups of countries inside and outside this military alliance.

These joint armed forces (JAF) shall be governed by international legislation. They shall be removed from the authority of national governments and subordinated to the Council of Foreign Ministers of the states forming the alliance, or a specially elected international non-governmental council. The size of the armed forces and armaments (conventional and nuclear) shall be reduced by at least 50 per cent.

3. An international system of financing the JAF and the military industries of the alliance member-countries shall be organized.

4. The proposed military alliance shall be made open to all countries with the idea of joining the world's armed forces. As the alliance expands, the JAF structure, armaments and military production capacities shall be revised.

5. The staff of military industries, servicemen and auxiliary personnel made redundant due to closures and reorganization of the armed forces, shall retain all their present privileges until they find new jobs.

It would be interesting to know the opinion of the USSR people's deputies about this proposed plan, since they will be influencing the Soviet Union's foreign and domestic policy making.

International Trade Unions Conference on Global Problems

Conference Opens

18070638 Moscow TRUD in Russian 28 Apr 89 pp 1, 3

[Report by I. Anatolyev and R. Puchkov on the International Scientific-Practical Trade Unions Conference held in Moscow: "New Thinking and the Trade Union Movement"]

[Text] The conference is being held at the AUCCTU Higher School of the Trade Union Movement imeni N. M. Shvernik. This time the traditional forum is devoted to the topic of: "Global Problems of Current Times: The Trade Union Alternative". On the eve of May 1, representatives from the trade unions of over 100 countries from all continents, as well as representatives from a number of international trade union organizations gathered at this conference.

AUCCTU Deputy Chairman V. G. Lomonosov called the first plenary meeting of the conference to order. AUCCTU Secretary G. I. Yanayev and Academician V. N. Ponomarev presented speeches. These were followed by a discussion.

Today, at the end of the 20th century, we have become accustomed to the headlong rush of time and to rapid change of events in political and public life. Yet the year which has passed since the time of the last International Trade Union Conference, timed with the Mayday celebrations, has been particularly eventful. The conference participants spoke about this. They noted that in many ways their aspirations and hopes had been justified, but that many problems still await solution.

However, it was stressed at the conference that hardly anyone has any doubts about the fact that the new political thinking based on the acknowledgement of the priority of all-human values in regard to states and peoples is winning ever stronger positions. Everywhere there is a consolidation of forces, which in practice aid in mankind's entry into a peaceful period of its history, a gradual transition from global confrontation to overall cooperation. The trade unions occupy their rightful place among these forces. "Our trade union view on global challenges of the epoch is necessary," said V. G. Lomonosov. "We need unified approaches, a constructive comparison of opinions, and an interested, matter-of-fact discussion".

What significant events of recent times did the meeting participants discuss? The start of elimination of lethal nuclear weapons in accordance with the Soviet-American agreement. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The signing of the Summary document of the Vienna meeting by the states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Soviet unilateral initiatives on reducing armed forces

and weapons, and military expenditures. Positive shifts in the solution of a number of regional conflicts. All this took place in only one year!

Yet the stereotypes of the past and mutual distrust are still quite tenacious. By far not all the parties in the world dialogue are equally serious about the political responsibilities which they have assumed. An example of this is the situation centering around Afghanistan, where in fact there is direct military aggression taking place by Pakistan, and it is being openly encouraged by those who, it would seem, are called upon to safeguard the Geneva accords on this country.

"From the moment of signing the Geneva agreements, our government, political parties, and public organizations, including the largest of them—our trade union," announced the secretary of the Central Council of Trade Unions of Afghanistan, Ziya Seddiki, "spared no effort to create conditions for bringing these agreements to life, so that peace would be restored in the country. This would undoubtedly have improved the situation in the entire region. Unfortunately, the Pakistani military and the reactionary forces under its protection placed their wage exclusively on a military solution to the problem and continue the mass annihilation of the peaceful population. In the past year they have launched over 427,000 missiles, artillery shells and mines against the cities, populated areas, and industrial enterprises. As a result of the shelling, over 2,000 people have died, including women and children. Over 13,000 people have been wounded and crippled. The overall material loss inflicted upon the country by this barbaric shelling alone during the year comprised 9 billion Afghani."

Another example of a legacy of the past are the plans for modernizing tactical nuclear weapons which are harbored by the most militant NATO circles. Specifically, Ervin Ebeling, chairman of the production council at one of the plants in Krupp (FRG) dealt with the persistent need for intensifying the struggle of the trade unions against these plans.

Sigfried Kachman, World Federation of Trade Unions secretary, and Stefan Kozyachiy, director of the Polish People's Republic [PPR] Center for the Training of Trade Union Personnel, as well as other speakers, pointed out that under these circumstances the trade unions should not weaken their efforts at strengthening peace. They must remember that it is specifically along this path that the primary reserves for significant improvement in the position of the working masses are found.

Of all the problems associated with disarmament, said G. I. Yanayev in his speech, the problem of conversion of military production is evidently of greatest concern to the trade unions. It seems to represent a specific trade union aspect of the overall movement in the struggle for peace. This matter, undoubtedly, is not a simple one.

Along with purely technical and organizational questions, much concerns also the social sphere, i.e., there is a large sphere of activity specifically for the trade unions.

First of all we are speaking of the task of retaining the level and quality of life of those many millions of people who are today engaged in military production. We need extensive, well-planned work on professional re-training, job placement, and the creation of an effective system of social guarantees. It is no less important to ensure the social rationality of utilizing the liberated material and financial means and the huge scientific-technical potential of the economy's defense sectors.

"In the Soviet Union," reported B. N. Ponomarev, "345 plants operating for defense have already been involved in peacetime production. 200 scientific institutes have also changed over to peacetime matters. In the current year, 40 percent of the production of enterprises in the defense complex have peacetime application, and in 2 years this proportion will reach 60 percent. Work is in progress on compiling a program of conversion of military production on an all-state scale. In short, the principle of changing over from an economy of armament to an economy of disarmament is being implemented in principle. The trade unions are also not being left out. Recently a number of the country's scientific and public organizations, including the AUCCTU, adopted the decision to create a Soviet National Commission to aid in the conversion.

In case of a favorable development of events on the international political arena, the problems of practical disarmament will arise in full measure in other countries as well, including also in the West. The trade unions must be ready for this. Here, evidently, we cannot get around the mutual study and application of all the experience accumulated throughout the world. The trade unions of the developing countries must also define their position, since they are directly affected by the question of choosing the primary directions and the mechanism of utilizing the liberated funds from the military budgets. This means we need to develop trade union proposals and recommendations at all levels—national, sectorial, regional and international—as soon as possible. In other words, in the sphere of conversion, the time for trade union cooperation is ripe, possibly more than in any other.

At the same time, stressed B. N. Ponomarev, it is not enough to limit ourselves merely to the creation of conversion groups in the trade unions. We need more large-scale measures, and primarily in the sphere of disarmament and security. Among others we might list:

- the cessation and prohibition of the application of scientific-technical achievements for the development and production of new generations and types of mass destruction weapons, as well as types and systems of conventional weapons;

- the prevention of the use of new technologies for developing weapons, primarily laser, genetic and electromagnetic means.

Disarmament, and primarily nuclear disarmament, is a necessary condition to the survival of mankind. At the same time the turn from the principle of "balance of fear" of general destruction to the principle of rational adequacy of armed forces for defense would signify the creation of new political conditions and the liberation of necessary material and financial means for solving the entire complex of global problems with which civilization is faced on the threshold of the third millennium.

Among these problems, one of the most important is the normalization of North-South relations. There is a growing imbalance here in exchange between the developed countries and the so-called "third world". There is also the absence of proper economic security of the developing countries, including their most acute problem—the gigantic foreign debt, about which the secretary of the International Trade Union Plenum of Workers and the National Convention of Workers of Uruguay, Felix Diaz, spoke.

SWAPO Secretary Katamila Kaveka (Namibia) and George Khazbun, chairman of the Common Federation of Trade Unions of the Jordan River West Bank, devoted their presentations to the national liberation struggle of peoples.

The socio-economic consequences of the scientific-technical revolution, the increasing ecological threat, the creation of a new economic order, and the growth of the role of trade unions in economic integration processes—these and many other current problems occupy a leading place in the activity of the international and national trade union centers. After all, trade unions, being one of the most massive and organized forces of society, represent an effective instrument for realizing the principles of new thinking and for truly involving the workers in the solution of global problems affecting their vital interests.

It is evidently no accident that a number of the speakers touched upon the question of the relationship of all-human and class problems in the current world. The discussion on this topic is ongoing also in the course of preparations for the 12th World Congress of Trade Unions. The basic question, noted the conference participants, is in defining the mechanism and proportion of relations of all-human and class interests.

It is hardly correct to contrapose the former to the latter. Such contraposition is just as contrived as the affirmation that the working class does not share any all-human interests. After all, the theory of the class struggle was created specifically from humanistic, i.e., all-human positions. The world historical role of the proletariat consists of liberating all mankind from any forms of oppression and exploitation in the struggle for freedom.

The world trade union movement is today experiencing a difficult period. We may, perhaps, affirm that of all the public institutions, it is specifically the trade unions which have first been faced with the challenge of radical changes. Practically all the speakers mentioned this fact.

We must note the contradiction which exists in the international trade union movement, declared the representative of the World Trade Union Federation. On one hand, the situation is characterized by the active participation of the workers in demonstrations, when demands are presented for the protection of their vital interests, and in a number of countries the trade unions have already become a real social force. On the other hand, the trade unions are forced to oppose the anti-trade union attack by large capital, transnational companies, and the reactionary governments which are in their service.

The changes in the professional and social structure of the work force, new priorities in the interests of the workers, shifts in the structure of demands—all this, as well as many other factors, directly and immediately affect the trade union movement. Some of its national detachments are experiencing a crisis in the full sense of the word. The trade unions have often found themselves unable to reorganize their work quickly enough to correspond to the new conditions, and have not everywhere been able to find adequate answers to new questions. Yet this certainly does not mean that these answers do not exist in principle. They do exist. The theory of scientific socialism speaks of this, and the positive experience of a number of national trade union centers, which have been able to define their place in a rapidly changing society, also testifies to this fact.

Here again it would not be an exaggeration to say that the activation of the trade unions and their definition of new means of effectively protecting their members are becoming possible only if they continue to maintain a course toward improving the living conditions of all of society, if they occupy the position of a guarantor of social rights and freedoms in the broadest sense of the word.

The representative of the PPR trade unions and other conference participants noted that the trade unions of the socialist countries are being faced with a number of entirely new problems. Among these, for example, are the tasks of re-training and job placement of the liberated work force, pursuing a rational investment policy, developing social criteria for the effectiveness of scientific-technical progress, etc. In other words, we are speaking of the theoretical revamping of the trade union platforms of all the industrially developed countries, which largely echo each other.

The trade union movement of many socialist countries, including the Soviet Union, said G. I. Yanayev, is today experiencing a period of deep-seated reorganization. Its primary tasks and directions were discussed in detail at

the conference last year. These are: Overall democratization of trade union work, reduction of the apparatus, and concentration of attention on the main, most acute problems of the socio-economic life of the Soviet people. This process is continuing and taking on new forms. Today, for example, 100 representatives of the Soviet trade unions represent a strong independent deputy corps in the renovated supreme legislative organ of the country. The election platform of the Soviet trade unions has been approved by tens of millions of people, and in principle it represents the uncompromising defense of the rights and interests of the workers and the social priorities of economic and scientific-technical development.

Those who participated in the discussions noted that the importance and acuteness of the problems with which the international trade union movement is today faced synonymously indicate that the need for new thinking here is just as strong as in inter-governmental relations. Specifically, the representatives of the Uruguayan and Palestinian trade unions focused on this question.

The interdependence of the world objectively brings to the forefront largely similar or common problems and tasks, which persistently demand the development of the broadest international trade union cooperation. The social aspect is to a significant degree characteristic for a large portion of the global problems. This dictates the persistent need to develop a trade union vision of their solution, a trade union alternative.

It is evident that such a task presupposes the constructive nature of trade union positions and proposals, and the need to reject those primarily critical approaches which have been so widespread in the past.

The discussion participants agreed that this will require a new outlook on the international trade union as a whole, which should be viewed not as an arena of confrontation and internecine strife of the three world trade union centers, but as a unified and total process in which different components operate, without merging and on the basis of equal partnership. Pluralism of opinions is certainly not an obstacle to fruitful dialogue. Cooperation is not synonymous with the rejection of principle positions.

And if at some stages one of the organizations forges ahead in certain directions of its work or becomes a "pioneer" in the development of new problematics, this should not alarm anyone. Healthy competition of ideas and methods is a natural process.

The realization of new thinking is a complex matter and, of course, cannot be accomplished in one day. It will require considerable effort and tedious, step-by-step work. And here, noted the conference participants, any, even the smallest step, is important on the road to establishing a working mutual understanding. Therefore, any multilateral meeting which allows for exchange of

opinions is so beneficial. Definite hopes in this regard are being placed on the preparations for the implementation of such a large-scale measure as the 12th World Congress of Trade Unions promises to be. It is called upon in fact to be a congress of changes, a congress of new thinking, and to outline the contours of the program for a democratic alternative.

Yesterday, within the framework of the conference, the meetings of the thematic "roundtables" began on the most current problems of the trade union movement.

Second Day's Session

18070638 Moscow TRUD in Russian 29 April 89 p 4

[Report by A. Vinogradskiy, N. Karpukhin, I. Mikhaylov, and R. Puchkov on proceedings of the International Trade Unions Conference in Moscow: "New Thinking and the Trade Union Movement; International Scientific-Practical Trade Union Conference Concludes"]

[Text] On the eve of May 1, the representatives of trade unions who came to Moscow from all the ends of the earth, in the course of 3 days discussed the pressing problems of the labor movement. Yesterday the International Trade Union Scientific-Practical Conference on "Global Problems of Current Times: The Trade Union Alternative" concluded its work.

IN THE STRUGGLE FOR ITS RIGHTS

The representatives of trade union centers from over 20 countries participated in the work of the "roundtable" on "Trade Union Rights and Freedom of the Individual". In their presentations they noted that trade union rights and freedoms belong to such a category of human rights for which we must fight most persistently.

The "roundtable" co-chairman, Doctor of Juridical Sciences, Professor S. Ivanov, noted in his interview with our TRUD correspondent that the discussion participants focused attention on the most acute problems of trade union rights and freedoms. Specifically, many of the presentations were devoted to questions of preserving the rights of women and young people, as well as the deterioration of the situation of migrant workers in the countries of the West. He noted that the question of pluralism and unity in the trade union movement attracted much attention.

The secretary of the General Italian Confederation of Workers, E. Guarino, proposed that the World Federation of Trade Unions develop a new charter of trade union rights and freedoms.

Hugo Diaz, the representative from the Unified Trade Union Center of Workers of Chile, announced that the 15 years of the Pinochet dictatorship have been a difficult period in the life of the Chilean workers. Many

patriots gave their lives in the struggle for the future of their homeland. At the present time, many human rights and basic rights of the trade unions are still being violated in Chile.

Men, women, and even children are victims of brutal exploitation. The work day at enterprises often extends up to 12 hours. Our task is to overthrow the Pinochet dictatorship. For this we need unity, and the avant garde role of the trade unions. In the name of the Chilean workers he expressed thanks to all those in attendance for their solidarity with the struggle of the patriots of Chile.

CONSEQUENCES OF PROGRESS

Despite the fact that the participants in the discussion on "The Consequences of Introducing New Technology" represented countries and regions which varied in the level of their development and held different political views, they were able to quickly find a point of contiguity.

Of course, the conditions of operation of the trade unions in the socialist, capitalist and developing countries are rather different. Yet the common ground first of all is the clear understanding of the fact that the progress of science and technology is an objective process and socially neutral in itself, i.e., it does not bear any inevitable negative consequences. It is important to direct the achievements of scientific-technical thought not toward evil, but toward the benefit of the people. This is where the protective role of the trade unions must be manifested. They are called upon to soften, in the words of one of the speakers, the consequences of the introduction of new technology for the workers.

The representative from the West German trade unions, Heinz Gener, a metallurgist by profession, stressed in this connection that the most important direction in the demands of the workers is becoming their participation in making vital management decisions and real participation in the management of scientific-technical progress. Another no less important aspect of the question is the mandatory, guaranteed employment of the liberated work force, as well as the provision of appropriate additional professional training for the workers.

The chairman of the "roundtable", national secretary of the Belgian General Federation of Labor, George Deriv, particularly stressed in his presentation that the trade unions must take technical competence and in-depth economic knowledge into their arsenal. Without these the effectiveness of their operation is unthinkable under the current conditions. They must aid the implementation of scientific research in the sphere of introducing new technology in every way they can. Also, they must see to it that the additional resources obtained as a result of the implementation of scientific-technical progress are used for the good of the workers. The trade unions, he

stressed, cannot speak out against new technology. They must do everything possible to see that its introduction does not violate social fairness.

MAN AND NATURE

The problem of environmental protection has recently become a current one for the workers of many countries. Therefore, it is no accident that one of the "roundtable" discussions was devoted to this topic.

Practically all the participants noted that the trade unions are still lagging behind the world ecology movement.

A. Zheritskiy, senior scientific associate at the Institute of the International Labor Movement, presented a number of specific proposals on the transition to the new form of conversion—from ecologically dangerous types of production to safe ones. In his opinion, it is also necessary to review the positions of the trade unions in regard to the "green" movement, and to present them in a unified front. It is time to recognize that the old dilemma—jobs or ecology—has become outdated. At the same time, the general ecological efforts of the leading trade union centers of the world, if they are united for the preservation of the environment, may break their corporative isolation.

War imparts irreparable loss on nature. Thus, the application of chemical weapons by the bandits from the UNITA terrorists group in southern Angola has led not only to great losses of human life, but has also extremely complicated the ecological situation in this region of the country, the director of the international section of the National Association of Angolan Workers, M. M. Difaila, told our correspondent.

"Up until the present time, neither the AUCCTU nor the WFTU has had a clear conception of their relationship to the problems of the ecology. Our 'roundtable' must become one of these measures, which will help to formulate this conception," concluded the "roundtable" coordinator A. K. Klimov, an associate at the AUCCTU international department.

At the concluding plenary meeting of the conference, summary reports were presented by the representatives of all the "roundtables". Then, AUCCTU Secretary G. I. Yanayev presented a brief word of conclusion.

He said that representatives from the trade unions of 121 countries and a number of international and regional organizations participated in the work of the conference. Altogether at the plenary meetings and the thematic "roundtables" there were 94 speakers. The discussion which was held for 3 days was serious, matter-of-fact, sincere, honest and concerned. It facilitated a better interpretation of those changes which are today taking

place in the world and in the international trade union movement. This dialogue, undoubtedly, will be useful also for the practical work of its participants.

Concluding the conference, G. I. Yanayev wished all those in attendance a happy Mayday holiday and expressed the hope that they will continue the useful meetings, discussions, and dialogue.

Yesterday, at their request, the conference participants met at the VShPD [Higher School of the Trade Union Movement] with AUCCTU Secretaries K. T. Turysov and G. I. Yanayev and a number of other official AUCCTU workers who told about the changes taking place in our country and of the activity of the Soviet trade unions at the current stage. The meeting demonstrated the continued interest of the representatives of the foreign community in the process of perestroika currently taking place in Soviet society.

Conference Concludes

18070638 Moscow TRUD in Russian 30 Apr 89 p 3

[Report by Ye. Zhurabayev, Ye. Piskunov, R. Puchkov, and B. Stolpovskiy on the proceedings of the International Trade Unions Conference in Moscow: "New Thinking and the Trade Union Movement; International Scientific-Practical Trade Union Conference Continues its Work in Moscow"]

[Text] On the afternoon of the first day of the representative trade union forum taking place at the AUCCTU Higher School of the Trade Union Movement [VShPD] imeni N. M. Shvernik, the "roundtable" meetings began on those current problems of modern times which touch upon the interests of working people. What must the trade unions do today to promote the cause of defending peace and disarmament? How can they increase the participation of the workers in production management? What is the role of the trade unions in establishing strong international economic security? These questions were analyzed in detail by the participants in the conference on "Global Problems of Current Times: The Trade Union Alternative".

WORLD PROBLEMS AND THE TASKS OF THE TRADE UNIONS

The search for specific trade union alternatives in solving global problems of current times is an extremely difficult task. We must admit that this search is not yet being conducted fruitfully enough. The conference, which was held in Moscow on the eve of May Day 89, represents an effort to find through friendly discussions that platform on which the trade unions of different directions could say their weighty word.

Having begun at the plenary meeting last Thursday, the discussion on the topic of "World Problems and the Tasks of the Trade Unions" later continued at the

"roundtable" discussion under the same title. It was conducted by USSR Academy of Sciences Scientific Council Chairman, Academician B. N. Ponomarev.

Quite noticeable was that optimistic mood which was felt in the speeches of the trade union leaders and scientists from a number of countries as they evaluated the changes taking place in the world. It was associated with numerous factors. Yet, according to the general consensus, the most important and basic of these factors was the Soviet-American Agreement on elimination of two classes of nuclear missiles—medium and short-range.

A number of speakers noted something else: The alarming fact that the arms race is still continuing in many directions. Moreover, its proponents are putting extreme pressure on their more circumspect partners for the purpose of creating a new arsenal of mass destruction weapons. This fact, specifically, was pointed out by the French World Confederation of Labor Ispolkom member Danielle Blan. He pointed out the maneuvers of certain leaders in the NATO block. The new arms race spiral which they are outlining, as was noted in the course of the discussion, "is capable of bankrupting entire countries and continents". Yet already today each year military preparations, in the evaluation of the UN experts, consume around a trillion dollars.

The "roundtable" meeting stressed that the workers must act if they want the specific steps on practical disarmament to continue.

In this light, the actions in the sphere which is particularly close to the trade unions take on particularly current importance. That is, in the sphere of production, and specifically—actions on changing the economy of armament over to the economy of disarmament. Yusef Dzhabar Kharb, chairman of the FENASOL general council (Lebanon), Hadishvar Rau, representative of the Center of Indian Trade Unions, Mikhail Goran, member of the General Association of Trade Unions of Rumania Ispolkom Central Council, as well as other speakers all mentioned this fact.

"I would like to isolate the initiatives of the Soviet Union and of President M. S. Gorbachev," the representative of the trade union of workers of technology, science and finances (MSF) of Great Britain, Dave R. Yomans, told us in a brief interview. "In the sphere of disarmament and conversion they have given the impetus to events which will continue to grow."

PARTICIPATION OF THE WORKERS IN MANAGEMENT OF PRODUCTION

There were many who wanted to participate in the "roundtable" on this topic. Therefore, its meeting lasted for 2 days. Speaking out in the discussions were representatives of trade union centers from the SFRY, GDR, Malta, the Congo, Bulgaria, Kampuchea, the USA, FRG, SRV, Belgium, and a number of other countries.

Practically all the speeches mentioned the fact that the trade unions support the continued expansion of worker participation in the solution of production problems. Here are some brief excerpts from several of the speeches.

Charlotta Bombal, representative of the Central Revision Commission of the Association of Free German Trade Unions (GDR):

—the GDR is a socialist country, and our trade unions do not need to battle with the entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, the task of involving the workers into management production is of first priority for us. The Association of Free German Trade Unions feels responsible for the stable and dynamic development of the economy, and believes that we have achieved good results in this matter.

The country's workers are actively participating in the discussion of production plans. I must particularly note that the trade union fraction in our parliament is second in number only to the representatives of the SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany].

The presentation by the "roundtable" coordinator and director of the AUCCTU Scientific Center, S. I. Shkurko, attracted much attention from the "roundtable" participants.

"In our country," he said, "important decisions have just been made which have a direct bearing on the topic which we are discussing. The USSR has long been working on expanding the participation of the workers in production management."

Now the question has been presented differently: To go from participation to self-government in production in such a way that the workers would themselves make the necessary decisions. The Supreme Soviet Presidium and the USSR Council of Ministers have adopted cardinal resolutions on the development of lease relations in all sectors. The collective may lease state property from an enterprise and independently manage the manufacture of products and the receipt of income. Thus, direct access is provided for every collective member to the management of production.

In conclusion the speaker stressed that the role of the trade unions is not declining under the new conditions. They are called upon to cement the interests of individual workers and employees around the common interests of the workers of a certain sector.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SECURITY

Not one of the participants representing the trade union centers of countries from all continents could remain indifferent to these most acute questions which were discussed during the work of this "roundtable". And although the commentator, USSR Academy of Sciences

Institute of the International Labor Movement Laboratory Chief B. I. Slavnyy, kept reminding the speakers to keep to the program, practically all of them exceeded the time limit.

The speakers tried to develop the positions of the trade unions in the search for means of solving the foreign indebtedness of the developing countries, to define the policy of the labor movement in regard to the TNC [transnational corporations] under conditions of ever-increasing internationalization of production, and to outline means of international cooperation for purposes of the fastest possible development of the "third world" countries and the struggle against hunger and poverty.

"The problem of foreign indebtedness is one of the most complex and large-scale problems which mankind has encountered at the end of the 20th century," stressed Doctor of Economic Sciences L. A. Knyazhinskaya. The countries where over 2 billion people live today are practically solid regions of poverty. Chronic hunger, illiteracy, and a horrifying infant mortality rate are prevalent there. The division which currently exists in the world between the 'well-fed North' and the 'poor South' ultimately hinders the continued progress of mankind and creates dangerous centers of tension."

"The struggle against the foreign debt is also a struggle for the solidarity of all the governments of Latin America, Asia and Africa, and for the unity of the entire 'third world'," declared the representative from the Trade Union Center of the Workers of Cuba, Carmen Perfecta Martinez. "During the meeting with M. S. Gorbachev, the leader of the Cuban revolution, Fidel Castro, presented the following facts: Every day 40,000 children die of hunger, every 3 days—120,000. This is an entire Hiroshima. In other words, in the course of a year, with the aid of hunger and the debt bondage, 120 atom bombs are dropped on the developing countries!"

"Millions of people die every year in the world from malnutrition," said the secretary of the IAT [International Association of Trade Unions] for workers in agriculture, forestry and plantations, Houssein Khaydar. "At the same time, the food produced on the planet would be enough to feed everyone. The developing countries are the main source of its production in the world, and yet at the same time there is the greatest rate of starvation and poverty here. The time has come to implement large-scale reforms directed at eliminating social inequality and the network of hunger which the TNCs have set up in the world. Yet these reforms are possible only through the unification of efforts of all the trade union centers, regardless of their orientation."

Today the conference concludes its work.

Compensation for Soviet Works Published Abroad
18070277 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian
No 19, 13-19 May 89 p 8

[Response to reader inquiry by Yu. Polnikov, deputy chief of the Author Registration, Distribution and Payment of Honoraria Administration, All-Union Agency on Author's Rights]

[Text] What is the compensation for works by Soviet authors which are published abroad? ... A. Lysov, Lvov.

The answer to this question is given by YU. POLNIKOV, deputy chief of the Author Registration, Distribution and Payment of Honoraria Administration of the All-Union Agency on Author's Rights.

Honoraria for all use abroad of any work of science, literature and art by Soviet authors are forwarded to the account of the All-Union Agency on Author's Rights [VAAP], and through it are paid to the authors. The amount of an honorarium for the publication of compositions, as well as for the public performance of drama and musical-drama productions is determined by the contract concluded by the VAAP or with its participation.

If the work is created specially by order from the foreign organizations and has not been previously published or performed on USSR territory, then a commission fee is charged for the honoraria on these works in the amount of 15 percent, and an income tax in the amount ranging from 1.5 to 13 percent is charged on the remaining sum. In other cases, commission deductions are taken from the honorarium in the amount of 25 percent, while an income tax of from 30 to 75 percent is withheld from the remaining amount, depending on the sum received in the course of the year. If the honorarium is transferred from a socialist country, the amount of the income tax on the first 1,000 rubles is reduced by 50 percent. The honorarium may be:

- transferred to the author's current account at his bank and used by the owner for obtaining goods for long-term use on the basis of non-cash accounting;
- paid out in Soviet rubles with the application of a mark-up accounting coefficient;
- if the author goes abroad, it may be paid out to him in cash.

FROM THE EDITORS. Commission deductions and amounts of income tax are such that after all the deductions the author receives far from the lion's share of his honorarium. We would like to know the opinion of specialists on how fair such a distribution is, when the mediator firm sometimes receives more for "protecting" authorship than does the author himself. At least such an order does not stimulate performances abroad, and this

means also the influx of currency which is so necessary to our country. It would also be interesting to learn how such activity is structured abroad.

Roundtable on Alternative Paths to Social Development

18070239 Moscow *RABOCHIY KLASS* I
SOVREMENNYY MIR in Russian
No 1, Jan-Feb 89, No 2, Mar-Apr 89

[Roundtable discussion: "The 20th Century: Development Alternatives"]

[No 1, Jan-Feb 89 pp 60-71]

[Text] I.K. Pantin. Opening the "roundtable," I consider it my duty to emphasize the part played in the elaboration of the problem of the historical alternative by M.Ya. Gefter. He did not formulate the "development alternative" problem but he has shown by his works, it would seem, that without this category we cannot today impart unity and consistency to our historical world view and raise it to the height which world social thought has reached at the end of the 20th century. His name (and Mikhail Yakovlevich recently celebrated his 70th birthday) will evidently be mentioned frequently in the speeches today. At the same time I would like the focus of our attention to be not so much the personality of M.Ya. Gefter, which undoubtedly evokes respect, as the ideas and concepts which he is developing.

M.Ya. Gefter was unable, unfortunately, to be present at our "round table"—the doctors said "no". But he intends listening to tape recordings of the speeches and expressing his opinion on the questions discussed.

And now a few words about the heart of the problems raised.

Soviet literature originally formulated the concept of an alternative and choice of paths of social development in the context of study of the prospects of countries of the "third world," as a sign of the problem of the variance of the political and social evolution of Asian, African and Latin American countries. However, I believe that the problem of choice is far broader and is of a general historical nature and should be interpreted as such.

In fact, the choice of path of social development understood as a change in type of historical movement and "people's historical activity" (V.I. Lenin) expresses something which goes beyond the narrow regional framework—a "dimension" of the social process associated with its alternative nature. Each major historical event undoubtedly possesses an integrality and grows out of the sum total of facts of past and present and also trends of the future. At the same time each event incorporates a vast number of elements of purposive influence possessing a new scale and new possibilities and revealing a whole scale of versions of the future. It is the historical alternative category which is called upon to

ascertain, consider and bring together the revolutionary potentialities of reality itself, incorporating in these potentialities the activity of people embarking on the struggle for a refashioning of reality.

Further, it is known that our theories and concepts (world view, in the extreme case) correspond, sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly, to particular questions, specific in their actuality, posed by the course of society's development. And if today we speak of a new stage of world history, fundamentally different from all past development, the thinking social scientist is naturally confronted with a number of questions. What is the essential novelty of the current world-historical situation? Around what "nucleus" are the new problems grouped? Can the present, the highly "original" present, what is more, be grasped with the aid of concepts and methods formed for study of problems of the past? These questions are given different answers. I would like to call the attention of those present to the fact that the social scientist today quite frequently encounters processes and situations which cannot be "decoded" only on the basis of a knowledge of the laws of historical development without account being taken of the existence of various possibilities and the choice of path being made on the basis thereof. Otherwise these processes and situations would seem inexplicable. The boundaries of the domination of the "force of circumstance" narrow to the extent to which people change from being a simple substratum of history to active characters. We can put it more definitely: where by force of some circumstances "freedom" of choice, changes and innovation is lacking, society becomes entangled in insoluble contradictions, encounters insurmountable obstacles and stagnates.

M.Ya. Gefter was one of the first Soviet historians to call attention to this fact. "Can 'primary' and 'secondary,' 'tertiary' and so forth formations with a number of formational characteristics common to all of them be defined quite unambiguously?" he asked in 1958. "Evidently not. For each 'secondary' and 'tertiary' formation is a living society imbibing and reprocessing by many paths the achievements and experience of countries and peoples which have moved ahead. And this reprocessing is accomplished, what is more, not simply in accordance with internal conditions and the social and ethno-national singularities of those assimilating the experience—it takes place in social and political struggle and itself becomes (as, at least, of the era of the emergence of capitalism and, particularly graphically, in contemporary times) a feature and factor of the 'choice of path'" ("Problems of the History of Precapitalist Societies," Bk 1, Moscow, 1968, p 14).

Despite the number of approaches and brilliant insights of K. Marx, we lack today, it would seem, developed means of conceptualizing the historical alternative and choice of path. This is reason for some people to deny the concept of an alternative and choice, dissolving it in historical determinism understood not as narrowly as previously; for others, to explain historical development

which has been effected (the successes and defeats of socialism in our country, say) by the motivations and will of leading figures, so-called historical personalities.

It could, of course, be said that the truth lies somewhere in between these extreme opinions, but we know that there is a problem here requiring serious gnoseological reflection.

I shall dwell merely on one point. Like the natural scientists also, we social scientists will sooner or later have to overcome the horizons of traditional rationalism. Specifically, the ideal of "classical" research extended to social development presupposes that, given any arbitrarily chosen initial conditions, the individual "freely" (that is, at his own choice) does what is coded in historical law. In other words, some "predetermined harmony" between the content of historical necessity and how people will act at a given point of historical space is presupposed. And if to this is added the postulate of the model of rational action prevailing in sociology, there appear all the grounds for classifying people's actions as "normal," in conformity with the course of history, and "deviating from the norm," in conflict with history.

Yet in social science, more than in any other field, perhaps, it is impossible to determine unambiguously (and in advance) in what specific actions the law of development will be realized and in what forms people will recognize a given historical necessity. And it is not a question here of the complexity of the subject. A law formulated in a system of the objective study of reality cannot unequivocally determine the course of events, in which people with their consciousness and wills participate. Any researcher here encounters some "limit" formed by the "work" of the subjects themselves with all their uniqueness, chance and unpredictability. The splash of uncontrollable forces and processes in this sphere is such that a kind of "gap" between the socioeconomic explanation of the subject and its individuality and indivisible wholeness as a historical phenomenon is formed. We cannot eliminate the lacuna in our comprehension and description by repeating research procedures, making the analysis more specific and "stretching" determinism, so to speak, into the depths of the subject and the actual behavior of personalities. Whether we like it or not, we have to introduce the aspect of "freedom" and "choice" to people's historical activity. And where the choice of society (about which we may speak only in the upshot, in the result) coincides with the actual version of socioeconomic development, there, in my view, appears the possibility of employing the "historical alternative" concept.

To put it briefly, my thinking is as follows: 1) a quite appreciable reformulation of the entire sociological description is necessary for space to be vacated in the materialist understanding of history for a cognition of the particular features of social development associated with the "choice of path" and alternative; 2) historical

choice and the alternative character associated with it are in relationship of a kind of "complementarity" to the "objective model" of the movement of the social whole. The act of choice has each time to be made itself and, as such, is not predetermined.

Yu.P. Lisovskiy. I particularly recall today numerous discussions with M.Ya. Gefter—profound, fascinating and always thought-provoking. M.Ya. Gefter is an original thinker with a profound and composite understanding of reality and historical processes, his own method of getting to the heart of things and historiosophical constructions and ideas based to a considerable extent on the historical alternative concept.

It seems to me that the historical process is moving by some convulsive jolts and stages and that at each stage development is determined by its own system of paradigms—conditions of development. Development in this direction continues until its resources are exhausted and new conditions requiring a new paradigm emerge. The stages of development culminate usually in a breakup, explosions and mutational changes. It is at the junction points that alternative directions of development mature. Thus the historical process may conditionally be seen as a kind of infinite dichotomous chain, in which each point of mutation throws out at least two alternatives, of which one has actually been realized, while the other is eventual, but for this reason or the other has not been realized. Each alternative represents a synthesis of this concept or the other based on the experience of the past, national traditions and an intricate interweave of the old and the new and is shaped under the influence of ideologies and the impact of historical personalities.

When we say "if such and such an event had occurred, then..." we thereby cut off the alternative branch which was actually realized and replace it with the eventual branch. This speculative operation, to which historians resort frequently, is undoubtedly fruitful in the sense that it affords a broader prospect for historical research. But it should not be forgotten that the chain of development which was actually realized is detached here and replaced by a new, imaginary dichotomous chain which has an infinite number of versions and, which leads, consequently, to a certain uncertainty.

I would like in this connection to say a few words about the role of the personality in history. The role of the personality—chief, leader—varies in different societies. It is less significant under conditions of democracy, where there are historically rooted institutions of the masses' participation in political life and, on the contrary, particularly strong in a socium in which the masses are passive and play chiefly a passive part and in which decisions are made by leaders. A leader is promoted here not per the principle of dynastic succession, as in the olden days, not as a result of elections and not on the basis of his professional and intellectual attributes but by other paths and frequently by chance.

The method of historico- and socio-psychological analysis could contribute to an elucidation of the pivotal moments in history. Material for historico-psychological portraits of politicians has begun to appear in our country recently. It must be objective and purged of all prejudice and supplemented with the ascertainment of the dominant traits of the national character, stereotypes of thinking typical of this social stratum or the other, the degree of political assertiveness or passivity, forms of conformism and so forth.

The genesis of Stalin's features as an ideologist may be ascertained, for example. He was characterized not by the creation of his own ideas but by the borrowing of those of other people and their utmost primitivization and utilitarian application for practical policy ends, primarily for the construction of an all-powerful state hierarchical-bureaucratic machine and an unlimited increase in his own authority.

Stalin lived and operated in his own unreal world, in which the masses figured, but in which people were absent and where human lives meant nothing, in a world in which there were no laws—historical, economic, logical, humanitarian—other than those which he established himself. Whence the ruthless breakup of society, the eradication of whole social strata, the triumph of violence and the deification of the "chief".

Thus was accomplished a social experiment of immense scale, which signified the depletion of national resources, the extermination of the most active nonconformist elements of society, the undermining of the gene pool and, consequently, a loss of values.

We now know that the balance of the ecological system may be upset as a result of a rapacious attitude toward nature. But it should be recognized also that no less disastrous is a predatory attitude toward the gene pool and the system of spiritual and human values and that they are not inexhaustible. The Khrushchev period, which had engendered a brief moment of hope of regeneration, came to an end, dispelling the last hopes. The Brezhnev era of general apathy, stagnation, corruption and moral decline could have begun only because terrible damage had been done to human values and the spiritual health of society in the Stalin era.

For this reason, I believe, the present perestroyka should signify not only a revival of healthy economic mechanisms, the creation of democratic principles and a state based on the rule of law and so forth but also perform the task, immeasurably more complex and requiring more time historically, of the regeneration of humanitarian moral principles and national spiritual values.

Ye.G. Plimak. The problem which M.Ya. Gefter has chosen and which we are discussing today I would call of vital urgency.

The perestroyka which has begun in the USSR has made a reality the prospect of the qualitative renewal of our society. A change toward truly humanitarian socialism or the conservation of backwardness and stagnation—such is the actual choice which has been opened to the country, such is the line of demarcation of its social forces. Perhaps this is not a "meta-choice," but of the fact that the "meta-choice" depends on this choice there is no doubt.

The present is linked with the past. Our current slogan "More Socialism!" poses a number of questions. Why was there insufficient socialism in the past? With what degree of necessity was the braking mechanism which has been impeding our progress embedded in this past, in the Stalin past primarily? Was it possible to have avoided the monstrous sacrifices which were the payment for our first successes? The problem of study of the alternative nature of the historical process in respect of its past stages arises. I would like in this connection to support certain most interesting ideas of M.Ya. Gefter's well-known interview "Stalin Died Yesterday..." and in some respects take issue with him, as, incidentally, with other authors also.

In the not-that-distant past the main processes of the 1930's—industrialization, collectivization, the cultural revolution—still taken only in their one, Stalinist, version, were interpreted as absolutely essential for the building of socialism, as natural and only as the "highway" to socialism for all countries. That arbitrary spurts were made and inevitable breakdowns occurred on this "highway," millions of people were wiped out and crimes committed was hushed up and not recognized.

Now we have finally recognized that within the framework of the natural processes there was a certain freedom of choice and that development could have been far more harmonious and human. Nonetheless, we sometimes forget that there was far from always freedom of choice in our history and that the field of alternatives itself was constricted in the extreme—by the country's backwardness, its prevailing lack of culture, its location amid hostile states and by unfavorable processes within the party leadership.

"Life is always a fork in the road," V. Selyunin maintained in his recent article "Sources" (NOVYY MIR No 5, 1988). That this is far from the case may be shown by the example of the Stalin "great change".

We frequently regard as absolutely equivalent, alternative versions from which the party could have chosen at the turn of the 1920's-1930's the concept of the First Five-Year Plan formulated back at the 15th Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) Congress, the concept of the Bukharin group (they are sometimes united) and the Stalin concept, which was opposed to them and which

was allegedly contrary to decisions which had been adopted by the party previously and to his own assurances (see O. Latsis, "The Change," ZNAMYA No 6, 1988).

But in the objective crisis situation of 1928-1929 these were by no means equally possible, alternative versions. The actual situation (exacerbation of the USSR's international position, the malfunctions of the NEP, the difficulties involving the grain procurements) predetermined the adoption of a hard line. Balanced development was becoming a utopia under the conditions of the forced industrial spurt, and no one was returning to the concepts of the 15th congress. N.I. Bukharin also abandoned his proposals (normalization of the market, temporary purchases of grain abroad, a certain cutback in capital investments in metallurgy and machine building). He also recognized the inexorable significance of the time factor, continuing to protest only at the "emergency-itis"—the measures of punishment elevated by Stalin to a system.

The historical point at which an opportunity had been afforded for more or less harmonious development based on the NEP and gradual transition to the highest forms of joint labor in the countryside—and here I agree with the viewpoint of G. Bordyugov and V. Kozlov (see "The Turning Point of 1929 and Bukharin's Alternative" in VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS No 8, 1988)—was, obviously, let slip in 1925-1927, when Stalin, engaged in a struggle to hold on to power, simply brushed aside the arguments of the members of the opposition predicting crisis symptoms in the country's economy. M.Ya. Gefter finds one further missed alternative: he believes that an opportunity for the antifascist democratization of the Stalin regime was let slip in 1934-1936.

So we have, to all appearances, four "forks" in the historical development of the country in the first half of the 20th century: the forks used by Lenin for progress in the right direction in 1917 and 1921 and the possibilities of development not used by Stalin in 1925-1927 and 1934-1936. I am impressed by M.Ya. Gefter's idea that any choice, as such, was alien to Stalin and that "each ruined alternative lies as a burden on the next and discredits it" (RK i SM No 1, 1988). However, while rightly arguing with the devotees of a straightening out of the path of history ("only this, and no other"), he himself straightens out this path. In 1917, he believes, there was no choice. What was done then was the sole thing opposed to an immeasurably greater bloody reshuffle and senseless disintegration. The choice appeared later—not of social system, not of historical path but a choice "within the path". But, taking it somewhat more broadly, the proletarian and monarchical-bourgeois alternatives (both perfectly feasible) confronted one another in 1917-1920, the petty bourgeois democrats having the fewest opportunities of all. There were, in addition, dozens of incidentals which could have prevented the choice of the new social system: had anything

happened to Lenin, there would have been no "April Theses," the destiny-laden party decisions of October 1917, the Brest peace—and history could have taken a different turn.

M.Ya. Gefter does not explain "the most puzzling of our 'forks,' the fruit of which were the 1936 Constitution and the terror of 1937..." (ibid., p 124). I believe also that M.Ya. Gefter clearly underestimates the influence of Stalin's "personal traits," primarily his, as he writes, "clandestine career with all its windings and shady spots." But the most surprising discoveries are possible here.

These "windings and shady spots" did not disappear together with the change in Stalin's career, its emergence from underground work and his accession to the helm of power. It was only the scale of the influence of his "personal traits" which changed.

Stalin's "personal traits" compel the question not simply of the petty bourgeois nature of his "terrorism" but of its lumpenproletarian nature. Stalin was, in our view, a most typical representative of the lumpenism which had penetrated the proletarian environment (Marx and Engels had warned of such a danger in "The Communist Manifesto"). And we need to understand the most immense significance of Lenin's counsel just before he died: remove Stalin from the office of general secretary. Had the party leadership carried out this advice, the country's history would have taken a different turn. Here was one further unutilized forking of the road.

V.S. Bibler. M.Ya. Gefter, whom I have known for 50 years, has always been characterized by inner fearlessness in his behavior: so I live and cannot do otherwise. And the idea of alternativeness which we are discussing today is not for him simply the result of historical and sociological reflection but a matter of moral choice and an expression of his inner line of behavior.

I would like to introduce to our present discussion of the problem of alternativeness in history one, in my view, very important dimension: culture. I believe that the true inner freedom of man's will and his capacity for deciding his fate are connected precisely with what we call culture. Culture affords the personality an opportunity to resist—in philosophy, morality, religion, in all spheres—determination from outside: from the economy or policy and from history, and from within: from genetic and other heredity. Culture is the brilliant "discovery" of mankind enabling the personality to determine his behavior.

I believe it wrong that we speak insufficiently about culture, particularly when it is a question of Russia's historical destiny. Granted all its backwardness, this country has always been characterized by the highest models of spiritual culture and the boldest quest in

philosophy, religion and art. And the paths of Herzen or Kireyevskiy, of the "silver age" and the democracy of the end of the 19th-start of the 20th centuries were alternatives in this plane.

My most general conclusion is that without spiritual, cultural alternativeness there can be no other alternativeness. I believe that one of our great misfortunes has been the idea concerning economic and political factors as being absolutely decisive. And even today, under the conditions of perestroika, we are attempting only in these factors to seek this alternative or the other.

Where the continuity of the development of culture is forcibly suspended, where its spirit is stifled, no alternativeness is at all possible. Culture turns us toward the origins of our behavior, the origins of social being. Of course, we are historically and economically determined and were born in a particular environment and under particular conditions, but in art we imagine our intercourse anew; in philosophy we address the origins of thinking, replaying thinking all over again, and not remaining somewhere mid-way.

One asks: is the formation of a new historical subject possible only on the basis of the working class? A particular type of labor, which Marx called general, is necessary. This labor is characteristic of all spheres of culture and the intelligentsia, like the labor of the peasant enlivening the natural powers of the land. In a word, the consideration and unification of all complex types of the activity of man the creator are essential. We cannot speak about alternatives without the conjunction of these forms of labor. A profoundly pertinent—economic and sociological—character is attached to these general arguments, in my view, in the 20th century.

Whereas in the recent past even history represented some ladder and process of man's ascent thereof (Hegel's "Aufheben" virtually), today it is a conjunction of different types of culture. In one space, in the mind of one person coexist the most diverse value spectrums: classical, medieval, contemporary. Man of the 20th century, knocked out of the ready-made social molds and thrown into trenches and the plank-beds of concentration camps, finds himself alone with history. He must create new forms of intercourse, small groups, in which he may alone exist as an individual.

But in the 20th century this phenomenon is "propped up" from another side also: what we call by the conventional, standard words "S&T revolution," when man—once again we recall Marx—is not incorporated directly in the production process but stands "alongside" it. The activity of small groups in the era of the S&T revolution has to be turned toward themselves because the actual production structures may now change not from within but as a result of the separation and removal therefrom of man. There arises what may be called not capitalism and not socialism but a socium of culture. Activity in culture, science and art which was previously marginal is

now at the epicenter of human activity as a whole. A fearfully great deal will depend on an understanding of these new possibilities and new alternatives. I do not know whether this is an alternative or not, but the formation of a socium of culture and the struggle of this "weak interaction," as the physicists say, but very powerful in reality, of the socium of culture and the giant economic and sociological megaforce sociums proper represents, perhaps, the main area of fighting of the 20th century.

I.M. Klyamkin. Of importance in any argument is its subject. Yet in the present debate on the alternative character of history (and our present debate is no exception) it very often disappears. And for this reason the argument is often about what is generally incontestable.

The content of the word "alternative" may be understood as something distinct from the given social condition, as the possibility of its change, transformation, "restructuring". But in this case this word contains no fundamentally new meaning and captures no theoretical problem, and it is possible to get along perfectly well without it. In this case saying that history is of an alternative nature is to say that history always contains the possibility of development. But what this possibility is needs to be examined specifically on each occasion.

The word "alternative" may further be interpreted as the possibility (and practicability) of different and even vari-directional historical development. There have been classical, Germanic and oriental communities, say; there have been different modes of incorporation of different regions in industrial civilization. In this case the word is suffused with far richer meaning. But it needs to be recognized that here also it contains nothing that would conflict with or in some way add to classical determinist outlines.

If in history some new version of historical development unlike the known ones begins to show, this means that it does not fit within the former concepts and is in need of new ones. At these points of cognition there usually emerges colossal intellectual exertion, as was the case with Marx, for example, at the time of the transition from West European and American to Russian topics, which was well shown in M.Ya. Gefter's article "Russia and Marx". But such exertion testifies not to the fact that the concept of the law-conformity of historical development is altogether becoming insufficient and is in need of the supplementary alternativeness concept but that the transition from some determinist outlines to others is a hugely difficult business. The dramatic nature of this transition may be intensified a thousandfold by the fact that history at first merely "hints" to the researcher, as it were, that there are in it "zones" which do not fit within the forms of determinism which he accepts (or which he himself has formulated), but in the meantime history hides and conceals the essence of these differences, this as yet unknown quantity, and does not release them to the surface. In this case speaking about alternativeness is

legitimate. But it will be nothing other than the noncoincidence of historically natural versions of development, which have to be interpreted in their inner objective logic and in their interaction with one another. However, nor is there here anything to argue about in earnest.

And only a third instance of use of the word "alternative" may lay claim to methodological newness—when attempts are made to substantiate the objective possibility in principle of hetero-variant development within the framework of one and the same historical version. The source of this concept is our post-October history and the endeavor to find if only a theoretical counterweight to the administrative-command system and its offspring—the Stalin business.

When M.Ya. Gefter employs the term "alternative" in the second of the meanings which I list, I have no objections. But when, however, he uses it in the third meaning, this causes in me profound misgivings. And it is not only a question of the fact that such an understanding of alternativeness goes beyond, strictly speaking, the bounds of scholarship since it cannot with hindsight be shown whether events could have developed otherwise. And not only a question of the fact that such an understanding comes up against the colossal resistance of empirical material: not just with us but in all countries of "real socialism" (and not necessarily with our participation) administrative-command systems emerged in this form or the other, and they have everywhere proven bankrupt in the face of the S&T revolution and the problems which it is engendering.

It is not, I repeat, just a question of this. It is, further, a question of the fact that such an understanding wittingly or unwittingly leads research thought away from study of "real socialism" as a particular form of realization of historical regularity, nurturing the illusion that it is the "deformation" of something which has not taken shape. Objectively, this conceals illusions as regards "real socialism" itself in its early versions and as regards its historical possibilities, that is, the possibilities of the noncapitalist modernization of regions which lagged behind in their development and did not succeed "in time" in breaking through into industrial civilization on a capitalist basis.

It is said that if there is no alternativeness, there is no "freedom of will," freedom of choice. I believe that the one is in no way connected with the other. Freedom of individual choice exists always, as it did in the Stalin era also, and that this was so is attested by the behavior and creativity of such people as Bulgakov, Platonov, Akhmatova and many others. That "self-determination" about which V.S. Bibler spoke operates here.

The degree of this freedom is the higher the more individualized is the nature of man's activity and mode of self-expression. And it is the less, the closer he comes into contact in terms of nature of occupation with the

activity and interests of large masses of people. For this reason it is maximal in art and minimal in politics. Particularly if politics has to operate under conditions where the majority is still within the historical bounds of another, impersonal, nonindividualized culture and for this reason non-self-determining at the level of the individual.

But nor does rejection of the alternativeness concept signify that social groups large and small are deprived of historical choice. In addition, they are, like individual people, condemned to choose. They choose, however, in accordance with their objectively conditioned interests, which come up against other interests, also objectively conditioned. But predicting which of these interests will prove dominant and system-forming at a given moment, at a given point of history, is impossible; the correlation of historical forces is revealed only in their activity, in their direct contact. This is the dramatic effect of history, which, if you like, amounts to the fact that there is choice of desired result and no alternativeness of results.

It seems to me that it is important today not so much to supplement the former determinist outlines as to formulate new ones corresponding to the realities of the end of the 20th century. We have to deterministically explain the history of the emergence and functioning of such a phenomenon as "real socialism". We have to deterministically explain such unique phenomena as, for example, the existence of "two Chinas" or "two Koreas"—explain by proceeding from the world nature of contemporary connections and relations. We have to understand contemporaneity as a complex interweave and overlapping of various types of determination. We have to ascertain which subjects are the exponents of this type or the other and how they correlate to one another. We must avoid here any illusions as regards the fact that if current problems are of a global-universal nature, this alone is sufficient for all mankind to recognize them and accept them as its own.

Will the alternativeness concept help solve these problems? I am not entirely sure about this. It is at best an indirect indication of their novelty and complexity and an original attempt to break through their intractability. At worst, it could simply distract attention from them.

A.S. Senyavskiy. Individual scientific categories have frequently moved to the fore in the history of social thought, becoming a kind of accumulator of new ideas. As a rule, these categories have been in opposition to the established and absolutized concepts on which ideas which are outmoded and no longer capable of explaining social realities were based. Something similar is happening in our time with the concept of the alternative character of social development, in domestic history in particular. It is rightly opposed to the category of social determinism, which at one time played a progressive part in social science, but, owing to certain factors, primarily of our social practice, was absolutized and largely consciously taken to the absurd, to the level of

historical fatalism: Naturally, this absolutization has nothing in common with dialectics and, consequently, with Marxism either. The introduction in broad scholarly usage of the alternativeness concept returns us to the dialectical approach to social development and makes it possible to view it as a unity of opposites inasmuch as the opposition of determinism and alternativeness is not absolute but dialectical. At the new twist of the spiral of social thought we are returning to the human character of the historical process, but enriched now with an understanding of the role of the entire aggregate of supra-individual forces of social development.

However, while establishing today in the scientific and social consciousness the undoubtedly necessary category of alternativeness we have to see the limits of the legitimacy and utility of its use; a clear understanding that this is only an abstraction torn from the living fabric of the historical process and that as a category it has a right to exist only in a system of interrelated concepts, that is, theory, and in itself explains nothing is essential. Constructing a theory on the basis of this category particularly in respect of the object of research is impossible. Only an integral concept of the mechanism of social development may be adequate to the subject of study—the historical process—and capable, specifically, of answering also the questions arising in connection with the alternativeness problem. At the same time the mechanism of social development cannot be studied today with sufficient fullness and adequacy without the broad application of this category.

Use of the alternativeness category as a methodological set of instruments also in study of domestic history proper would seem highly productive. Without asking "what might have been if..." and "at what moments and under what conditions might our development have proceeded differently?" researchers into Soviet history will be unable to adequately throw light on the real, actual historical process and answer the question: why did we develop precisely as we did? And this is not a matter of divination by tea leaves. It is—granted the full understanding that history cannot be changed—the modeling of possible situations for the purpose of the more profound penetration of reality. A change in attitude toward the past means a more adequate attitude toward the present; enriched with the cognition of history, we can realize in practice the accumulated theoretical arsenal, including that associated with the alternative character of social development, in order not to repeat the mistakes of the past and make our future more human.

The "alternative" category requires very thorough study for its productive use. While recognizing in principle the multi-variant nature of the historical process (we would otherwise have to adopt a position of historical fatalism where, incidentally, theories, which, having taken possession of the masses, become a material force, would be of no use either), it is necessary to clearly recognize what the essence of this phenomenon is and the mechanism,

limits, spheres and levels of action of alternativeness. Otherwise we would inevitably descend to an explanation of the historical path as a product of the activity of "evil geniuses" of history. A graphic example is the approach which is widespread currently in current affairs writing to Stalin and Stalinism. There is no doubt that this personality was in our history the personification and powerful component of social forces which realized specific alternatives, but the whole difficulty of the problem consists of comprehending the limits of the "freedom of choice" of this personality, the social forces behind him and opposed to him and of society as a whole at specific stages of its development. It is important to analyze the correlation of the "alternativeness" category and the concept of the "irreversibility" of the historical process. After all, the existence of some "field of freedom of choice" following realization of one alternative, following negotiation of the "fork" of the historical process, could sometimes lead to irreversible changes in society and determine for many years and centuries even its inertial movement in one direction, along a prescribed track. When one investigates more closely the factors which turned history onto this path, it could transpire that from the viewpoint of significance for society they were seemingly negligible, fleeting and largely incidental. Having been realized, they set a strictly determined direction for all of social development. In the same way Stalinism (in its developed form of the 1930's-start of the 1950's) appeared not because Stalin had conceived a desire for this but because as of a particular moment it could not have failed to have appeared, even if personified by other names.

Consequently, the essence of the scientific problem is determination of the causes and the moment when the change had become irreversible and the conditions which predetermined it. In our view, this was 1918, when the split in the left-revolutionary forces which had headed the revolution led to the deformation of the democratic political system, which had barely had time to emerge. The transfer of policy outside of society into a narrow circle of professional revolutionaries and the detachment of the real mechanisms of power and political decisions from the people inevitably led also to a winding down of intraparty democracy and the usurpation of power by the managerial machinery. Against the background of the deproletarianization of the party and the creation therein of the social base of a "strong authority," to which new cadres would be obliged for their promotion, regardless of their revolutionary contributions, the supplanting of the professional revolutionaries and the loss of democratic traditions were inevitable. So the formation of Stalinism as a military-bureaucratic dictatorship was merely a question of time and the tactics of this ambitious political leader or the other. The most dexterous "tactician" proved to be Stalin, and for this reason the military-bureaucratic dictatorship, predetermined as of a particular moment, came to bear his name and acquired a personal imprint, essentially not fundamental. Likewise not fundamental were the other intraparty alternatives also—the logic of

the development of the political superstructure based on a monopoly of power inevitably led also to the abolition of the NEP, the triumph of the command-bureaucratic management mechanism and the extermination of the old revolutionary personnel. The real goals advanced by the revolution became here merely slogans and a convenient instrument of manipulation of the social consciousness—in the interests of the new managerial stratum.

What today are sometimes still called the "excesses" of collectivization was the forcible establishment of new forms of social inequality via the implantation of the command-bureaucratic system down to the lowest cells of economic life. The general statization of social life and total state control—this is the essence of Stalin's "socialism". The social essence of these measures is the artificial division of the people into privileged strata belonging to the bureaucratic hierarchy, and the rest, into "highest" and "lowest".

In addressing the alternativeness category today we are seeking answers primarily to questions concerning domestic history. We still know insufficiently what it was that we built, although we have already recognized what it is necessary to restructure. Without taking this category as a basis it is impossible to understand why things happened precisely as they did, and not otherwise. But for alternativeness to be an effective methodological instrument of cognition even more theoretical work is necessary.

I.A. Zhelenina. The well-known Soviet historian A.I. Neuskykhin once called historical thinking a particular type of scientific-philosophical thinking which is a product of an understanding of various historical formations in all their specificity, that is, in their distinctiveness and community. This description applies in full to M.Ya. Gefter's thinking. As a philosophically-minded historian and analyzing the roots of the actual gap which exists in our country between philosophy and history, M.Ya. Gefter raised his voice in the 1960's together with other scholars against a mechanical—in the spirit of the "Short Course"—division of Marxist philosophical science into dialectical and historical materialism. At that time, speaking in connection with A.S. Arsenyev's report "Historical Method and Logic," M.Ya. Gefter called attention to the inverted depiction of the structure and logic of Marxism whereby a materialist understanding of history proves to be secondary and derived from natural-philosophy "dialectical materialism". Thus was the actual picture of the genesis of materialist dialectics distorted, but even more material was the fact that, having stuck in the mind, this seemingly merely educational outline has kept the isolation of contemporary historical materialism away from both dialectics and a specific study of society past and present. An analysis of this situation, were we to carry it through to the end, would bring us close to an understanding of the roots of the dogmatization of Marxism which are the most difficult to distinguish.

An analysis of this situation has yet to be made. I would like to express one further consideration. The surmounting of the simplistic understanding of historical determinism is connected with increased attention to an analysis of historical situations. The historical situation should be spoken of in sociological concepts, which characterize the state of society as a whole and the correlation of the effective forces. The historical situation may pertain to a social integrality of varying scale (as far as global), indicating simultaneously here both the phase and stage in the development of the system. Elucidation of the "historical situation" concept and its introduction to scientific usage should, obviously, contribute to the elaboration of the problem of an alternative since any alternative occurs within the framework of a particular situation.

Ye.V. Mareyeva. We set ourselves an unprecedented goal—a scientific forecast and conscious structuring of a new social community. But how did this "scientific management" of social processes of ours result in practice? After all, it is perfectly clear today that we have hitherto engaged in subordinating our life to theoretical outlines accepted in advance, foisting our prescriptions on it in the direct sense. Our society experienced a time of the forcible conversion of kolkhozes into sovkhoses to accommodate the narrowly understood idea of public ownership. We are still suffering from wage-leveling distribution connected with the misunderstood principle of equality. There is an urgent need today for a radical change in our system of planning, which has for many years trampled economic life underfoot inasmuch as we discerned therein the embodiment of the very idea of a "planned economy". And all these metamorphoses are connected with one root, one basis. With the fact that theory with us has proven to be in a distorted relationship to practice, ideals, to reality, and ideology and policy, to the economy. We have hitherto existed under the conditions of a kind of "practical idealism," whereby life has been like material for the embodiment of someone's theoretical designs. And these designs, furthermore, have not ennobled but limited and exhausted it. And the most important thing is that whole generations were "initiated" into the implementation of a particular social theory.

So, what, then? The scientific forecast and conscious control of social life are impossible? Many people are today despairingly inclined to just such a conclusion. But, in my opinion, we have by the path tested rejected merely one version of the regulation of social life. More precisely, the version of the "structuring" of a new society about whose lack of alternative character V.S. Bibler has spoken so well here. The point being that until recently we had been "building" communism like houses and plants are built. But society is not an apartment house, and an engineering approach here is not simply inappropriate but also extraordinarily dangerous. When building a house, it is necessary to have in advance a plan approved in all details. There can be no such plan in respect of social life. And it is for this reason that both

the directive planning in the economy and the strict projection of social processes as a whole, as far as the "designation" of 1980 as the start of communism, caused us so many troubles.

The aim of "building" a new society is dangerous also in that in this case we naively equate social and purely technical processes. But the distinctiveness of social life is that its authors and actors are endowed with free will. And for this reason there is little that can be foretold, even less, projected. It is only possible here to forecast, taking into consideration the confrontation and opposition of different trends. And we must not control these processes as does a traffic policeman but like a chess player, taking into consideration his opponent's freedom of will. Thus avoiding the unpredictable results of our social planning means counterposing thereto social forecasting. And the "building" of the new society should in one way or another be replaced by the method of indirect regulation of social processes, when each decision is determined by the situation or, rather, by what from this specific situation may be derived for the benefit of man and his well-being, freedom and creativity. And our ideology would in this case no longer tower abstractly above life but reflect its main thrust and aspiration to development.

All these prospects were outlined in the classics of Marxism. And it should be a question of how prehistory, beyond which we have not passed, played a bad joke on Marxism, converting it from a revolutionary method-theory into a dogmatic prescription-theory. How did this conversion occur in reality? This still needs to be investigated. And we will be able to seriously analyze the tragedy of Marxism if we take as a basis the method of K. Marx himself.

M.Ya. Gefter. Our problem, even if taken "only" within the limits of the declining century, is boundless. It is easier to say what is not a part of it today, and even this is not easy: everything, perhaps. And it is for this reason that differences of opinion are productive. But the question is: are we speaking about the same thing? Or, does the subject itself not coincide among persons thinking differently?

In fact, what is meant by alternative? Why do we avail ourselves of this non-native word, more than just avail ourselves, cannot help but avail ourselves? This is, of course, not the sole instance of the worn condition of "our" concept forcing us to resort to a substitute.

Let us study the "alternative". How to grasp it in order to bring the discussion into the channel of at least a preliminary agreement on the framework of the concept? By beginning with some negative, perhaps, saying: this means "nonvariableness". In both the space and time sense. That is, recognizing that it is not simply a multiplicity of noncoincident conditions crossed with a multiplicity of existing possibilities. It is not simply the result of a selection made by history (historical man!) of

the most promising, practicable possibilities, a selection incorporating both pro and contra. It is not only a higher level of the elemental and even created variety of forms of development. It is something different, where ahead of the possibilities is Impossibility (a word not to be found in our theoretical vocabulary); something different, wherein could appear—or not—fundamentally new, unpredictable possibilities going beyond the former norm and former anti-norm. Necessarily, beyond both!

In this case it is clear why we are so much in need today of this concept, which has also its Russian counterpart, but which is, however, too "simple" to be used, namely, choice. I will return to it. But meanwhile let us ask: why are we so in need of an "alternative" now? And where has it come from? We, however, are historians and know that the key to an intractable subject is sought in its genealogy, in its genesis. Why does today's "round table" not peer deep into the well and ask itself: is homo sapiens alternative, and if so, primordially so? I do not intend proposing an answer, the learning of many specialists and debate with their participation are needed for this. But I am convinced that this question cannot be avoided, and, besides, in anticipation of the 21st century, which will have to decide anew whether the homo species itself will be or not be. It seems that this will be the final choice.

However, the historical "sources" did not, after all, arise one after the other in a void, they also had to have had a "moment" of their "origin". It stands to reason. The alternative in this specifying sense had its "proto," and this cannot fail to preoccupy us seeking a new "proto". I shall confine myself to two brief observations: the first, concerning the primitive state. Our Hegelian positivism (I hope this word combination offends no one) attributes all that is behind us to what has literally been overcome, and if it is still encountered in some exotic or converted forms, serving by these "living vestiges" as the rule of contraries, as it were, it shows that what was has departed—once for all—from the world process, from irreversible historical time. Consequently, what is more archaic has departed most irretrievably. I believe that this is by no means an innocent prejudice but a most stubborn stumbling block now preventing cognition by the past of the universal future.

We historians are still living in our "pre-Freudian" phase, as it were. No, I am not talking about the subconscious, not about psychoanalysis (it is fashionable), but about the methodological lag in our own sphere. We still have to acknowledge, it seems to me, that the primordial nature of the social animal called man is not only a phase negotiated by *all* (peoples and civilizations) but also the first principle of all current existences, whose complete removal not only is not possible but not even necessary. And what is there—in the first principle? Let us suppose that it is a qualitatively new variety of the trial and error "method" characteristic in one way or another of all that is living. Man will merely try in another way and err in another way. There too some

people will try in a different way, will make mistakes in a different way to others. More often? Or over and above all differences? Both and yet a third, probably, no longer quantitative. A different attitude toward them, and this, perhaps, is what is most important. There would grow from the errors something new going beyond the framework of the "genetic memory". An insecure something! Possible to prosper, possible to sink. Somewhere there arise there blame without guilt, and retribution without responsibility; somewhere alongside (centuries, millennia!), the *discovery* of death and its "rediscovery" in life somewhat akin to the discovery of slavery and its rediscovery in liberty. And to whom should we turn for corroboration and clarification of what has been said if not to the ancient Greeks forming the boundary between man living in the cosmic world and man entering history (life in history!). Is that not why the world of the classical Hellene is futile without a tragedy whose hero, in the excellent definition of Ya.E. Golosovker, is "more often than not a determined criminal willy-nilly."

What, it might be asked, has this to do with an alternative, a choice? I would say that choice has its ontogenesis, that choice, in embryo, is *personal*, and, being personal, cannot remain cooped up in an individual, on the contrary: it needs space, it is straining for implementation, it is endowed with the property of converting its "prematurity" into necessity, momentum and obligatoriness and is for this reason forced to reckon with the given. The alternative, consequently, is both less and further than nonacceptance, than denial. It aspires to escape into the "boundless" and is simultaneously realized in compromise: in a modification of that which exists.

The transition from the rudiments of an alternative to it as such is not, of course, a one-act play. Here is the place to introduce *history*, one of the decisive, if not the most decisive, definition of which is: the conversion of an alternative "proto" into the flesh and blood of human progressiveness. Into a different flesh and a different blood! One could insert the period, seemingly: if history is always alternative, that is, constantly capable of choice, what is the need for this last concept. It is possible to switch directly to an examination of specific situations. However, there is a snag here also. Since the time when history arrived in the true sense (and not simply all that changes in time) through as long as it remains history, it may with equal right be said of the alternative: it is and it is not. It comes in order to depart, and departs in order to return. And we cannot help but learn to discern its "fingerprints". Pertaining to these primarily are changes in speech, which are noticeable only to those who themselves have not lost their keenness of hearing.... No one, most likely, will maintain that at the sources of the concept of an alternative was an "author"—in the singular. But authors there were. At least two mysterious persons, whose Word-Deed was preserved inasmuch as it stirred to thought and action others, initially tens or hundreds, ultimately, millions, of people. One of them was Socrates, the loyal citizen of

Athens. He did not infringe the exclusive (but not closed) community of the equi-imperious, just as he did not infringe the last step of human life. But by his "know thyself" he modified the speech (and thereby the character!) of polis man. Not immediately. Not directly. But what would we have done without him, without Socrates' hemlock, which imposed a moral veto on the city-state's method of maintaining equilibrium by banishment. Would there have been without this not only Plato's philosophy but also Plato's utopia, and if a line is drawn across the centuries, would there have been Hellenic syncretism: the meeting of civilizations? Not immediately. Not directly. And along the way—the campaigns of Alexander of Macedon, tormented peoples, their repulse, and from the repulse, a growing new connection—and new "inner wall". If Hellenism was the alternative to the city-state losing itself in the conversion into the Mediterranean World, what was the alternative to this "would-be" alternative if not a rupture with the world, if not a "rebellion" against the ethnos and against the sect, if not the sudden demand for all-humanity? Golgotha, the punishment intended for slaves, imposed a moral veto on slavery, on "natural" inequality in general. A boundary? Rather. But still not an alternative. Ahead still was a compromise which produced Christianity and Christian powers and imbibed also the *Lex Romana*, and by a line across the Middle Ages (and imbibing it)—a new meeting with "first principles" and a new challenge: in the phases and forms of the classical revolution of the 18th-start of the 19th centuries, and a new compromise imprinted in the Code Napoleon, a compromise which produced, the "reform revolution," the triumph of empirical knowledge, machine civilization and so forth.

In short, in updated terminology—a change of "formations," transitions from... to...? Not entirely. And entirely not even when one is dealing with a completed pattern. The alternative is contra-indicated by the very concept of "transition," this pragmatized pre-indication of the world process. Of course, if capitalism emerged in Europe, where did it come from, if not from the feudal Middle Ages (I speak about this transition inasmuch as all preceding transitions had also been built "beneath it")? Indeed, where did bourgeois civilization come from? But this is the trouble. Studies show that feudalism had exhausted itself by the 14th-15th centuries, that substantial social fragments began to fall away from this equiponderant world, that absolutism, which, in turn, entered into a dispute with the local liberties and rights without which the Middle Ages cannot be understood, attempted, and not unsuccessfully at first, with itself to make up for the lost hierarchized wholeness of the Middle Ages, and that this dispute, intensifying to the point of a direct clash, could not be resolved within the framework of an "intermediate" condition, within the framework of a system agreed on for itself. Capitalism "somehow emerged," Marx observed in the first draft of "Das Kapital". Somehow, precisely! Up to a certain level, from itself. By the negation of denial—in the Hegelian sense, which, if one thinks about it, was

"merely" a giant extrapolation of a European-world introduction and gesture to all-human development. We will agree with Hegel and part company with him on one point of capital importance: in respect of utopia. Is it surprising that Hegel replaced pure reason, sowing good as a counterweight to evil, and Rousseau's "social contract," compromised by the guillotine, with the odyssey of the Absolute Spirit? He did not, however, have to go cap in hand to triumphant commonsense—the heir to the self-propulsion of the revolution cut short by Thermidor.

Now it is customary not so much to reject utopia even as to abuse it. Should not this abuse be extended to history, to historical man? This would at least be consistent. Just as it was consistent (from the standpoints of abuse) to reject the French Revolution from its first steps, and not only from 1793, inasmuch as we were observing in its initial phase even a kind of symbiosis of insufficiency and surfeit: while not yet having matured to the point of anti-absolutism, the revolution already contained an egalitarian embryo going far beyond the limits of the so-called prerequisites (is this not why the outsider Marat was so "inappropriate" for this phase?). The fundamental singularity of the phenomenon of revolution is that it creates its own prerequisites by its own movement, but this is why Thermidor (in the broad sense) is incorporated within this phenomenon inasmuch as by its contra it fixes and consolidates as a norm what could not be a norm without the utopian "madness" of revolution. And this norm, in its own way, is also without a limit inasmuch as the heirs to the revolution are (cruel rule!) not the direct continuers (in the "French" case, all of Europe headed by Britain); and these aggregate, although not united, heirs discover the power of expansion: the extension of what has been conquered, endeavoring to subordinate to it, spiritually and materially, the entire many-sided planet. The compromise-alternative makes the results of the revolution inexorable. A failure to recognize this means either falling into the trap of apologetics or the trap of retrospective castigation, but there are mixed, "arithmetical-mean" traps also. It seems to me that I.M. Klyamkin fell into one such in his historical publicistics. There are, however, more simplistic versions also—like the idea of the healthy Russian proclivity for "revolutions from the top," which have with regular fury been impeded by Russian utopians in a hurry.

I have already touched on this subject in written and, partly, in printed form. I will therefore permit myself in conclusion to be telegraphically brief. In speaking of Socrates and Christianity, the revolution of Pure Reason and the guillotine and the developing abolition which came out of it—non-European commonsense—I am by no means endeavoring to "hint" at our revolution with its results and tragedies. What hints there already are.... I was thinking about it—what else can a man of my age and profession think about? Arguing with me, Ye.G. Plimak said that in 1917 there was an alternative to the

Bolshevik revolution—in the shape of manorial-bourgeois monarchical counterrevolution. I would be prepared to agree with him at once if only he dropped the word "alternative". Confrontation, yes. Desperate bloody clash, yes. And with an outcome not predetermined in advance, yes. But where is the room here for that which is different, "beyond the bounds" and at the same time capable of becoming a part of the daily round and taking root in it? There are two polar views of October and its era, polar, but methodologically essentially common. According to one, our revolution is exhausted by the regular embodiment of the ideas of Lenin and Bolshevism; according to the second, it was the result of an apical coup accomplished by people who were better organized than others and most capable of manipulating the masses. What is to me unacceptable in these guidelines, if one overlooks the value aspect? The one-dimensional nature of the view failing to spot the different roots and different images of this cataclysm, which shifted the terrestrial axis. Different! There is here the proletarian storm and the "Russian rebellion, senseless and merciless". Here also the age-old scores of "high-born and low-born" and the utopian breakthrough into the unknown. And not simply alongside but together, in the same people even. Any civil war is fratricide. But a new normality of existence may not emerge from any fratricide. Whatever may be said about Lenin, he did the maximum possible for a man who had placed in the scales of fratricide his thought and will in order to make the revolution qualified and the qualified source of world revolution. He moved—but did not reach—from the counterweight to the "continuous knife-fight" to an alternative to October itself: to a multistructure norm, to "reform" socialism, to the lasting temporal (an era!) civilizer's cause. Moved, but did not reach. He, and Russia too: they moved and did not reach. The place of the new commonsense was taken by a vampire, who made total violence the "norm".

It is easy confusing responsibility with blame. There come from this muddle not only disagreements but also, one after the other, fits of mutual rejection. This is why this strange word "alternative" is with us like a knife point. Necessary and dangerous.

In November 1917, at the height of the desperate arguments concerning ways to hold on to power, Lenin hurled at his opponents the question-cum -reproach: "We are told that we wish to 'introduce' socialism—this is absurd. We have no wish to make peasant socialism. We are told that we need to 'stop'. But this is impossible. It is even said that we are not Soviet power. Who, then, are we?"

Official record, not an autograph. But the intonation is genuine. But the question exudes life. The same question which we are making efforts to answer today.

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[Text] G.G. Vodolazov. The "humanity" and "alternative" concepts should be the two main "passwords" of modern historical and sociological scholarship. An alternative is the dialectical unity of necessity and freedom, a choice based on the objective logic of history. I believe that all of history needs to be described as the history of the tying and untying of knots of alternatives, and not merely as the development of cause and effect connections. And the present day should be understood in the context of alternativeness.

Was there in our country an alternative to Stalinism? The answer to this question is very important because, specifically, two extreme approaches, equally superficial, in my view, have been showing through in recent publications. The supporters of one viewpoint believe that there was, of course, an alternative—there were, after all, such figures as Frunze, Rudzutak, Bukharin, Kirov, that is, the alternative is constructed in accordance with some personal criteria. Others believe that there was no alternative to Stalinism and that, granted all the "costs," Stalinism ensured the solution of the problems facing the country.

In reality, however, it would seem to me, Stalinism resolved nothing. It was a pseudo-answer to the challenge of the times, a pseudo-solution, which subsequently brought the country to an impasse. The precrisis and crisis situation which we encountered in the mid-1980's was a consequence of the choice made at the end of the 1920's. A political regime cannot, however, be "deduced" from the traits of the personality of Stalin, as of other leaders. The more so in that Stalin and his views evolved. We recall, for example, that in 1927 he occupied positions close to those of Bukharin. But what happened subsequently? In order to answer this question we need to view deep-lying processes—the movement of enormous social and political forces and their clashes.

The alternative of the end of the 1920's was very complex. The unusual nature of the situation was determined not only by the new situational factors which had emerged at that time—in domestic economic life and in the international arena. The distinctiveness of the moment was largely the result of the political struggle, which had been under way in the Bolshevik Party since 1923. The fight with the Trotskyites was the essential fork here.

In my view, it is more correct posing the question not of whether there was an alternative to Stalinism but of whether there was an alternative to the command-administrative system (I accept this only as a working term for it is very conditional). I would recall that the first—unsuccessful—attempts at the creation of such a system had been made by Trotsky in 1923. And it was a question, what is more, not of the Stalin—hypocritical—version of barracks socialism but of a very honest, I would say, theoretical model. In formulating it Trotsky

said candidly that our aim was socialism and the fate of the proletariat and that everything else should "manure" the soil for them. The proletariat's "right" to exploit the peasantry, as far as punishment companies and concentration camps, was openly justified. As is known, Trotsky's proposals were opposed by Bukharin (primarily), Zinoviev, Kamenev and Stalin (more weakly). Bukharin showed brilliantly that the methods proposed by Trotsky and his supporters were contrary to the principles of socialism.

Why was it possible to push through in 1929 what had failed in 1923? In order to understand this it is necessary first of all to trace the evolution of two lines, two streams, two tendencies in the Russian revolutionary movement. The first—democratic—proceeds from Radishchev through Dobrolyubov and Chernyshevskiy to Lenin, uniting the developed part of the working class, the progressive intelligentsia and all who were devoted to the idea of the independence of the people's masses. The second stream is composed of ideologues of the Nechayev and Tkachev type and the strata and groups thrown to the bottom of life. They were carried on a wave of revolutionary protest against the exploiter system. However, their downtrodden and oppressed character was inserted in converted form in the new society. The nature of the sociopolitical activity of such forces is authoritarian, and its results are totally destructive.

After October 1917 Lenin had constantly to oppose authoritarian slogans and aspirations in the most varied spheres of social life. And the old party guard supported these protests. However, the ranks of the Lenin guard were thinning, and it had weakened itself by endless argument. Moving to the political forefront were people of an entirely different mold—of the Zhdanov, Kaganovich type and others. And this reflected the course of the clashes of the two mass social forces described above and the preponderance of authoritarian tendencies. It is for this reason that the victory of Stalinism cannot be explained at the level of an analysis of personal traits, intrigues, emotional experiences and so forth.

Of course, Bukharin's ideas did not constitute a full, consummate alternative to the development of Soviet society. But they pointed in the right direction. Society still lacked sufficient forces capable of developing, adopting and realizing Lenin's democratic alternative. Such forces have now matured. Awakening them and uniting and stimulating them—this is the most important task. We need to see here that the struggle of democratic and authoritarian tendencies in society is a reality. And those who do not understand this and call on all to embrace one another are preparing for society a version of neo-Stalinism.

Yu.A. Levada. It would be difficult, in my view, to find a more appropriate topic for a session devoted to M.Ya. Gefter's birthday. Not only by his theoretical reasoning but the entire nature of his activity Gefter has been an

example of how an alternative is posed and realized by a true scholar and man under conditions which were long imagined to be the sole possible ones and without an alternative.

The particular importance of the elaboration of the idea of alternativeness for us is determined by a domestic tradition with very deep roots. I am talking about the tradition of understanding the history of society as some movement along a single line—forward or back. The place of Clio in the historian's figurative system is replaced by a train whose movement may only be accelerated or slowed down.

The sources of this unilinear perception of the historical process go back to the era of the Russian Enlightenment, and this perception has been typical of generations of our historians, and economists also—left and right, radicals and liberals and Westernizers and, to a considerable extent, anti-Westernizers. Even with the most radical thinkers the ideas of struggle against the train did not go beyond the framework of the train model. And even today the idea concerning the unilinear nature of historical movement hangs over our consciousness and is revealed in the works of the most worthy, respected authors.

It seems to me that the idea of the unilinear approach strengthened in the mind because domestic history was seen as a series of "tasks" which had to be "accomplished". There were the tasks of reaching the sea and matching in terms of military power Britain, the "empress of the seas"; later the tasks of collectivizing the country, industrializing it and so forth were advanced. And it was suggested that history be evaluated merely in accordance with how it "accomplished" this "task" or the other.

This approach was evidently connected with the fact that Russia was constantly having to "catch up" with someone in something. The function of our fatherland was seen as continuous and general "catching up". But why did we never manage to catch up with and, even more, overtake anyone? Why did we always see merely the lights of the last car of the competitor-country's departing train? Insufficient forces? No! The tasks themselves were impracticable and unrealistically set.

Obviously, owing to the long predominance of the approach to history as a series of "tasks," particularly favorable soil evolved in Russia (particularly by the end of the 19th century) for the spread of vulgarized forms of West European progressivism, which, as is known, portrayed history as some smooth, punctual forward movement toward a predetermined goal.

I am asked: how does the task of "catching up" and "overtaking" appear today? After all, we have secured, for example, nuclear parity with the United States. Yes, we have the missiles. But the main thing is comparing

what this parity has cost us and the Americans. We overtook others long since in the smelting of pig iron and steel. But what did this cost us, and what has this "gross" really given us?

And here I turn to the next aspect of the alternativeness problem—the correlation of end and means. Victories which are won at too high a price are not victories, they lead to an impasse. In principle the result is always equal to the means employed to achieve the end. In addition, it is the means and methods and their character which determine what is obtained and which engender the result. Thus command-administrative methods of administration created a sluggish system of management, with which it is proving so difficult to break today.

It is frequently said that we can dispose of the future, but have no power over the past. This is not entirely accurate. The possibility of rereading our own biography and interpreting and reinterpreting history expresses the degree of our present freedom. Of course, we are not free to "abrogate" historical facts but have to evaluate and draw conclusions anew, on the basis of the accumulated experience thereof. It is impossible to operate today without this. And nothing must be forgotten. Let us follow the great Pushkin:

...And reading my life with revulsion,
I tremble and curse,
And complain bitterly and bitterly shed tears,
But do not the sad lines expunge.

In examining alternatives—realized and unrealized—we should not, nonetheless, approach history as a network of railroads with junctions, from which predetermined routes branch out. History is a field in which the most varied directions of movement, more or less probable, are possible. And this probability ultimately depends on the correlation of social forces at this moment or the other.

Discussion of the problem of alternatives in our press has been concentrated recently around the events of the end of the 1920's and the struggle within the Bolshevik Party leadership. In my view, this is leading to an artificial narrowing of the field of vision. To speak of our contemporary history, there have been many pivotal moments and points, great and small, of pronounced or imperceptible choice. I mention merely 1914. The spring of 1917 was an alternative situation. I agree that there was no alternative to October. But was it strictly, absolutely determined? The year of 1939, which was a most essential fork in our and all world development, afforded a wide spectrum of possibilities.

In conclusion I would like to take issue with M.Ya. Gefter. In his well-known interview (*Rabochiy klass i sovremennyy mir* [RK i SM] No 1, 1988) he called Stalin (not directly, true, with reservations) a tragic figure. He was, I believe, more a blind tool of history. Its collective tragic subject were the people, the millions of victims of Stalin's terror. If, however, we are speaking of the tragic

element of personalities in our century, we need primarily to mention the name of Lenin. But he was not simply a tool of history but its builder and creator.

G.G. Diligenskiy. The subject of the dispute concerning the alternative character (or multi-variant nature) of historical development has not yet, it seems to me, been formulated with sufficient clarity. Participants in the debate are at times speaking about different things. What is discussed in M.Ya. Gefter's extraordinarily profound reflections on the alternatives of the post-revolution period? He says that in the 1920's the choice was between product exchange and the market, between communism based on poverty and patient work from the rudiments ("found from scratch"); further, "between... the blind impulse of development seeking and establishing the new (not one, not two!) and a self-perpetuating monopoly of power whose credo was might at any price" ("Stalin Died Yesterday...", RK i SM No 1, 1988, pp 122-123). It is obviously a question here of versions, which objectively, potentially, existed, of the country's economic and sociopolitical development. The supporters, however, of "uni-variant" history—we turn, for example, to I.M. Klyamkin's article (VOPROSY FILOSOFII No 9, 1988)—transfer the question to a different plane—to the sphere of social psychology. As far as the brief journal exposition of his paper permits us to judge this author's concept, he explains the non-alternative nature of the history of the 1920's-1930's by the "communal type of personality" predominant at that time not only in the country but in the town also; for representatives of this type the Stalin administrative system, I.M. Klyamkin maintains, "was considerably more acceptable than the NEP."

I.M. Klyamkin's undoubted contribution is that he had understood that the problem of an alternative in history cannot be resolved without addressing the actual man and the socially typical individual mentality. An alternative exists merely to the extent that it may be found both in objective reality and within us! I.M. Klyamkin is also right in saying that an important prerequisite of the formation of the authoritarian system were the traditions of the mass consciousness inherited from prerevolution peasant Russia: the weakness therein of democratic values, the orientation toward a hierarchical political arrangement ("the authorities are more visible"), wage-leveling ideals and so forth. But the indication of these traditions answers by no means the question which I.M. Klyamkin asks: was there an alternative to Stalinism? Rather it helps us understand why this alternative was not realized.

In order to have avoided such a substitution of the problem and to have analyzed precisely the possibility of an alternative he should not have confined himself to distinguishing the "predominant type" (even if it is allowed that it is a correct definition) but have ascertained other non-dominating types of social and personal mentality also. But the scholar chose another, far more primitive method and employed essentially the "base

personality" concept, which was once discovered by cultural anthropologists and which is suitable, possibly, for an analysis of static primitive-communal or ancient oriental societies, but by no means the Russia of the 20th century! Even the prereform serf Russian peasantry was far from psychologically monolithic, it containing both Khor'i and Kalynichi. And later it passed through the development of capitalism and the Stolypin reform, three revolutions and a civil war and the initial years of the NEP, in a word, it experienced a multitude of processes which intensified its social and psychological stratification and enriched its character with increasingly new personality types. How can this diversity be reduced to a common "communal type"?

It is even more difficult fitting in such a Procrustean bed the mentality and ideological-political character of the urban, including worker, population, which in the 1920's was no longer composed merely of people from the countryside and had in its composition both hereditary proletarians and workers with a length of service going back to before the revolution, for whom primary democratism was a part of their own experience. And if, as I.M. Klyamkin believes, the despotism of Stalin's power was acceptable to all these heterogeneous masses, it is incomprehensible why the former needed to swell the repression and punitive machinery and the GULAG, set different strata of the working population against one another, banish millions of peasants to Siberia and thoroughly "comb through" the industrial working class, particularly the politically active part thereof.

For an analysis of the sociopolitical sources of historical alternatives it is important to consider not only the intra-group heterogeneousness of the mass consciousness but also the diversity and contradictoriness of the tendencies characteristic of the individual mentality—motives, notions and orientations of the personality. And however unusual M.Ya. Gefter's idea concerning the "severed wholeness" of Lenin's thought and the historic choice "made within him" sounds to us, this idea is, however, basically profound and warranted. The "alternative character" of the potentialities of the individual mentality, well known to psychological science, remains, unfortunately, mainly outside of the field of vision of our social science studying the normalities and mechanisms of the historical process. Touching on spheres of the social consciousness, it too often exhibits superficial psychological dilettantism facilitating for it the construction of strict outlines and fatally predetermined and the "sole possible" types of mass or group mentality and behavior.

A version of this approach is the "statistical" method, which, as we see in the example of I.M. Klyamkin, takes into consideration only the numerically preponderant. I believe that such statistics, manifestly unsuitable for ascertaining potential alternatives, are far from faultless as a method of explaining the actual course of history

also. In many, particularly pivotal, historical situations the actions of a minority are far more "destiny-laden" than the sluggishness of the majority.

The question of why a particular development trend gains the ascendancy over others may be solved only by an analysis of specific situations always representing a unique coupling of factors operating at different—economic, social, psychological, political—levels of historical reality. It is this coupling which stimulates and imparts this relative significance or the other to various tendencies of the social mentality and various types of personality. Thus in the specific course of our history of the 1920's individual attributes of the leaders and the nature of the machinery of power which evolved after the revolution and its relations with society, particular features of the political experience and political culture of the ruling party, specifically, the spread of the principles of strict hierarchical discipline to the sphere of intellectual-cognitive activity, and much, much else played their part. It was the interaction of all these features which "unleashed" and stimulated the development of particular types of mass mentality and stifled and hammered deep down other types thereof.

Yu.A. Burtin. As formulated very precisely by M.Ya. Gefter in his article "Stalin Died Yesterday....," Stalinism deprived our society of an alternative. Deprived it for a long period—this period continues essentially to the present day. Society found itself in a situation where it decisively chose nothing in its fate, it being deprived of this possibility: the state, the authorities decided for it. And all components of the political system served to ensure that it remain thus always. This may be called totalitarianism, Gefter's word "non-alternativeness" may be used. All this is sufficiently clear. It is more important to think about the periods of transformations, of the attempts to restore an alternative to our development which have occurred in Soviet history. There are two such attempts in our memory. If we do not count the would-be economic reform of the latter half of the 1960's, these were the Khrushchev period and the one in which we are living today.

I believe it may be maintained that the defeat of Khrushchev and the failure of his attempt at perestroika were connected to a tremendous extent with the fact that, as in the Stalin times, the process of transformations was without an alternative in the sense that the leaders of the party and the country at that time brooked no counter-proposals to their decisions and their understanding of the tasks and ends and means. Testimony to this were, specifically, the dressings-down which Nikita Sergeyevich gave our intelligentsia from time to time, thereby reproducing the former, Stalinist norm of relations with it, although, in other, not bloody, forms, of course. But the trouble was that society offered it no alternative, nor did the intelligentsia. In any event, it failed to put forward in any definite, clearly formulated form a program countering what was being done at the top. Of course, the intellectual product of the end of the

1950's-first half of the 1960's, say, was radically different from what it had been in the 1930's, when virtually all literature (to take as an example the field best known to me) really fitted the definition "socialist realism" which had appeared at that time. It was only at that time, incidentally, that this definition was, I believe, realistic. Subsequently it became an empty shell, but at that time it expressed the unity, if not of the whole people, of the conscious, so to speak, part thereof and, finally, the state. The paradox was that it was this most conscious, civilically active part of society which renounced its own thought to the greatest extent and joyously, sincerely reiterated the same that was being said "from on high".

In the 1950's things were completely different, but then also, and later, in the 1960's, our intelligentsia offered society, the state and the leadership no alternative to what was being done. And now, with hindsight, I feel in some sense sorry for Khrushchev: while recalling how he did not wish to listen to anyone, I nonetheless feel before him something akin to a belated feeling of guilt. I feel sorry for a person who initially did so much that was good. We recall not only the 20th congress but also Khrushchev's earlier steps, particularly the CPSU Central Committee September 1953 Plenum, which for the first time opened our eyes to the position of the ransacked countryside. Much good came from this man. And then before our eyes he would then make mistake after mistake, which would lead to his well-known finale. And not one voice was heard explaining if only to Khrushchev himself, let alone society, how dangerous was the path he had chosen....

Some of the participants in today's discussion have observed that one does not mount the same experiment twice. Throughout the last 30 years we have been mounting the same experiment for a second time. Today we have (at least, we say we have) glasnost and quite a large diversity of opinion. But, as before, our intelligentsia has failed to offer its program of perestroika or, even better, several alternative programs, among which a conscious choice would be possible.

I.B. Levin. If perestroika has begun to develop most rapidly in the sphere of the consciousness, this is explained not least by the first breakthrough in the ideological sphere in the 1950's-1960's and some "store" of ideas preserved from that brief period. A gulp of oxygen at that time was undoubtedly the conference in the International Workers Movement Institute in the spring of 1967 in remembrance of Antonio Gramsci. One of the most memorable speeches thereat was that of M.Ya. Gefter.

Gramsci's ideas have penetrated our consciousness unevenly, in waves, and interest in his legacy, moreover, has risen at times of a revival of creative thought in Soviet social science. More precisely, this interest has itself been testimony to our awakening. According to recent information from the Library imeni V.I. Lenin, Gramsci comes in terms of the number of readers'

inquiries immediately after Marx, Engels and Lenin. Had his "Letters From Prison" been translated more fully and better explicated to the reading public, the processes of ossification might not, possibly, have affected our social disciplines so profoundly.

The idea of the alternative and different-version nature of social development permeates all A. Gramsci's reflection on history. Hardly anything evoked in him such repulsion as the attempts to create (or revive) the "fatalist flavor" and crude determinism introduced to Marxism by the orthodox of the Second International.

Alternativeness in history was connected for the author of the "Letters From Prison" with Marx's set of methodological instruments itself. Extraordinarily indicative is his repeated appeal to Marx's reinterpretation of the theoretical heritage of British classical political economy, particularly, D. Ricardo with his law of the tendency of the rate of profit to diminish. Marxism, Gramsci thought, perceived not only specifically the substantive aspect of this law but also, primarily, its "innovative-philosophical," "gnoseological significance" returning to the normalities of history precisely their tendency and probability nature. Thus understood, these normalities primordially contain a permanent "area of freedom" and a supplement of conscious will and collective energy.

It is significant that M.Ya. Gefter chose for his speech precisely that—celebrated—fragment of the "Letters From Prison" ("Foresight and Perspective") in which Gramsci flies particularly passionately in the face of the determinist distortion of the Marxist view of history; a distortion reducing this view simply to the "ascertainment of permanent laws like laws of the natural sciences." The scientific nature of the foresight of the historical perspective is inseparable from the political and party program "of he who foresees" and his resolve "to implement it by his strong will."

Today the view of alternativeness—as the multi-variant nature of the historical process—is being restored in our social science in all its organic complexity. It is our good fortune that M.Ya. Gefter is an active participant in these efforts. And once again his pronouncements are fruitfully interacting with the thoughts of Antonio Gramsci. I would recall that past years have not been cloudless for the elaboration of Gramsci's ideological and theoretical inheritance even in his homeland. This applies particularly to the end of the 1970's-start of the 1980's—a time when the forced retreat of Italy's workers movement and its retirement onto the defensive showed through perfectly distinctly not only as the result of the change in the trends common to the whole capitalist world but also as a consequence of miscalculations and the limited nature of the movement itself in its preceding, victorious segment of the 1960's-1970's. Many books and articles of Italian figures of parties and unions of the left have been devoted to a self-critical analysis of the causes of this limitation. This makes it possible to

turn at once to a central issue which has arisen here: what has survived and what has failed to stand the test of time from Gramsci's principles of the strategy of the communist parties and forces of the left?

Primarily, of course, the question concerns the problem of hegemony. Gramsci developed his theory of hegemony in the wake of Lenin, analyzing both the pre- and post-October experience of Russia; he developed it with reference to the Western world with its civil society, practically excluding the likelihood of victory as a result of a one-time revolutionary onslaught. Whence an in-depth study of the junctions and centers of intellectual-spiritual influence whose possession—before the capture of political power included—could secure for the revolutionary forces hegemony, that is, control with the consent of the controlled.

Naturally, Gramsci performed his search for the sake of his own—communist—party and the class behind it (the "dependent social group," in the coded terminology of the "Letters From Prison"). Objectively the result of his search here—the theory of hegemony—was an alternative to all the versions of the dictatorship of the proletariat which had been tested by that time (and subsequently also). However, the difference remained not completely elucidated. The theoretical outline of hegemony and its social referent continued many years after Gramsci's death also to be perceived indissolubly, which not only fed the suspicions of significant numbers of society (in the same Italy, for example) that this hegemony was simply a rehashed dictatorship of the proletariat but also damaged the theoretical analysis proper. I will venture to maintain that it was just such sociologization of the theory (against which, incidentally, Gramsci had warned), which straightened out the diversity of social development to one essentially non-variant line, which caused the contradiction reflected at the turn of the 1970's-1980's. On the one hand the PCI, under the burden of the changed social and political circumstances, hastily, drawing onto itself increasingly severe reproaches from Moscow,^{***} was assimilating—as the core of its own program—the values of democracy and pluralism. On the other, its strategy was based, as before, on the hegemony of one particular social group. This is why for a certain time Gramsci's theory of hegemony—this, at least, was the impression of a person who followed the left press in Italy at that time—found itself relegated to the background, as it were.

The idea constantly present in M.Ya. Gefter and supplementing, as it were, another favorite proposition of his: concerning choice as the specific filling of the alternative, would seem incomparably more productive in this case. This idea is about self-change. The self-change of the subject of social action, "he who foresees". About his conversion, transformation—specifically, under the impact of the results of his own struggle and conquests. In his note on the British miners' general strike in 1912 Lenin deemed it possible to write: "...following the coal-miners' strike, the British proletariat is no longer the

same. ...There has been a change in the correlation of social forces in Britain which cannot be expressed in figures...." But how many—and of what kind!—strikes and other social conflicts have shaken the Western world since then! In Italy alone, for example, and only in the "hot" 1970's, not once and not twice strikes encompassed the country's entire gainfully employed population. Is it conceivable that after all this the social referent of Gramscian strategy has remained the same as six decades ago?

Now an understanding of that which is new which has been introduced by life and history to the social structure of society and, at the same time, to the vision of the social perspective is blazing a trail for itself at an accelerated pace in the consciousness of both Italian and Soviet Marxist scholars. True, more as theory catching up with policy, and not the other way about, unfortunately. Years have been let slip, and they cannot be brought back. In an explanation of what happened with us superficial analogies can hardly be avoided. "We must prevent this mind from functioning for 20 years," the prosecutor demanded at Gramsci's trial. But are prohibitions alone to blame for the fact that for two decades most vital, searching thought was with us driven into the channel of karst rivers?

V.Ye. Ronkin. In speaking of alternatives we should, in my view, speak about the problem of dialogue.

Dialogue presupposes a certain exchange of information and, consequently, nonidentical positions of the participants in communication. A monologue, on the contrary, presupposes unification of the participants in intercourse in some "we" and their identification with one another. The purpose of a monologue is adaptation of man's psyche to the environment, the purpose of a collective monologue, adaptation of the psyche of its participants to one another and the entry of each individual "I" into a supra-individual "we". In my younger days the combination of words "All as one!" which became a cliché, would be seen in the newspapers frequently.

When it is a question of dialogue, it is assumed in advance that the "truth," the conclusion at which the parties to the dialogue will arrive, is not known in advance and that it may be arrived at only through argument and discussion. A monologue, on the other hand, presupposes a truth known in advance, and its participants are introduced to it via ritual.

I would like to dwell on the role of this mode of communication or the other in different cultures. Cultures oriented primarily toward the transformation of the external environment are based on cooperation and dialogue. In transforming the external environment man cannot fail to counterpose himself to it as the subject-transformer to the object of transformation. In adapting his psyche to the environment man is oriented toward

unity with it; the more active the process of this adaptation, the more blurred the boundary between the individual "ego" and the outside world proves, and for this reason the world ceases to be "outside".

European culture has preferred dialogue. This was manifested in the Athenian court, which was conducted with the participation of both a prosecutor and a defender, and in Plato's dialogues. There was at that time the distinct idea that the unity of the city-state could be based only on the cooperation of its social groups—the demos and the aristocrats (in Rome, the patricians and the plebs)—the difference in whose interests was perceived as something which was taken for granted.

The concept of the individual as some phenomenon opposed to the collective "we"—the crowd, the masses—is an undoubted gain of European culture.

The progress of individualism has at all times, however odd this may seem, gone hand in hand with the progress of humanism. There is nothing odd in this, of course, incidentally. Only the notion of oneself as an undoubted value may engender the notion of "another" as something which objectively exists and possessing not only its own "ego" but also moral right to its preservation and defense. Unity with those around one, on the other hand, creates the idea of the certainty of symbols, the idea of the "sole correct," and this certainty cannot be anything other than a projection of one's subjective attitude toward the world onto this world.

In the history of Russia the unity of monologue always prevailed over the cooperation of dialogue. An aggressor represented not that much greater a danger than the defender against aggression—the state. The aggressor, if successful, replaced the former feudal lord, the intestine strife ended, and everything once again took its place. This was the case in Rus with the arrival of the Varangians. If nomads were the neighbors, it was a different matter. They had no intention of farming on the captured land, and the victory of nomads was synonymous with the annihilation of everything living. Under these conditions the state and, together with it, the psychological perception of the collective "we" assumed the nature of highest value (European culture was characterized by an attitude toward the state as a necessary evil).

Throughout its whole state history virtually dialogue was possible in Russia only with others, with those who from a misunderstanding did not as yet constitute a part of the Russian Empire. Any attempt at dialogue "within" was perceived as open rebellion, as a betrayal not only of the sovereign and the state but of the entire community implying the collective "we"—the people, nation and mankind.

Nor were the other, revolutionary forces of society disposed toward dialogue. Any dialogue presupposes compromise—mutual concessions. It is significant that in Russia compromise was seen (and is still seen now by

some people) not as a necessary condition of cooperation but as a temporary retreat. It was not for nothing that such a word as "opportunism" (Latin, "convenient," "beneficial") acquired in Russia a clearly expressed negative value.

Monologue thinking frequently confuses dialogue with monologue, attempting to find new information where there obviously cannot be such. Under today's conditions of the rapid development of science and technology and active contacts between different cultures and communities an orientation toward unity as the determining factor of people's interaction may lead only to negative consequences—S&T stagnation and the degradation of culture and morality. The monologue frequently becomes a fiction, and its participants, incapable under today's conditions of like-mindedness, only create a semblance of unity.

It has long been time to learn dialogue between society and the state. Alas, we are not learning particularly successfully as yet. Who should be the first to begin? Pride is inappropriate here, it is a manifestation of monologue thinking, when compromise is considered a retreat, and not the normal mode of relations in a civilized world.

Whoever is the cleverer should begin. Whoever understands that the transition from monologue to dialogue is a complex problem which cannot be solved in one day.

O.R. Kvirkveliya. The increased interest in alternatives has led to an appreciable blurring of this concept. What is understood by alternative today is anything one wishes: a fork on the road of the historical process, the capacity of thinking for evaluating options, real and imaginary, the latent possibility of choice, some force opposed to the victorious one. At the same time, however, it is pointed out that alternatives may be used and unused (although, in the second case to what are they alternatives?), that they may change qualitatively, that the possibility of their realization may be present or absent. This dissent requires if only a formal standardization of the concept or, at least, an analysis of its use.

Choice presupposes the existence of objects of choice recognized as such and the criteria, purpose, procedure, subject and mechanism of realization of the choice. Our discussion has centered mainly on the objects of choice, rarely touching on the subject of its criteria and aims. The maximization of human good, given a minimization of human costs, that is, a highly blurred parameter, is advanced as the criterion of choice here. As far as the aims and tasks are concerned, and here I agree entirely with V.S. Bibler and Yu.A. Levada, it is altogether pointless placing them before the historical process.

The subject of choice is a complex business. What is understood by it, in manifest or indistinct form, is either a leader—a specific personality endowed with power—or the freedom of will of society as a whole, as the sum

total of its members. In any event, it is a question of personal choice. The procedure of choice in this case is the object of study of psychology. And the question of whether the given subject could in a given situation make a different choice has nothing to do directly either with history as a science or historical regularities. I join fully with I.V. Klyamkin here—the idea of alternative-ness in this aspect is not promising. Of course, the subjects differ in terms of degree of mastery of the mechanisms of the realization of choice, and it is for this reason that the discussion of alternatives inevitably comes down to a discussion of the role of the leader. And the leader, like any other person, recognizes or even imagines alternatives to the extent of his capabilities, is guided by his moral (or amoral) principles and pursues his goals by the means accessible to him. This is not a historical task or, at least, does not belong among the main tasks of the historian. Possession, however, of the mechanisms of the realization of choice determines the degree of impact of the personality on history, and then the task is historical in nature.

Does this mean that I am making an absolute of the role of the personality in history? By no means, the reverse even. The personality is socially and culturally determined, this is the first thing, second, it makes its choice not in isolation but in the context of the personal choices of other members of society. No leader is capable of realizing his choice without taking as a basis the readiness therefor of the ordinary citizens. The historical process as a whole appears to me (in this aspect) as an unbroken sequence of personal choices, the sum total of which is determined by development trends. The constant clashes of such choices are a source of movement.

I am perfectly aware of the apparent contradictoriness of my position: while recognizing the strict determined character of the personality I at the same time allow for it the possibility of choice. But the discussion of decision-making mechanisms is separate and special. I would say here that, first, the system of determinations of choice of a specific individual changes in terms of makeup constantly, depending on subjective and objective conditions. Just as it is impossible to enter the same river twice, so it is impossible to find the same system of determinations twice. Systems of priorities and preferences change also. For this reason great significance is attached to the moment of decision-making itself: what we would choose yesterday we will no longer choose tomorrow. And the arrival of this moment for each individually depends on the speed of recognition of the need to make a choice, on the degree of knowledgeability, social assertiveness, speed of response and a whole number of further conditions.

Second, implicit in the arguments is a triad: alternative—decision-making (choice of alternative)—realization of choice. Behind all the components here is man. And, consequently, he may or may not recognize the real alternatives and imagine missing alternatives and consider them real. His adoption of a decision is determined

by a whole number of conditions, among which the existence of a recognized alternative is not the most important. Even having recognized and chosen the "correct" alternative, man may not find, for objective or subjective reasons, an adequate mechanism for realizing the choice. For this reason the existence of an alternative skill does not mean the possibility of its realization, which is, generally, a cornerstone of my conviction that things could only have been as they were.

The endeavor, on the other hand, conscious or hidden, to hyperbolize the significance of the choice of alternative by a political leader is essentially an endeavor to find the switchman. Account is not taken of the fact that it is the ordinary citizens who by their personal position ultimately determine the possibility of realization of this alternative or the other. Alternativeness is primarily a moral category. And if it is considered that within each point of the historical process it is impossible to determine which tendency will be victorious, this acquires particular, civic significance.

And one more point. In the last half-century in the history of our country there has been a sequence of choice of the "wrong" alternatives. The reason? The sacralization of this procedure, in my view. Enough has been written in the West about the "Marxism-religion" analogy. Some parallels seem quite convincing. The following are of importance in the aspect in question: 1) the purpose of the choice is taken beyond what is attainable in the foreseeable period, from which ensues the noncomparability of ends and means; 2) the end is defined by polysemantic concepts, which affords an opportunity for their manipulation (of good and evil everyone chooses good, but what is understood by it?); 3) as a result the actual right of choice and decision-making belongs to a group of "initiated" and their leader; 4) the possibility of realization of the choice is based on ritual action—under our conditions this is "struggle" and "battle" ("battle for the harvest," "struggle against alcoholism" and so forth). The object of the struggle also is taken beyond the real and may thereby easily be personified in an individual—is this not where the dreadful "Inquisition-Stalinism" parallel comes from? Struggle permeates all spheres of our life—men and women struggle for supremacy in the home, there is a battle for things in short supply in the store, a fight at the beer stand. And, as is known, in a fight it is difficult making the right choice.

Is there a way out of the current situation? In my opinion, yes. It consists primarily of a desacralization of concepts, about which Ronkin spoke, the formulation of practicable goals, the unequivocal reasoning behind a choice and the creation of an atmosphere of advancement which is measured, plan-oriented and comprehended by all. It is time to strive not for a "shining future" but a guaranteed present.

And as far as historical science is concerned, an analysis of alternatives is for it a regular method, albeit inadequately developed and disseminated as yet, of study of a

purely applied nature. It makes it possible to determine not what might have been but why things could not have been other than they were.

S.S. Neretina. I am one of the few here present to have worked in the USSR Academy of Sciences General History Institute in the Methodology of History Department led by M.Ya. Gefter. This was in 1968, when we were all following in the papers the unfolding of the student movement in France and the demonstrations of the "new left" and tensely awaiting the outcome of the "Czechoslovak events". Our "thaw" had come to an end also, and those who would subsequently be called dissidents had already made their presence known. The sorrow of impotence came to be added to the pride in NOVYY MIR. The sole, but powerful, antidote was professionalism, that is, what was everywhere being lost, since professionalism demanded unity of "scholarship and morality" in the sense that scholarship which was true to itself was a moral choice, and ethics which abided firmly by their logic were meaningful for scholarship also.

Historians of the most diverse specialties were gathered in the department: experts in the primitive society and the Middle Ages, specialists in the culture of the Renaissance and the recent and contemporary history of Russia, Europe and America and also culturology philosophers. The mission of the department included study of the idea of the multi-variant nature of historical development (the term "alternative" appeared later), an analysis of different types of culture and a critical comparison of set historical regularities (socioeconomic systems) with a source-study base proper, and not one adapted to these regularities. The "Dialogue of Cultures" seminar, which assembled participants from various academy and nonacademy institutes, was conducted under the leadership of V.S. Bibler.

A result of the work of the department was the publication of the digest "Historical Science and Certain Problems of the Present Day. Articles and Discussion" (Moscow, 1969)—virtually the first in which the debate was of an essential, and not formal, nature based on the custom of relying on the authority of opinions. The digest came in for a destructive dressing-down in the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. The authors of the article "In the Guise of Scientific Quest," Doctor of Historical Sciences A. Kornilov and N. Prokopenko and A. Shirokov, two assistant professors at Moscow University, employed the method of pigeon-holing, outright juggling of the facts and distortion of the meaning of the problems combined with blatant illiteracy. All this was necessary to accuse the participants in the digest of the "preaching of non-Marxist views and distortion of the history of the Communist Party and the Soviet state"—a cliché testifying not only that the authors of the article were the true inheritors of the old times but also to the return to these times. Our refutation was neither published nor discussed. Another digest—"Lenin and Problems of the History of Classes and Class Struggle"—

which had appeared by this time, did not, in connection with the circumstances which had evolved reach the reader. And shortly after, in 1971, the department was broken up—almost simultaneously with the breakup of the NOVYY MIR editorial office.

The story of the Methodology of History Department was characterized by a reflection of the general situation in the country, which had changed ideological policy abruptly in the direction of authoritarianism and cultural and ideological monotony. Events imperiously demanded an unequivocal attitude toward them on the part of contemporaries and, correspondingly, their self-determination. Some ventured by word and deed to oppose the situation, others preferred to hold their peace, although they could not be called apostates. History is dual: it is both a stream and moment of reflection. It is made independently of the historian. However, he also is the maker of history inasmuch as the meaning of history, in my view, may be revealed only if we take as the point the personality understood not as something integral and consummate but as the "regulative idea of man's existence in culture" (V.S. Bibler has written and spoken about this). Man here is not identical to himself, he constantly reveals the possibility of becoming other, self- and redetermining. And for this reason the alternative to historical development (of the country included) should be sought not outside but primarily in the thinking of each of us.

It is no accident that I have recalled the work of the Methodology of History Department. This was a small cell, a microsociety, in which problems of research were posed and no one guiding idea prevailed since, the oriental sage proclaims, in order to unravel the world, it needs to be viewed through different eyes. There was skillful coordination of the efforts of the different fields and different positions of different people. There was precisely what we lack on the scale of the whole state—room for thought and pluralism of opinions.

V.L. Sheynis. When the seminar of historians which M.Ya. Gefter conducted was brought to an end and persecution rained down on its leader, a "history general," widely known at that time (not so much by his works as his offices), said: "The whole trouble is that you, Mikhail Yakovlevich, have ceased to be a fellow-thinker of ours...." M.Ya. Gefter immediately objected: "What you are defending is not like-mindedness but non-mindedness."

The compulsory "like-mindedness" preventing the scientific and artistic intelligentsia performing its main civic mission was not, of course, absolute. And today also, when we have different opportunities for creativity, it is important to remember that even at that time the live historical thought and civic temperament of "concerned scientists" made a way for itself through the concrete of the bureaucratic ideological monolith.

The transition from unthinking conformism and aggressive ignorance to today's condition would also have been impossible without the work of those who, like M.Ya. Gefter, began to restore the continuity of intellectual quest. We seek in the mistakes and insights of the Russian intelligentsia an answer to the most urgent question, perhaps, of the present day—concerning alternatives on Russia's historical path.

The question is, in my view, however, very often posed simplistically and for this reason wrongly. The dispute as to whether there were alternative versions of development at this point or the other of the historical path skips, as it were, a fundamental stage: elucidation of what the alternative to the actual development in fact was. Or, more precisely: the discussion of alternatives is conducted in the same categories and in the same language as employed by the direct participants in the events in their thinking and speaking.

At the start of the 20th century scholars and politicians who had been molded in the channel of the Marxist ideological and theoretical tradition or who had experienced its influence were, granted all the differences in their positions, convinced that the course of general historical development on a world scale was predetermined and that alternativeness was connected chiefly with the timeframe and mode of transition from capitalism to socialism. It is striking, but a fact: very many of their opponents, proceeding from different value and theoretical premises, saw the historical process in a similar perspective. The supporters of socialism saw capitalism here in the permanency of its fundamental characteristics and viewed socialism as the realized age-old dream of mankind, which had for the first time found firm scientific soil. Utopia in the social consciousness was elevated to the level of a science.

And in our day also utopia continues not only to be drawn toward the commonplace but also to loom over certain important spheres of scientific consciousness and if it does not flatten it with indisputable postulates, as was the case quite recently even, it determines the general channel in which the arguments are conducted. A typical example is the debate about whether socialism has been built in our country. The radical position rejecting the tenets enshrined in authoritative documents emotionally impresses many of us, but, in my view, strengthens, and does not weaken, the mythological position of the historical process. According to this outline, world history appears as a change of socioeconomic systems inexorably following one another, and socialism and communism, as the society inevitably coming to replace capitalism.

In reality the 19th century handed the 20th century as the main question not the problem of ownership, private or public (neither exists in pure form, but the contrast between them was manifestly absolutized), but that of the backwardness of some societies compared with others in a world in which the gaps between them and their

interdependence had grown many times over. How backwardness emerged and why it came to be perceived as an intolerable phenomenon are the subject of a special discussion. I wish here merely to emphasize that practice based on socialist doctrine became a means with which certain societies attempted—some with greater, others with less, success—if not to overcome, then, at least, to lessen the degree of backwardness and ease its pressure or, to speak of the big powers, restore their authority in the world arena which had been lost to them for a long time and become a superpower.

The 1917 October Revolution was a principal event of the 20th century not because it showed, as we recently maintained, the way to the future to the whole world but because it created social, economic and political structures adequate to the world perception and essential aspirations of backward societies and populous social strata. An alternative to the real and imaginary defects of European capitalism and colonialism was put forward and implemented, and its nucleus was concentration of economic and political power in the hands of the state within the country and a messianic idea addressed to the outside. To what this ultimately led is well known.

At the 19th party conference G.Ya. Baklanov expressed the notable thought that in their history people have fought repeatedly for their own enslavement with an energy and passion such as with which it is permissible to fight only for freedom. This idea should be continued. For people to fight for their own slavery it is necessary that there occur in the social consciousness a fundamental substitution of concepts in accordance with G. Orwell's well-known formula of the anti-utopia: "freedom is slavery". However, anti-utopia is not the opposite of utopia. It grows from the utopian dream and counterposes itself to the effective defects of social organization against which utopia is a protest. Invariable in all socialist teachings has been the emphasis on collectivist values and subordination of the particular to the general interest.

In the 19th century a current of socialism declared itself scientific socialism. At the level of the scholarship of its time it analyzed the social order which was predominant at that time, at least in the most developed European countries and, in any event, in Britain. This current did not deal with the formation of the details of the future system, but some common ideas concerning the nature of the society coming to replace capitalism were considered incontestable, although containing utopian elements. As historical experience showed, it was in this respect that the teaching contained unscientific, utopian elements. Marxism was put seriously to the test when anti-bourgeois revolutions occurred in a number of countries and the capitalism described by Marx underwent a profound transformation. In addition, Marxism, as a doctrine of the desired future, contained certain elements which—to the extent that they were not overcome in the course of subsequent development—were to play a fatal part. First, the economic system of the future

society was portrayed as the complete and emphatic denial of the existing order. The abolition of private property, which was seen as the main, if not the exclusive, source of all social evils, was, it was understood, to have entailed the elimination of economically separate production units, commodity production, the market and the competitive selection of the efficient and rejection of the inefficient components and to have replaced all this by a centralized, scientifically administered system. This alone contained the not entirely recognized danger of authoritarianism.

Second, the counterpoise of a "state of the Paris Commune type" to the system of representative democracy and the separation of powers, the naive conviction that the elimination of private property was a sufficient guarantee of civil rights and the underestimation of democratic institutions and procedures ensuing from the idea that democracy as a form of state should wither away.

In principle these components of theory which failed to pass the historical test and which went back to the utopian predecessors, although occupying an important place therein, could have been overcome, the more so in that the classics themselves repeatedly took exception to the dogmatization of their views. Unfortunately, however, the theoretical constructions together with the insights and delusions were perceived by their followers wholly as a "teaching" and variety of religious, and not scientific, doctrine. Theory was subjected to growing ideologization, and ideology, with its one-sided absolutization of the "class approach" and so forth, won approval allegedly from science.

Of course, this process had its social and historical roots. Of course, the socialist utopia had emerged as an antithesis to a real social evil, capitalism, which, particularly in backward countries, was revealing not only inhumanity but also—it seemed—an incapacity for solving key problems of social life. But particularly today, when calls are being heard so often for a return to the sources of Marxism not muddled by subsequent distortions, a surmounting of the "deformations" of socialism and so forth, it is essential to recognize fully the responsibility borne by the doctrine or, more precisely, the defective nature of some of its supporting structures. The socio-cultural traditions of backward countries also played their part, of course.

A bifurcation of socialist theory and practice occurred at the start of the 20th century. Socialism understood as the affirmation in this form or the other of collectivist principles progressed not only in the countries in which revolutions had occurred and which recognized themselves as socialist. Modern Western society is obliged to a considerable extent for the introduction of collectivist elements in the economy and social life to the activity of international social democracy, although not to it alone. Together with socialist ideology here there also existed and developed in parallel doctrines which had grown up

in the bosom of European civilization which were opposed to utopia and which emphasized individualist values, the sovereignty of the individual and the limitation of social interference in private life. The French revolutionaries of the 18th century failed to notice that the slogans of liberty and equality got along amicably together only on placards and that the consistent implementation of one principle imposed limits on the realization of the second. And only gradually did methods of combining a contradictory, constantly misfiring compromise of personal and collectivist values come to be formulated in real social practice. In other words, although the 20th century has not, as expected, brought the victory of socialism worldwide, socialism as a powerful social and historical intention of our time has "worked" for the "ennoblement" and modification of capitalism. In the countries which to Marxists at the start of the century seemed the most ripe for the transition to socialism the "capitalism or socialism" alternative has been removed by the historical process, for the foreseeable period, in any event.

Events in the east of Europe and then in certain other countries unfolded differently. The difference of Stalin's model of social arrangement from the dreams of the utopians is striking! But it cannot be denied that there is an undoubted and organic connection between the socio-economic system established in our country and the socialist idea. It differed largely from the positive of the theoretical model, but quite consistently reproduced its negative—rejection of the preceding order: the market was abolished together with private property, and the party-state trampled beneath it the civil society as a system of separate and independent social institutions and initiatives, and the "class against class" principle came to determine not only political but also cultural life.

We still have to comprehend what conclusions ensue from recognition of the historical duration of the coexistence of the two systems. In my view, not only does the current era not promise a transition from capitalism to socialism (predicting what will happen beyond the foreseeable period is a matter for fantasy-mongers, not scientists) but does not prove the superiority (potential even) of "real socialism" (we need say nothing about the Stalin or continued, "stagnant" model) to contemporary highly developed capitalism, which has demonstrated its capacity for self-development and the self-denial of certain of its features. "Real socialism" will be capable of proving its superiority to the extent that and when perestroika is crowned with success. In any event, it would be too conceited to maintain that this system has already denoted the highest phase in the development of mankind.

But, perhaps, such a comparison is altogether invalid inasmuch as the countries which are in the first echelon of modernization accomplished the transition to capitalism back in the 18th-first half of the 19th centuries, and the countries and peoples which belong to the second

and subsequent echelons have a different historical fate, and for objective reasons the latter cannot reproduce the path of the first? Perhaps the socialist alternative to capitalism in the forms in which it has been implemented thus far is the most rapid and efficient way of lessening the backwardness and of the accelerated establishment of important social values? In order to answer these questions two fundamental points cannot be avoided.

First, although nonmarket mechanisms and state institutions removed from public control made it possible to accomplish a market in the creation of industrial productive forces and the spread of certain elements of modern culture, both have become a practically insurmountable obstacle to the transition to the scientific-industrial phase of world progress. Lagging has once again begun to assume a qualitative nature, and this ensues from the model's blocking properties.

Second, the "normal" functioning of this model even in the manifestations which it is customary to consider its merits engenders social immobilism and introduces demoralization to society. Thus the replacement of competition by fictitious competition and social guarantees of employment (although not for everyone and not under all circumstances), social security (albeit at a relatively low level), education (given any level of real training and qualifications) and so forth extinguish most important incentives to intensive labor, initiative and independence.

The main, determining alternative confronting mankind has emerged distinctly toward the end of the 20th century. This is not capitalism or socialism but existence or nonexistence, survival or perdition. We cannot impute blame to the people directing the course of historical events at the start of the century for the fact that were unable at that time to rise to the vision of the future presented later by Einstein and Russell, although the perception, not entirely distinct at that time, of "Europe on the brink" was being experienced by certain experienced thinkers after WWI. But today it is unforgivable for either a scholar or politician to substitute for a true alternative a false one and arrange social priorities in accordance with this. The more so in that a threat to civilization is created not only by actions of a particular kind but also by inaction.

To be more specific, this means that either, despite all the social and historical extraneous features, the common interest and an endeavor to solve accumulated problems on the basis of consensus (of, if only initially, the current world centers) will prevail or a spirit of conflict fraught with the danger of events slipping from the control of responsible forces will grow.

As far as the domestic social arrangement of national-state organisms is concerned, what is determining today, in my view, is a choice not between capitalism and socialism in theoretically refined form but between

democracy and authoritarianism in their innumerable specific modifications. The forms of economic organization—the correlation of “plan” and “market”—are a derivative of this basic choice.

The popular slogan of the present day in our country is “more democracy—more socialism”. Indeed, democracy represents a social and historical value in itself; according to the general rule, the more fully and steadily democratic standards and institutions have been established in society, the further it has advanced along the path of world civilization. In this sense, albeit conditionally, we may distinguish more or less democratic social structures and find the criteria quantitatively verifying the processes of democratization. What is required of us, however, is not “more” or “less” socialism but a different socialism organically contiguous with democracy, with rules of law, with political (and not just social) guarantees and with ideological pluralism and a human face.

T.S. Kondratyeva. It is common knowledge that the Russian Revolution, February and then October, has been compared with the Great French Revolution, but we usually have virtually no conception of the scale of this analogy, and it is striking. In fact up to WWII the Russian Revolution did not cease to engender analogies with the French Revolution. Similarity was sought in everything: events, dates, people. And various circles—Western observers, historians, Russian emigres, opposition groups in the communist parties and enemies and friends of the October Revolution—had recourse to comparisons.

In this connection a situation took shape wherein what was expected of the Jacobin-Bolsheviks outside of post-October Russia was a continuation of history interrupted by 9 Thermidor 1794 (Western historians and journalists, volte-face people, primarily Ustryalov, the Mensheviks, the SR's, Cadets, monarchists). At the same time the situation within the country could have been portrayed as follows: the Jacobin-Bolsheviks in a clash with Thermidor.

And if the collective imagination ran on 7 November 1927 to the point of people shouting in the streets of Leningrad “Down With Thermidor!” this could not have failed to have had repercussions. I have attempted to discover them by tracing the behavior of the Bolsheviks in the face of the widespread “NEP-Thermidor” analogy. Prior to 1922 they had regarded the NEP as a policy of “self-Thermidorization,” and this analogy did not frighten the Bolsheviks. While warning about the danger signaled by the volte-face-er Ustryalov, at the 11th party congress in 1922 Lenin nonetheless ignored the problem of Thermidor. Carefully avoiding the term “Thermidor,” Lenin found to define Ustryalov's speeches no words other than the “the truth of the class enemy”.

In 1926-1927 the phantom of Thermidor had grown to such proportions that it was introducing hesitation and division in the ranks of the members of the opposition and forcing the party majority to recognize the problem of Thermidor as the most important one in the differences with the opposition, more important even than the British strike and the Chinese revolution (Rykov's speech of 11 August 1927 to Moscow activists, Bukharin's speech on the same subject, this being the main point of the disagreements of Stalin and Trotskiy). Under these conditions the fact that the NEP was persistently being said to be the “Russian Thermidor” and that the Stalin majority was incessantly being accused of Thermidoreanism could not, in my view, have failed to have been reflected in the abolition of the NEP.

The consequences of the “Jacobins-Bolsheviks” and “NEP-Thermidor” analogies were thus manifested in the policy sphere twice: initially the NEP had been conceived of as a means of self-Thermidoreanization, then the abolition of the NEP also appeared as a method of deliverance from an imagined Thermidor.

The consequences of the analogies with the French Revolution were reflected also in the sphere of the historical consciousness. For the direct participants in the Russian Revolution they had become an epistemological barrier. The Soviet concept of history which became firmly established at the end of the 1920's-start of the 1930's was to a considerable extent the result of the struggle against the phantom of Thermidor. Original features of the Russian Revolution and the Soviet system were revealed thanks to this to outside observers (Ustryalov, Kautsky, Bauer, Gramsci).

The example of the French Revolution, in other words, sometimes impeded the most important problems and sometimes forced them to be driven deep down in the consciousness. Soviet historiography insists that the bourgeois and socialist revolutions are not comparable. In fact there is a continuity here which ignores the “differences in class content”. The difference in ideologies and class characteristics is real, but it has been unduly absolutized, and there remain as a result moral values, ideas and illusions belonging to the general mental level of the French revolutionaries and their successors in the 19th and 20th centuries.

Z.P. Yakhimovich. The 20th century and, particularly, the latter half thereof have been characterized by an abrupt complication of the world-historical process, its growing dynamic nature and the confrontation and interaction of factors and trends of different levels. Correspondingly, the content and forms, criteria and value orientations of social progress are becoming more complicated. History appears more than ever not only as a process which is common and regular but also as one distinguished by tremendous diversity and contradictoriness. The experience of contemporary times has shown the utter groundlessness of straightened, oversimplified

notions concerning the on-going march of progress. There is a growing need for the improvement and updating of the set of theoretical and methodological instruments at the time of analysis of social phenomena in an increasingly integral and interdependent world, with regard for the entire wealth of forms and types of social development typical of the world community. As the dogmatized notions concerning historical monism are overcome, Marxist researchers' attention is being attracted increasingly to questions of the choice of path of social development, the modeling and forecasting of social processes at the micro- and macrolevels and so forth.

Among the issues which have been insufficiently studied, in our view, are those of a systemic analysis of types of alternatives and forms and methods of their realization. It is essential, in my view, to distinguish the alternatives arising within the framework of a particular formation in different phases of its maturity from alternatives whose realization presupposes transition from one formation to another. Even more complex are the alternatives brought about by inter-formational contradictions and the interaction and mutual influence of social systems which exist simultaneously. In addition, and the new political thinking has recorded this, with the emergence and complication of global problems and civilizational aspects of social development the immeasurably more complex relationship of man, science and technology and the biosphere than hitherto is being revealed. New spheres of alternative solutions are emerging, and at the same time a whole set of limitations and imperatives dictating their terms of the economic, S&T and social activity of the world community is taking shape.

The complexity of the elaboration of the problem of alternatives as a scientific category is conditioned to a considerable extent by the fact that it presupposes the creative development of certain essential aspects of Marxist teaching, including the concept of progress as such and the role of the revolutionary factor and class struggle in contemporary social development.

Thus Marx's concept of progress incorporating as an inalienable component the idea of the progressive development of mankind and its transition from prehistory to true history recorded in its basic propositions the totality of regularities and trends of the world's social life in the form in which it had taken shape in the 19th century. This, specifically, explained the fact that, having substantiated the role of demographic and geographical factors as fundamental by nature for man and mankind, Marx and Engels were able to a certain extent to abstract themselves from them, concentrating the main attention on study of the laws and regularities of social development as diverse forms of human activity. In formulating in their time the theory of class struggle as the driving force of history and revolutions and as the locomotive of history, Marx and Engels proceeded from the prospect of

a practically infinite alternation of generations, proceeding from the geological timeframe of the existence of the planet Earth which had been determined at that time.

Marx's concept of progress interpreted the relations between man and nature as relations of subject and object. Marx's definition of labor as a process accomplished between man and nature, in the course of which "man by his actual activity mediates, regulates and controls the exchange of substances between himself and nature," is well known. Furthermore, the conviction of the founders of Marxism as to the historically proximate transition to socialism (of the capitalistically developed countries of Europe and America, at least) afforded an opportunity for the assumption that mankind would be able to avail itself to the full extent of the advantages of the activity, regulated consciously and in conformity with plan, and creative potentialities of man freed from the bonds of class exploitation and oppression.

As a result of the victory of the October revolution there emerged a new vector of social development and new social system—without class exploitation and antagonisms born of the existence of private ownership of the means of production. At the same time contemporary history revealed the entire complexity of the problem of choice between capitalism and socialism—this fundamental social alternative of the 20th century. On the one hand there was a pronounced expansion of the possibilities of the adaptation of capitalism to the new conditions of existence, not without the influence of the socialist world which had sprung up (granted the imperfection and deformations of the latter even and the far from full revelation of the possibilities contained therein), for it had brought about a multiplication of the types and forms of capitalist development from the viewpoint of the level and forms of organization of production and consumption, the political superstructure, methods of solving social problems, the correlation of class forces and so forth. On the other, the process of the creation of socialism proved immeasurably more complex than had been envisaged by its creators at time of the accomplishment of the proletarian revolution, and the successes and surges ahead both in our country and in other countries which had embarked on the socialist path of development did not rule out either severe deformations nor the emergence of difficult problems.

The experience of socialism, as, equally, of anti-imperialist and class struggle within the framework of the world capitalist system, cautions against the danger of the absolutization of the revolutionary factor in social development, which was the sin committed by Marxist social science of the 1920's-1950's and, to a certain extent, of subsequent years also. It is significant that in the course of the present discussion no speaker has resorted, terminologically, in any event, to an analysis of the significance of revolutionary methods of the solution of the historical alternatives of the 20th century. This is not fortuitous inasmuch as it is a question of a certain reaction against the revolutionary rhetoric which was

predominant even recently in social science. However, it would not be legitimate to ignore the fact that the modern world is largely the fruit of revolutionary processes and changes of a varying level, scale and maturity and also of the reform actions, "passive" revolutions, "revolutions from the top" and so forth which accompanied them. This is why it is important to understand fully the entire significance of the revolutionary factor and revolutionary forms of social development and, at the same time, their historical limits.

It is no less important when analyzing the realities of the end of the 20th century and forecasting mankind's prospects in the foreseeable future to proceed from a concept of social progress, enriched by the new thinking, with regard for all the problems and contradictions born of the social activity of the entire world community. Thus the "demographic explosion"—a consequence of the interaction of processes overlapping one another—decolonization and neocolonialism—which is hard to predict—is of sharply increased significance. The preferential rate of national economic development and S&T progress compared with social progress has contributed to the complexification of the load on nature, compelling the introduction in scientific usage of the concept, inconceivable for the 19th century, of the "carrying capacity" of Planet Earth. There has been an immeasurable complication compared with the past century of the man-science and technology-biosphere relationships, a whole set of socio-cultural, civilizational and personal problems and alternatives, for whose solution new methods and new mechanisms are essential, having been engendered. The role of compromise solutions mutually acceptable to various social forces is growing in political life together with the class struggle, which has continued and which has incorporated new spheres to a certain extent, and other forms of social protest. Correspondingly, an objectively necessary zone of the joint activity of the world community as a common, although socially heterogeneous, whole is expanding.

V.I. Maksimenko. Before speaking about an alternative, it is probably necessary to mention that this word is currently in fashion in our country and that there is a demand for it revealing a latent social need. The word began to be glimpsed from time to time, and thereupon the verbal outer casing began to be used separately from its meaning. When, for example, one reads that "perestroika is not an alternative," it is somewhat hard to understand this: inasmuch as there is a clouding here of the question of what is being restructured into what (the restructuring of social relations as ownership and power relations is one thing, the restructuring of the press, diplomacy and the propaganda machinery is another).

An alternative (and I would like here to separate Gefter's interpretation of this concept from that in common usage) is not an option alongside another option. It is not a sudden change of policy, not an abrupt change in the channel of events at the will of chance. It is something of a different nature and different meaning.

Running the risk of the author not agreeing with me, I shall attempt, nonetheless, to formalize what Gefter has written on this subject. An alternative is a choice, exercised in the mind and in action, of a practicable (not beyond-the-limit) future—a future which is projected in the "material" of the present, but not predetermined by anything therein. It may be expressed thus: an "alternative-capable" consciousness and action are possible in principle where man's teleological philosophy is collapsing and the circle of old functional connections is breaking apart.

The October revolution in Russia, Gefter writes, was not an alternative. A participant in the "round table" disagreed with this. But let us take a closer look at the situation. Given an army which had been rolled back from the front, the political impotence of the government and Soviet "democracy," the specter of famine and the feeling of class animosity with which manorial-intelligentsia-officer Russia had begun increasingly to oppose the insurgent "low born"—given the combination by the fall of 1917 of all these circumstances, there was no alternative to the Bolshevik coup, if the catastrophic and bloody disintegration of Russian statehood was not considered such. And, on the contrary, literally the day after the Bolsheviks' victory (and by no means by the time of the "war communism" crisis) the October coup had afforded the new authorities room for an alternative—and this to the extent (and by virtue of the contradiction) that the proletarian dictatorship had become possible and firm merely by having combined with radical agrarian revolution.

The fate of the post-October alternative and Stalinism are, in my opinion, one of Gefter's most vital research subjects. And he was motivated here to a considerable extent, it seems to me, by what he himself called "morality of the mind"—a quality which under our Russian conditions has been tested in a confrontation with ideological reality of a particular kind.

The "Short Course in the History of the All-Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)" describes 1929, the "year of the great change," as "the most profound revolutionary change... equivalent in terms of its consequences to the revolutionary upheaval in October 1917." In respect of the scale of what was done that year Stalin was not, I believe, mistaken (and he hardly made the comparison with October, which began a period of civil war, fortuitously). But we would note that this description was given to an action pertaining to the extermination of a class of independent working proprietors and the liquidation of a most fundamental conquest of the Russian revolution. Another example from the same work: how it depicts 1937. This terrible year is portrayed as the legendary time of the "smashing of the Bukharin-Trotsky band," the "complete democratization of the electoral system," the "victory of socialism in the USSR" and the "moral-political unity of the Soviet people".

It seems to me that the "morality of the mind" for a person of the philosophical temper to which Geftler belongs would assume that restoring all the inconceivable ruptures within the Marxist tradition, as, equally, the severance of this very tradition from world culture, is not possible today either by an indication of the high "classical" models and their highly subtle and modern interpretation even or by exposures of Stalinism. And here I repeat an idea of Geftler's of long standing concerning the past, which is not so much entirely "past and gone" as, equally, irreversible and nonremovable. And it is for this reason disastrous to manipulate it in terms of selection or mummification, and it hangs as a weight on the generation of the living, reminding us that we will have no other past and that there is no ridding ourselves of this one. What is more relevant is another approach: dauntlessly taking the past into the consciousness in all its fullness (and we still have far to go!) and attempting to discern precisely there—in our common past—the emergence and loss of development alternatives. This task is of a specially historical nature, but at the same time it is relevant to today and urgent: without its accomplishment we will not find the alternative to which we are today endeavoring nationwide to restructure.

(Ingerflom) Claudio. A chapter of my book "Would-Be Citizen. Russian Sources of Marxism," devoted to M.Ya. Geftler—"a pioneer-citizen of difficult times and historian—indefatigable master of questions without answers," discusses the set of problems of the dialogue-contact between P.B. Akselrod and V.I. Ulyanov in 1895, in the light of which it is possible to examine an ideological alternative which emerged in the Russian revolutionary movement of the turn of the century.

The sources leave no doubt that this meeting made a profound mark on the consciousness of the young Lenin. I shall leave aside currently the subject of both parties' mutual agreement in respect of Russia's backwardness compared with the bourgeois West—a backwardness which emanated from the nature of the Russian historical process and, specifically, from the absence therein of politically structured classes and, correspondingly, a developed class struggle, the insufficient buildability of capitalism to the point of a social whole and the impossibility of a natural transition from autocracy and a barbarous way of life to a state based on the rule of law. If not a coincidence, there was a proximity of views here. But there was quite a profound difference also—as to what the mission of the proletariat was under these circumstances, in other words: where the center of the "surmounting" of the historical inheritance lay. According to Akselrod, the solution lay in the Europeanization of Russia understood as the disappearance not only of the economic but also socio-cultural "deficit," which required of the socialists recognition of the independent significance of society. The triumph of liberal values was important as a condition facilitating the struggle of the proletariat and, more: without these transformations affecting the masses, the same masses would know how

to use power as a tool against Europeanization. Akselrod was referring here not just to some institutions but any policy of tutelage, specifically, the temptation of socialist despotism.

Is this set of problems alien to Ulyanov-Lenin if one grasps the whole series of his works after the Swiss meeting? No, it is not. But, nurtured by the same sources (Marxism and the Russian democratic tradition, the thought of Chernyshevskiy particularly), he sought a nonliberal alternative of the formation in Russia of a class society based on the non-constrained development of capitalism. The decisive point—precisely in this sense—was for him the party. The "What Is To Be Done?" concept: the way to society lay via revolution, in which the self-determination of the classes would alone occur; the way to revolution was the socialists' movement "into all classes" (primarily the peasantry), given the former's preservation of their character and leadership. Whence the strictness of Lenin's condition (stricture against Plekhanov's draft program of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party)—the limits of the "alliance" to be determined by concurrence with the socialist consistency of the proletariat. In the light of the lessons of the 20th century we cannot fail to see the gap in this liberation project: in taking upon itself determination of the moment and destiny of the society which was being formed the party thereby condemned itself to a return to the main instrumental functions of traditional Russian authority.

Let us ask: why did this difference of the two liberation projects, which was not all that pronounced initially, subsequently expand, becoming polar? What contributed to the most radical criticism of barbarous ways proving in practice to be the exponent of an idea of power qualitatively indistinguishable from its predecessor?

I do not have the time to examine both the progression of Lenin's thought and the evolution of Bolshevism in the context of the historical process as a whole (not omitting the role of the consciousness and way of behavior of the social "upper strata" and, particularly, the Russian intelligentsia here). All this, of course, has to be considered. But I would like now to call attention to a little-noticed point—the historically successive popular notions concerning power. A traditional mode of the masses' struggle for their interests—impotence—has to be recalled here. As of the start of the 17th century they struggled not against a particular type of authority—autocracy—but against the alleged unlawful exponent of this authority: on behalf of the "true" tsar. Could the Russian revolutionaries appealing to the people and seeking support therein avoid the "reverse" influence of the masses at the sorest point—the formulation of a concept of power organically combining Europeanization and the Russian historical process proper? This is as yet a "question without an answer". It will be necessary in

search thereof to go a long way back and make use, inter alia, of methods of historical psychology, penetrating thus the genesis and conversions of collective notions concerning power.

Perhaps we will then be able to find an answer also to the question of whether an alternative to the resumption of despotism as the result of a kind of "plebeianization" of the machinery of power following October was possible—an answer which would not amount merely to the nondemocratic singularities of the ideology of the Bolsheviks or the personal attributes of Stalin.

As you can see, a small episode—the meeting of two people—could throw light on problems which would involve the fate of millions.

B.G. Kapustin. "Historical necessity is alternative by nature...." I fully agree with this idea of M.Ya. Gefter's, but would make the reservation that the nature of alternativeness at different stages of social evolution, the mechanisms of realization or nonrealization of alternatives and also how in both instances they become a part of the fabric of actual history vary appreciably. If it is possible to speak of the general logic of the world-historical process, it is manifested also in the fact that at the higher twists of the spiral of evolution an alternative "with a plus sign" makes it possible to retain in the conflicts which are under way the cultural resources of society of general value to a greater extent than at preceding twists of the spiral. An opportunity is thereby afforded for man's richer personal development associated with his social role functions, but not reduced to them. An increase in the extent of the cultural resources (guaranteed by nothing a priori) which are retained and the growth of the personal principle in man are what forms the basis of the change in the nature of alternativeness, including forms which contain opposite subjects (preclass, class, post-class), modes of their activity and possibilities of transforming reality.

I believe that the 20th century has produced a qualitative leap forward in the development of the nature of the alternative character of history. An alternative always represents the realization of a moment of freedom. Earlier the alternative arose at the level of mechanisms of the realization of the type of regularities which embodied the "objective" at a given stage of history and remained impenetrable to people's conscious creativity. Now the condition and mode of realization of an alternative is the incorporation of the consciousness in the very structure of the regularities of social being and the formation of a different type thereof. In conformity with this, the "objective" is no longer something independent of consciousness and will but the form of people's participation in the movement of social being which is born of its own contradictions, as the possibility of the continuation of the life of mankind and its history. Disregard for this possibility and a search for alternatives at the level of mechanisms of the realization of regularities of the old type will lead to total annihilation.

Always realized "at the expense" of some people (individuals, groups, nations), development has led to a boundary beyond which continued movement along the same channel is possible only "at the expense" of mankind as a whole. Whence the unacceptability of an alternative sacrificing anyone as a means. "Reassembling" the former mechanism of social development is senseless. It is possible to progress by various paths, but not at the expense of man....

I see as the historical significance of October the fact that it showed some of the main features of this new character of alternativeness, and not only in Russia, what is more, but throughout the world also. October revealed the fact that a diverse world cannot be based on a single socioeconomic foundation. More, in order that the capitalist, "North Atlantic" branch of mankind might exist and develop and in order that its development not bring perdition to the whole of culture (a threat revealed by the first and then by the second world wars) the world as a whole had to be built on a different, noncapitalist foundation. A different socioeconomic foundation? It was thought so originally. Brest of 1918, Warsaw of 1920, Kronshtadt of 1921 and Genoa of 1922 were landmarks of the movement toward another idea—concerning the general-civilizational foundation of a formationally diverse (not even bipolar!) mankind.

What is this general-civilizational foundation? Clearly, it is not the neutralization and, even less, the assimilation of local civilizations. Such a foundation may exist only in them and via through them on condition that they become subjects of a world-historical play. But becoming such is not simple. The energy of destruction does not yet guarantee this. It is necessary to apprehend and adapt from the specific formational context that which could form in man a particular culture—a culture of the given "popular spirit"—a hypostasis of the "empirically universal individual". Self-discipline, openness to the world, wealth and dynamism of requirements, recognition of one's "ego" capable of distinguishing between freedom and arbitrariness, democracy of personalities in place of the system of patronage "in the interests" of the masses.... Could all this be the general-civilizational foundation of a formationally diverse world? Was this not the question which was put to the world by post-October Russia, which had ascertained for itself that it would proceed toward civilization only by a "different path" and which, thanks to this, revealed the possibility of the reconstruction of the world arrangement "in accordance with another plan"? A Russia regarding its prospects and itself "not as an egotistical center destroying all other economies and the economies of other countries of the world, as was the case previously, but a Russia which offers to restore economies from the viewpoint of the whole world" (Lenin).

October was an alternative to what? Or, another way: what joined Russia and the world? The alternative to the "North Atlantic" capitalist path toward civilization. And at the same time, the alternative to "distinctive"

noncivilization. This was an alternative in a national dimension, an alternative at the level of the particular. But October was an alternative at the level of the general also. An alternative to the "plan" of the world arrangement which makes the foundation formational unity and a standardizing tendency always realized "at the expense" of someone. An alternative of search and self-revelation opposed to "civilizing missions" and "iron laws". The coupling of Russia and the world was the Russian and global NEP and their relationship.

However, there is a time barrier—not only for theoretical thought but also for historical practice. Here is a problem of the painstaking work of history itself on the de-shelling from the capitalist formational context of that which is a part of the general-civilizational foundation of the world. The problem of the movement of life itself beyond the framework of industrialism as a type and phase of the development of the productive forces, as a civilizational model. Within the limits of industrialism the specific formationally capitalist is so blended with the general civilizational that the sharpest scalpel of theoretical thought is not in a position to separate them with absolute precision. The image of socialism as a single factory? Labor armies? Socialist Taylorism? And, finally, Russia's "distinctiveness" laying, of course, "along the common line of world development" (Lenin)? What draws this "common line"? What is the "distinctiveness" of Russia's post-October "different path" toward civilization? The nature and mechanisms of power, the changed forms of ownership? Or, perhaps, the different type of development of the productive forces themselves, the "different quality of development," as theorists of the left now say in the West? To what does the definition of socialism as a "system of civilized cooperative workers" pertain: to individual structures whose existence is tactically allowed at a particular stage of development or is this an integral description of the new society reflected in the strategic course? What is it—a declaration of the tolerant nature of the authorities or the registering of a new mode of combination of live and past labor, a mode which raises the workman of the "human factor of production," who is becoming independent, to the position of the "single source predominant over it" (Marx)?

But is this possible, when the central question of the S&T revolution—concerning the replacement of direct labor by general labor as the underlying principle of production—has not even been posed as yet? When industrialism would seem to be (and really is) the future, and not the past? When the way in which we will, for a start, manage without the particularly double-dyed types of cultures of a prebourgeois nature is as yet only being dreamed about? I believe that this is the deep-lying seam of the question concerning the possibility of an alternative to Stalinism. The image of socialism as a "single factory" and its definition as a "system of civilized cooperative workers" are not different "angles of vision" of the problem, not different phases of the development

of theoretical thought even. They are mutually suppositional and mutually denying aspects of a particular contradiction of reality itself. The meaning of this contradiction with reference to Russia is whether noncapitalist civilization is possible if the conditions are as yet lacking for a breakthrough beyond the framework of industrialism, and with reference to the world, whether the general-civilizational foundation of a formationally diverse world is possible or whether—given the domination of industrialism—this formation may only be the expansion of one formation and whence a struggle not for life but to the death and the question of "who wins" on a universal scale.

The historical unproductiveness of Stalinism was that it represented not the removal and solution but destruction of this contradiction and the suppression of an aspect thereof. The result of this was not only noncapitalist but also noncivilized industrialism. It is naive and wrong to interpret Stalinism as the domination of the conscious ("planned") principle over reality, which would return us to the ideas concerning the sole "intelligent and natural," one-dimensional and unilinear process, from which Stalinism was allegedly a deviation. October introduced the conscious principle to the structure of the regularities of social being, and this was a "natural" endeavor to resolve the contradictions of the old type of social development, which was fraught with catastrophe. Mankind, aspiring to survive, has no alternative to this new direction of development (which was shown in its own way under different conditions by Roosevelt's "New Deal" and the "Keynesian revolution," the creation of the United Nations and the INF Treaty).

Consciousness built into the structure of social being contributes to the qualitative transformation of its regularities, subordinating them to man's development and thereby realizing the potentialities of humanization. Otherwise it proves to be merely a new means of realization of the old logic of social movement under changed conditions, the logic of the achievement of dehumanized goals at the expense of man. Stalinism, as the realization of the second potentiality, is precisely a servile reflection of social being and the facets of industrialism which represent the past abiding in the present. And in this sense Stalinism is domination over reality, over its gravitation toward the future, over its need for the consciousness not only to reflect the objective world but also create it. Was there an alternative to Stalinism? The answers will vary depending on whether we understand by "reality" only social being as is or social being in process and whether we see merely the historical outer casing or hear additionally the breath of the future through the birth pains.

V.A. Chalikova. We have been discussing the problem of missed or lost alternatives, calling to account exclusively domestic factors and characters only of our history. We have been speaking about Stalin as a strictly domestic, local phenomenon. This is a natural and fruitful path, but only on condition, it seems to me, that it is placed

within the world's "multi-lane" road system. We are obliged to correlate ourselves: where, how and when the choice of an alternative depended on the positions of those who in this tragic era for us lived outside of our state. The answer would be such: the outside world (even if with reservations) accepted and virtually legalized Stalin's policy. It was no accident that one of the first researchers in Stalinism—R. Conquest—wrote in the preface to his book that without assimilation of the fate of Stalinism we cannot fully understand how the modern world is arranged in general. In this author's opinion, the support of world public opinion was a decisive factor of the staging in Moscow of the falsified political trials of the 1930's.

Of course, there were protests from left social democrats and progressive cultural figures. But had the whole world community condemned the Moscow trials, could Stalin have operated as ruthlessly, as cynically? He calculated that the West would "absorb" the 1930's trials (testimony of B. Nikolayevskiy). It is known that when Orwell had written his anti-totalitarian, essentially anti-Stalinist satire, even a rightwing Catholic publisher refused to accept the manuscript.

Why did a substantial part of world public opinion reject for such a long time the numerous pieces of testimony to the Stalin-Beriyia terror, right up to the "GULAG Archipelago"? Because in the name of their intellectual peace of mind people wish to be deceived. Because the principle in the spirit of Machiavelli: "the winner is not judged" continues to dominate.

Assimilation of the new thinking in politics should mean, in my view, a return to ethical imperatives and a renunciation of violence, if only for the sake of the future triumph of the highest ideals.

M.Ya. Gefter. Just a few words in the form of a response to the discussion and by way of specification of my own position.

I derived much that was material for myself both when the views of the speakers were akin to mine and also in instances of noncoincidence. I agree with Yu.P. Lisovskiy, for whom the concept of an alternative is attended by critical "points," at which, crossing and clashing, determinants of the process of varying scale and varying levels coincide and where values which are at first sight, seemingly insignificant and chance even, kinds of triggers of epoch-making changes, could perform an authorizing role. Having extended and emphasized this viewpoint (in the light of which the role of particularly varied—in both scale and moral character—subjects of historical "perturbations" and rows also may be scrutinized anew), we will, I believe, have come closer to the greatest difficulty. If alternatives not only are not reducible to prerequisites, which is more or less obvious, but are also not deducible from them, in full, at least, and in terms of their very essence ever; if they are not either the unequivocal result which we with hindsight elevate

to the most forward-looking, decisive trend, if, consequently, the alternatives do not lend themselves to simple "mastery," what are they else if not the property, which cannot be wrested away from history, of its "branching," falling unintentionally, as it were, in a situation of world bifurcations, where the direction and "vector" of development changes—one way or another? Additional characteristics of historical time and history as such appear: not only unpredictable but also, in a certain sense, surprise ones (like, for example, the "backwardness" mentioned by V.L. Sheynis, which, of course, is not simply some sum total of age-long indicators but a particular phenomenon and specific "feedback" with a late-European anticipatory spurt ahead, which was, in turn, an abrupt breach of the "primordial" imbalance of the rhythms of human activity).

Posterity is distressed in connection with the noncoincidence of what it inherited from its ancestors with any intentions and most profound anticipations, but this disappointment, this nostalgia for lost opportunities should not, understandably, be attributed to waste and losses of the process; they are part of its very nucleus, as a pledge against repetition. But no more than a pledge! Subsequently there is action, the efforts of the cognitive mind and morality realized in social and political choice, in a clash of a new "project" with the inertia of the former alternative situation. Without "endings" there are no "beginnings". The endings have to be won also—and have they demanded fewer sacrifices than the beginnings? I employ the past tense not only because I am a historian but also because here, it seems to me, is the "secret" of our interest in the problem under discussion. Let us ask ourselves: is it not because it is so troubling and intriguing that we, at least, have the presentiment that the alternative mode of human self-changes is on the verge of its rejection by people worn out by the abundance of sacrifices and fatal helplessness in the face of the corresponding results, including such as those from which the appellation great cannot be removed?

It seems to B.G. Kapustin, who spoke interestingly about the nature of the present choice of "general-civilizational foundations" of a World not reducible to one "formation," that prior to the end of the 20th century the alternatives were unconscious, as it were—impenetrable to people's creative impact. It seems to me that this is a manifest exaggeration, but heuristic exaggeration. The heart of the matter, probably, is not simply the greater or lesser capacity of the consciousness to conduct or, at least, adjust the element of changes (what in human affairs happens outside of the consciousness?) but in the depth of the gap between the intellectual primary impulses of the movement toward the unity of the World and their actual final reckoning. Perhaps, the main banner of the departing century is that it calls in question both the inevitability and productiveness of precisely this gap? And then there arises, as O.R. Kvirkveliya put it, a gravitation toward a "guaranteed present" denying citizenship to the inspiration of the universal goal and thereby utopian man who has aspired from merciless

criticism of "his" and "others" past to erect a construction site for the future. In fact, perhaps, modern man is capable in advance of envisaging the unpredictable in his own activity or should (and could?) go even further, ridding himself of the very unenvisageableness immanent to history? This is an open question awaiting translation into a language intelligible to the daily round. In the broadest and most immediate sense it is a departure from the World as a walk of life to a Dialogue-World, a Consensus-World precluding in advance any "common denominator". In a narrower, but also immediate, sense, concerning people of our profession, it is the formation of a new syncretistic mode of self-recognition requiring not only a different organization of studies of human life in all its projections but also a fundamentally new inner orientation of man the researcher, about which V.S. Bibler spoke so expressively.

And in conclusion one perception which is very personal and important for me. This "round table" has brought together people whom even yesterday many things divided—both in our common life and in their capricious fate. The presence here and the voices of such people as L.I. Bogoraz, S.A. Kovalev and V.Ye. Ronkin echoed in my heart as a sign of permanent significance.

For the warm, friendly words about me, thank you!

I.K. Pantin. It is the done thing in the closing remarks at a "round table" to sum up. I have, unfortunately, to depart from the customary rule: the discussion proceeded step by step at a level at which a customary theoretical explanation of the course of history is too narrow and limited to incorporate the new social experience and new problems which have opened to mankind on the boundary of the centuries. Research in this field is taking just the first timid steps, and laying claim to a "collation" of the work which is unfolding would hardly be serious. For this reason I shall confine myself to an indication of the situation in which historical cognition in connection with the comprehension of social development of the 20th century, of the end thereof particularly, finds itself.

According to "classical" Marxist tradition (I shall hold off as yet from the views of Marx himself), all historical changes of society may be transferred, so to speak, onto a single canvas, where they are linked in a single picture of social development—the transition from capitalism to socialism. Throughout the 20th century an entirely different picture of historical reality has, it seems to me, been taking shape. Social development is losing its unequivocal nature and predetermination and appearing, if you will, as a multitude of branches of development, as a spectrum of possibilities, which are being realized in various historical situations. The divergent trajectories of historical changes revealed by the 20th century, which have arisen under the impact of big industry, have revealed a surprise limit to the universality of the West European type of the development of civilization. How radical the change in our views of the

evolution of society brought about by this development of history has been may be seen most clearly from the fact that the principle of the economic determination of social changes has proven inadequate for an explanation of the distinctiveness of the regularity controlling fundamental historical changes. The vari-directional nature of social development has led to world history appearing contradictory and separated into incompatible parts. At one time this was the basis for the depiction of the world as systems totally opposed to one another.

It took time and experience to move from the notion concerning only the vertical correlation of the levels of historical reality—socialism and capitalism—to an understanding of the actual wholeness of a common, although contradictory, world. It transpired that interaction between countries, regions and civilizations constitutes an inalienable part of historical development in the 20th century. Recognition of this fact not only revealed the limited nature of the old historical world outlook, which had previously remained overshadowed, ascribing independent and invariable characteristics to social systems but also forced us to pay due attention to the development and interaction of different, at times heterogeneous, types and forms of historical progress.

It has to be said that recognition behind the wholeness of world development of features of an independent force is leading to a reinterpretation of the role of socialism in social progress. If the distinctive world vertical, with the aid of which the direction of the development of civilization was set, is proving to have collapsed, absolute historical movement loses its strictly fixed sense, and there is only relative movement—in relation to something else. It is currently difficult to say how the abandonment of the idea concerning socialism as being a single whole enclosed within itself and totally unbound and also recognition of the priority of global problems common to all mankind will be reflected in the development of the fate of Marxist thought. But one thing is clear: the 20th century has posed a whole number of new, serious problems, whose solution will lead to an appreciable change in the foundation of social theory and the historical world outlook as a whole. The question of the historical alternative will not, I am sure, be the least in this category.

Footnotes

* In this issue we publish the speeches of the participants in a "round table" held at the end of 1988: Doctor of Philosophical Sciences I.K. Pantin (RK i SM), Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.P. Lisovskiy (International Workers Movement Institute), Doctor of Historical Sciences Ye.G. Plimak (International Workers Movement Institute), Candidate of Philosophical Sciences I.M. Klyamkin (VIPP), Candidate of Historical Sciences A.S. Senyavskiy (USSR Academy of Sciences History of the USSR Institute), Doctor of Philosophical Sciences V.S. Bibler (USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences Psychology Institute), Candidate of Philosophical Sciences I.A.

Zelenina (Moscow University), Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Ye.V. Mareyeva (Moscow State Culture Institute) and Candidate of Historical Sciences M.Ya. Geftler.

Publication of the material of the "round table" will be completed in the next issue.

"Conclusion.

The following spoke at the session of the "round table": G.G. Vodolazov (doctor of philosophical sciences, Academy of Social Sciences), Yu.A. Levada (doctor of philosophical sciences, USSR Academy of Sciences Central Economico-Mathematical Institute), G.G. Diligenskiy (doctor of historical sciences, MEMO), Yu.A. Burtin (USSR Writers Union), I.B. Levin (candidate of historical sciences, USSR Academy of Sciences International Workers Movement Institute), Ye.V. Ronkin (Voronozh), O.R. Kvirkveliya (candidate of historical sciences, USSR Academy of Sciences History of the USSR Institute), S.S. Neretina (candidate of philosophical sciences, USSR Academy of Sciences Philosophy Institute), V.L. Sheynis (doctor of economic sciences, USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO), T.S. Kondratyeva (Oriental Languages and Civilizations Institute, Paris), Z.P. Yakhimovich (doctor of historical sciences, USSR Academy of Sciences International Workers Movement Institute), I. Claudio (USSR and Central and East Europe Institute, Paris), B.G. Kapustin (candidate of philosophical sciences, Academy of Social Sciences), V.A. Chalikova (candidate of philosophical sciences, USSR Academy of Sciences Social Sciences Scientific Information Institute), M.Ya. Geftler (candidate of historical sciences) and I.K. Pantin (doctor of philosophical sciences, RK i SM).

*** Fortunately, perestroika is helping untie this knot also. In January 1989 acknowledgment of injustice in the dispute with the PCI in 1981-1982 could be read in the journal KOMMUNIST.

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Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev Blamed for Western Distrust of USSR

18070578 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 23 Mar 89 pp 2-3

[Article by Aleksey Novikov, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA observer: "Yesterday and Today"]

[Text] Of course, they also got into a conversation about Egypt... One of the pharaohs died in the Red Sea, pursuing the Hebrews, and Rededya examined that place personally. Old residents say that in old times there was a ford there, to the left, but the pharaoh made a mistake. He turned to the right and so he crashed with the chariot...

"I will not keep still," Rededya answered firmly, "as long as even one English tradesman remains in India—I will not keep still!"

The residents of Vesyegonsk heard these speeches and clapped their hands. And they shouted: Bravo, a Russian Garibaldi! Viva! Hurrah! And one younger man even began to sing: *Allons, enfants de la patrie...* ["Forward, sons of the homeland..."] (the Marseillaise).

We also clapped our hands with Glumov, first, because, try not to clap in this case and you will be among the traitors and, second, because, in essence, this was a kind of fiction and all of us—I am ashamed to say—have a weakness for fiction. Glumov very clearly expressed the general mood, saying:

"March, brother! Obviously, this is your fate... But buy Smirnov's geography, because otherwise, like the ancient pharaoh, you will go to the right and then you will disappear without a trace!"

N. SHCHEDRIN, "Sovremennaya idylliya" [Modern Idyll]

Speaking at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, E. A. Shevardnadze said: "There was a time when subtle topics were not touched upon and views, even inoffensive, but differing from official ones, were not expressed. That time is past now. But look what is happening: Bold, interesting, and debatable articles on many basic issues of internal life in all of its manifestations, party and state construction, economy, culture, art, and science have appeared, but there is nothing similar in the area of foreign policy. Is everything really correct here and are there no alternatives other than those being implemented? Is such conformism permissible today?"

No, it is not. That is why it is vitally necessary to objectively glance at what was wrong in our foreign policy. Mistakes should not be continued from yesterday to tomorrow. But, for a start, a short explanation.

I very much do not want this article to be perceived as just another session of the presently fashionable "public undressing" and confession of all conceivable sins. No, this is an attempt to comprehend why during many decades the Western world has perceived our country with such hostility and distrust and how big our own "contribution" to this is. Let the reader not get the impression that I put the entire blame for the long-term West-East confrontation on the Soviet Union—this would be foolish and unfair. The West has on its account a great number of adventuristic actions, political crimes, and "dirty" wars, beginning, if only, with the military intervention against Soviet Russia in 1918-1922 and so forth. They are well known and nothing can justify them.

However, nor should we run to another extreme, fully shifting the responsibility for the "cold war" years, international crises, and distrust to our Western opponents. In governments of bourgeois states and in the West's social and economic circles two approaches to the USSR—liberal and hard—always struggled. Our press traditionally called representatives of the former "doves" and representatives of the latter, "hawks." The Soviet Union is a reality, the "doves" said, and it is necessary to cooperate with it—this is a fact. Russia should be boycotted and, if we talk to it, then only in the language of force, demanded the "hawks." Unfortunately, Soviet diplomacy very often played into the hands of the latter.

The thesis on the "need to further strengthen trust between the West and the East" (or rather, the Soviet Union) was repeatedly encountered in the speeches of our "stagnant" leaders. However, it is hardly possible to strengthen what does not exist and never did. Yes, no matter how distressing it is to talk about this, it is finally necessary to admit that during many decades of the Soviet State trust in it did not exist in the foreign political arena. Why?

It is naive to assume that, having trampled down on the country's entire internal life, the command-bureaucratic system did not extend its tentacles to its foreign political relations. However, this did not begin right away. A healthy line, which N. I. Bukharin, M. M. Litvinov, M. N. Tukhachevskiy, I. P. Uborevich, and some others represented in the country's military and political leadership, still predominated in foreign policy during the first half of the 1930's. It is precisely to their credit that a plan appeared for the establishment of a collective security system, whose results were the entry of the USSR into the League of Nations and the conclusion of mutual assistance and nonaggression treaties with a number of countries. However, as a result of repressions, which followed after some time, the purge of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, and the ousting of M. M. Litvinov from the post of the people's commissar (the gloomy figure of V. M. Molotov took his place along with the post of chairman of the Council of People's Commissars), many experienced associates at this department were removed and people capable of thinking independently were destroyed. The foreign political course of the USSR took a 180-degree turn. The rapprochement and then also cooperation with Hitlerite Germany and confrontation with Russia's traditional, historical allies—England and France—these were only some of the steps that brought about the solitary political isolation in which our country found itself by June 1941.

This is what Doctor of Historical Sciences, Prof V. I. Dashichev thinks about this: "The foundations for this tremendous fear and distrust, which the West experienced with respect to the USSR, were laid down by Stalin during the period between the wars. For the West Stalinism turned into a scarecrow, because it embodied

ultra-leftist, dogmatic extremism, Messianism, hegemonism, treachery, and cruelty. The totalitarian dictatorship gave rise to voluntaristic decisions cut off from life, which were imposed by ideological dogmas of over 100 years' standing. Methods of state-political gangsterism—reprisals against millions of Soviet people and the country's transformation into a torture chamber—were also added to this. All this was carefully hidden from our people, but the West knew this perfectly well. Already then all this turned Stalin into 'persona non grata'—a person not desirable for Western policy (in diplomatic practice it is customary to call people expelled from a certain country for espionage and other illegal activities persona non grata—A. N.). Messianism, the attempt to 'make mankind happy' by imposing Stalin's dogmas on it, runs through many of his speeches. Moreover, in March 1939 at the 18th party congress L. Z. Mekhlis openly said that an increase in the number of Soviet republics would become one of the main tasks of the Red Army in a possible war. That is why an image of the enemy in the person of the Soviet Union was formed at that time. That is why in response to our expansionism of that time the West took the position of deterrence and later also of rejection of socialism—the Stalinist model of socialism."

That is why with Stalin's death in 1953 not only millions of GULAG [Main Administration of Corrective Labor Camps] prisoners, but also the entire civilized world, sighed with relief. It is not difficult to understand this relief. You will agree: It is very uncomfortable to have among one's opponents a militarily very strong power headed by an unpredictable tyrant, who, in addition, is obsessed by delusions of grandeur and omnipotence. The logic of distrust is understandable: If this man has been methodically destroying his own people over many years, what do all the rest matter to him—he will crush them without a moment's hesitation?

However, during those years the distrust syndrome affected not only "Westerners," but also us.

V. I. Dashichev: "The dictatorial system created by Stalin could exist only in isolation. That is why in the consciousness of the Soviet people for decades the Stalinist propaganda cultivated an image of the enemy in the person of all sorts of imperialists and their 'henchmen' inside the country. This was necessary in order to justify the criminal domestic and foreign policy of the leadership of that time: If there are enemies around, it means that it is impossible to do without terror and belligerence. For how many years were we brought up in the spirit of distrust of and hatred toward American imperialism, this attitude being carried over to the American people and to foreigners in general? Any contact with people 'from there' was prohibited, the entire Western press was driven into special library storage rooms, and the people were not informed of the real state of affairs in the West. Our scientists—philosophers, economists, and politologists—were oriented toward the application of old postulates to modern capitalism, which did not at

all resemble the capitalism of the last century. It was transformed by the scientific and technical revolution, which we missed owing to the fact that until very recently we lived by dogmas of 120 to 150 years' standing. However, this is absurd! Is it really possible to mechanically and vulgarly carry over the views of the last century—even if correct for that time—to the end of the 20th century? I consider this gap between the official state theory and real life one of the fundamental reasons why we have experienced so many difficulties in the country's internal life and, moreover, in foreign policy and continue to do so."

The 20th CPSU Congress, in addition to exposing Stalin's crimes, also became significant, because it stated: "There is no fatal inevitability of a war." "We assume," N. S. Khrushchev said at it, "that countries with different social systems can not merely exist next to each other. We must go further, toward an improvement in relations, toward the strengthening of trust among them, toward cooperation."

Many practical steps taken by the new head of the Soviet State in the international arena confirmed the sincerity of the peace-loving statements made by him from the tribune of the 20th congress and prior to it; for example, the trip in 1959 to the United States—the first visit by a Soviet leader to this country in history, the proposal during the same year for a universal and total disarmament within 4 years (completely unrealistic, like Khrushchev's many other projects), and, finally, the settlement of the dragged out Soviet-Yugoslav conflict provoked by Stalin's leadership in 1948. "Not a single step taken by the Soviet Government after Stalin's death for the purpose of relaxation of international tension," Richard Lewenthal, the famous West German publicist, wrote in 1968, "caused such a sensation as did the visit by top Soviet party and state leaders to Belgrad, which took place from 27 May to 2 June 1955."

Everything would have been good if not for one "but": For some reason the West did not rush to believe the sincerity of Soviet peacefulness. The distrustful view of USSR foreign policy characteristic of that time is contained, for example, in the work of Willi Schickling, a West German specialist in information problems. In his book with the eloquent title "Khrushchev's Barrel-Organ. Playing on Mankind's Nerves" he writes: "For periods when threats turn out to be insufficient Moscow also keep in its arsenal another weapon: coexistence slogans pleasant to the ear and calming, with which it hopes to lull the West. For Moscow coexistence is the continuation of the war by other means."

What is the reason for such distrust? It would seem that the dictator departed and the 20th congress specified everything. Yes, Stalin died, but Stalinism remained. It turned out to be more viable, including in foreign policy. As before, it was built on ideological dogmas and on the conviction that the Soviet Union was supposed to defend in the international arena some class interests in

detriment to general human interests. Having been formed as a political figure during the cult era, Khrushchev was unable to get away from many principles of Stalinism. As before, he viewed the arena of international relations as a gladiators' stadium, where capitalism and socialism fought to the death, until the complete victory of one and the defeat of the other. This concept of the class struggle in international relations would exist for a long time—more than 30 years—and until that time all our leaders, who professed it, strove primarily not so much to ensure genuine security as to achieve momentary tactical advantages in this planetary skirmish, in their irreconcilability and intractability coming to resemble Pentagon's "brass hats" only with an opposite sign.

The danger of such an approach became obvious during the Caribbean crisis of 1962, when the placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba brought the world literally to the threshold of a nuclear conflict. Fortunately, Soviet and American leaders had sufficient self-control and common sense in order to depart from the dangerous line.

In my opinion, the second reason for the post-Stalinist distrust of Soviet foreign policy lies in the character of N. S. Khrushchev himself. It is paradoxical, but he himself and his manner and style of behavior were the worst advertisement for his practical steps in the field of international relations. A man of moods, unsophisticated in diplomatic and, moreover, ordinary etiquette, with a loose and uncontrollable tongue, and hot-tempered, he could in one moment cancel out the vast efforts to stabilize the situation made not long before that. Here are only some "pearls" from N. S. Khrushchev's speeches in New York in October 1960. "We would say, as we, Russians, do in such cases: 'Get out!... And the one that pokes his nose into this—pardon such an indelicate, but quite graphic, expression—will get it in his face!'" "Wake up, pinch yourself in a sore spot if it is difficult for you to keep away from drowsiness." "Yes, we left the Committee of Five..., because you, gentlemen, turned this committee into a stable. You made such a stench there that an honest person could not breathe and we went away." "What did Mr Macmillan (Great Britain's prime minister—A. N.) propose from this tribune? He said: We must do the following: Let us meet and establish a political committee. Let us establish a scientific committee. And this scientific committee will determine how best to kill the flea—to pull out its legs or to tear off its head." These are the expressions with which the Soviet Union tried to convince the world community of the need for disarmament...

Judge for yourselves: What opinion can be formed of the sincerity of a leader, who along with appeals for universal and total disarmament frequently says that we make "missiles like frankfurters" and that an accurate Soviet missile can "hit a fly in outer space." Or, for example, in January 1960 N. S. Khrushchev announces a reduction of Soviet land forces by 1.2 million, but, at the same time, he states: "... The weapons that we already have are

formidable and those that are about to appear, so to speak, are even more perfect and even more formidable... The Soviet Army now has in its hands combat means and fire power, which not a single army has ever had... If some madman were to provoke an attack on our state, or on other socialist states, we could literally wipe out the country or the countries attacking us from the face of the earth." Obviously, such a warlike declaration virtually nullifies the entire propaganda effect from an important foreign political step. There were also more vivid cases, for example, such as swearing and banging with a boot on the table during a meeting of the UN General Assembly on 12 October 1960.

Thus, Khrushchev fought with... Khrushchev, canceling out his concrete steps, which were unequivocally useful for the fates of the world, with his tricks, which were difficult to explain and unforgivable for a statesman of such scope. Therefore, it is not surprising that those at whom the peace-loving appeals of the USSR were directed did not rush to throw themselves into our arms.

The year 1964 became a thing of the past and eccentric Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, with it. L. I. Brezhnev was at the helm of the state, but the foreign political concept did not undergo any significant changes. Despite short-term bright spots (for example, the signing of SALT-1 and SALT-2 treaties, which remained unratified), as before, the prospects for international security seemed bleak. When in 1980 the Administration of President R. Reagan, who decided "to make America strong," came to power in the United States, impenetrable clouds completely obscured the horizon. And this even though during the years of Brezhnev's rule more than ever many peace-loving proposals of all sorts were made.

I remember how during my years at the institute—in the middle of the 1970's—bewilderment arose in me and then began to increase: How is that? Remarkable, wonderful peace initiatives delighting all progressive mankind are pouring as from a horn of abundance, but those at whom they are addressed do not even react. As there was no stability, so there is no stability. Expressions heard from the highest tribunes become increasingly sharper and the atmosphere of distrust, increasingly denser. Understanding came later.

Like any major phenomenon of a foreign political nature the aggravation of Soviet-American relations in the 1970's-1980's has several reasons. First, the categorical unwillingness, which existed on both sides, to give up even one iota of one's global geopolitical interests and the desire to defend them at almost any price (there is no need to cite examples—everyone remembers them); second, the continuing excessive ideologization of interstate relations and the stubborn unwillingness, so to say, "to forgo principles."

The peak of the psychological war occurred precisely during those times. The fact that our leadership of that time joined this dangerous game with fervor largely wiped off the propaganda effect from its numerous peace-loving demarches, which even without that were represented by the Western press as the "traditional Russian hypocrisy" and "false propaganda." After all, what was intended for "internal use" was so strikingly different from the "export version."

Our press of those years confidently nicknamed President Reagan a "hawk" (which, in general, corresponded to the truth) and a "blatant anti-Soviet and anti-communist" and every one of his bellicose statements was immediately repeated in dozens of editorial articles and commentaries. However, the bad luck lay in the fact that the verbal duel was waged virtually in expressions equal in strength. Compare for yourselves. R. Reagan: "... The march of freedom and democracy will lead to the fact that Marxism-Leninism will remain on history's site of fire." L. I. Brezhnev: "... Imperialism as a social system was and remains the main obstacle on the path of mankind's historically inevitable movement toward the triumph of freedom, peace, and democracy." Reagan calls for a "crusade against communism" and Brezhnev says that the "task of our time is the establishment of a worldwide anti-imperialist front." Reagan calls the Soviet Union the "empire of evil" and Brezhnev talks about the "danger of the main force of world reaction—U.S. imperialism—which is being established." Is there a big difference? These statements were made during different years, but they give an idea of the level at which the Soviet-American dialogue was conducted.

We have always extremely painfully reacted to all the attacks by the West addressed at communism and socialism, that is, we related them directly to ourselves. For example, let us take the words uttered by the Soviet leader in 1969: "Communists are called upon to be in the vanguard of the fight against imperialism on the entire front, including its ideological section. We are convinced that by joint efforts it is possible to decisively defeat imperialism along all lines and to win a worldwide victory in the fight for the cause of the working class and all workers" (my emphasis—A. N.). In your opinion, how should West Germans, Frenchmen, Englishmen, and Americans—in brief, those who directly live under the conditions of this imperialism itself—regard this statement? The answer is simple: as the manifestation of "Soviet aggressiveness" and "Moscow's attempt to implant communism by force in all the parts of the world." In turn, who stands to gain from this? Our opponents and they alone.

The obstinacy of Soviet diplomacy, which was unexplainable at times, undoubtedly, contributed to the fact that until recently our appeals to disarm hanged in the air. Not in vain was the nickname "Mr No" firmly attached to Soviet diplomats in the West. Speaking about the principles of foreign policy, as long ago as 1917 V. I. Lenin insisted: "Ultimatum-ism can prove to be

disastrous for our entire cause... Ultimatum-ism will facilitate the position of our opponents." Unfortunately, this Leninist appeal, like many others, was forgotten by our leaders of past years. Apparently, they did not realize that in foreign policy it is possible to advance only through compromises, mutual concessions, and good will. Such a reinforced concrete position enabled President Reagan, soon after the signing of the INF Treaty, to declare that this agreement was the embodiment of the "zero option," which he, Reagan, had already proposed in the early 1980's and, consequently, the U.S. position on this matter was primordially more constructive.

Although the "zero option" did not provide for a reduction of shorter-range missiles, ultimately, it happened, in fact, almost as Reagan proposed: zero medium-range missiles both in the USSR and in the United States. According to the INF Treaty, we even undertook to reduce more nuclear systems than the Americans, which enabled some to ask the following question: Do we not act in detriment to our security? However, in addition to the arithmetic of missiles, the algebra of trust—a science much subtler and less mastered by us—also exists. According to its laws, it turns out that such "detriment" from the INF Treaty in no way can belittle the vast importance of and political benefits from this document. This is the alpha and beta of new thinking inaccessible to the foreign policy of "stagnation."

I remember how several years ago I was present at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during a briefing for Soviet journalists, where we were "pumped" in connection with the negotiations on the ban on and elimination of chemical weapons. In particular, it was stated there that the signing of the convention was delayed owing to the fact that we categorically opposed on-site inspections, not wishing to allow inspectors from the West on our territory. "Why?", one of my colleagues asked. "Where is the logic?" The official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs only shrugged his shoulders coolly: "I don't know. In fact, this is our weak spot. Therefore, try to bypass it."

Indeed, the verification problem was always the weak spot of our diplomacy and the most different negotiations very often were held up precisely by it. For example, the attempts on the part of the West to "impose" on-site inspections on us were unambiguously perceived by the Soviet side as an encroachment on our state secrets and, of course, this did not make our positions stronger. Once they are afraid of inspections, it means that they do not intend to observe the agreement and in such a case why should we come to an agreement about something with them at all! It is not difficult to guess such a logic of reasoning produced by our former obstinacy. Hence the suspicion and the constant accusations of "violations" of all kinds of agreements by the Soviet Union. The verification system developed within the framework of the INF Treaty (incidentally, it also provides for the right to an unexpected on-site inspection, which should be realized at the request of any side)

represents a striking contrast to this literally stagnant, die-hard position. No one will be able to accuse us of having a knife in our pocket.

The logomachy continued for years and, since it was absolutely impossible to attain something by means of it, simultaneously with this the powers continued to compete in the arms race, against the background of which mutual appeals to disarm began to look completely like ritual incantations. The 19th All-Union Party Conference stated the following about this: "... Having concentrated vast resources and attention on the military aspect of the counteraction against imperialism, we have not always taken advantage of... political opportunities. As a result, we allowed ourselves to be pulled into the arms race, which could not fail to affect the country's social and economic development and its international situation. Meanwhile, the arms race was approaching the critical mark. Against this background our traditional political and public activity in favor of peace and disarmament began to lose its persuasiveness. If to state this more sharply, not breaking the logic of such development, we could have really been on the brink of a military confrontation."

Having forgotten about the golden rule of diplomacy, that is, to acquire friends, with our policy we more often made enemies for ourselves. In the history of international relations it never happened that the United States, England, France, Japan, and China—in one way or another—together came out against one country. We encountered such a situation for the first time.

The decision to bring troops to Afghanistan, which was opposed by most members of the world community, also seriously undermined confidence in the USSR. In 1987 the number of votes cast at the United Nations for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan exceeded 120.

Afghanistan, more than anything else, united the opponents of the Soviet Union and placed powerful trump cards in the hands of advocates of the hard line and of the extreme right anti-Soviet propaganda. Many people in the West—and not only there—who before that time had not managed to develop a certain attitude toward our country, sharply swayed to the right. A "trifle"—the clumsily "intercepted" South Korean Boeing—was needed for the stereotype—"Soviets are the empire of evil"—to be firmly imprinted in the consciousness of the Western inhabitant for many years. Thus, drop by drop, through the efforts of our die-hard ill-wishers, into whose hands we too often played, an image of an enemy in the person of the Soviet Union was formed. Moreover, this idea was carried over to our entire nation, producing in Englishmen, Frenchmen, Americans, and so forth confidence that the "Russians are a nation of barbarians and potential oppressors." How some simple country boy from Ryazan, who hardly made ends meet, would have been surprised if he found out that in distant and

unknown America he was considered an aggressor, such a bloodthirsty Tamerlan of the 20th century! However, this is what he was considered.

The inconsistency and often absolute inexplicability of certain foreign political steps and the lack of discrimination in the choice of "friends," who often included odious individuals, at times made us a laughing stock in the eyes of the civilized world and enabled our ill-wishers once more to accuse the Soviet Union of immorality and a lack of principles. For example, having deservedly anathemized the regime of the "black colonels" in Greece, we nevertheless maintained fully normal relations with the military junta in Argentina, where lawlessness reigned, torture flourished, and hundreds of people guilty of nothing disappeared without a trace and then were eliminated. This is understandable—we buy wheat from Argentina.

At one time we flirted with the "Khmer Rouge." This was at the time when Kampuchea literally gushed blood and was thrown into a primitive chaos. I will never forget the following episode: When the monstrous crimes of the Pol Pot political system had already become the property of glasnost in our country as well, when Soviet newspapers had published photographs of hundreds of thousands of skulls piled up in rows, we in the editorial department received a letter. Asking "how to explain this?", the reader sent a clipping from PRAVDA of 20 April 1976: "To Pol Pot, Prime Minister of Democratic Kampuchea. On behalf of the Soviet Government and from me personally I send you greetings on the occasion of your appointment as prime minister of Democratic Kampuchea. I wish you success in your activity aimed at solving the important problems facing your country. I express confidence that friendly relations between our nations will develop further." And a signature of one of our state leaders. I shelved the letter, not knowing what to answer the reader.

For example, why did we like Idi Amin Dada, a former boxer, sadist, maniac and, along with this, president of Uganda? Did he not become dear to us, because he challenged the old and weak Golda Meir, who was Israel's prime minister at that time, to a boxing duel?

Now we, normal people, do not understand the logic of such actions, but guys like Idi Amin immediately caught on how to conduct themselves with our leaders of that time. One has only to state publicly that "the USSR is the bulwark of peace on earth" and "the support of the national liberation movement" and it is enough to express several times delight in connection of the "new impressive peace initiatives made by Leonid Brezhnev" (with which the African princeling had nothing to do) and one can ask for everything—construction, weapons, and money... J. Bokassa, the cannibal-president of the Central African Republic, formulated the essence of this

philosophy with disgusting frankness, saying approximately the following: The only thing that I need is money. If they give me little money, I am silent and, if much, I smile, and I can even smile broadly.

In order to become one of our friends, it was only necessary to be called "poor, but very progressive" and success was ensured. The very concept of "progressiveness" was distorted beyond recognition—by it were meant flattery and servility at an international level; of course, not always, but quite, even too, often. If he praises, he is progressive; if he curses, he is an imperialist yes-man. It is quite obvious that such a tactic in no way contributed to a rise in USSR prestige in the international arena. After all, in foreign policy, as in ordinary life, there is the principle: Tell me who your friend is...

A person who is not very experienced in politics can ask in puzzlement: "Strictly speaking, in what does this revolution of Gorbachev lie in the international arena? What has he done? After all, our previous leaders, including even Stalin, talked about the need for peaceful coexistence. In fact, they talked. However, peaceful coexistence according to Brezhnev and Khrushchev was considered the continuation of the class struggle. Socialism and capitalism—two systems—remained irreconcilable enemies. They did not accept us, nor we them. It is clear that with such a situation appeals for disarmament from both sides remained words: Who will disarm himself when an enemy is in front of him? Not having resolved political contradictions, we sought a world without arms, thereby putting the cart before the horse. In chess terminology such a situation is called a stalemate. The arms race continued to unfold. It is not that some of the parties would seriously nurture plans for a nuclear attack—no. In this terrible competition efforts were made not to attain a superiority, but not to give the opponent such an opportunity. Mutual distrust and, as a consequence, the concept of a "balance of forces" (or of a "balance of fear"—in principle, this is the same) triumphed.

A "balance of interests"—this is how the foreign political concept formulated by the new Soviet leadership after the 27th party congress can be designated. Trust and understanding that today not a single country can safeguard its security alone should become its basis. For this, however, it is necessary to withdraw the soundproof wall of ideological battles from the practice of an interstate dialogue. "The Soviet Union comes out in favor of the deideologization of international relations and for the exclusion of the self-contained component of ideological differences from foreign policy and diplomacy... The leadership of the Soviet Union tried to more profoundly interpret the idea of interconnection of the class and the general human [element] primordially inherent in Marxism, giving priority to interests common for all nations. In our view of peaceful coexistence... it does not appear as a special form of the class struggle." E. A. Shevardnadze, USSR minister of foreign affairs, uttered these words last September. Mounting the same platform

2 months later, M. S. Gorbachev expressed himself even more definitely: "In the past differences often served as a factor tearing us away from each other. Now they have the opportunity to be a factor in mutual enrichment and mutual attraction." The struggle of ideologies should not be carried over to relations among states, "otherwise we simply will not be able to solve any world problem."

Ten years ago such words would have seemed to be sedition. How is that: "respect for the views and positions of others, tolerance, readiness to perceive something different not necessarily as bad or hostile, and the ability to learn to live side by side, remaining different and not in agreement on everything with each other." This is defeatism and conformism! In actual fact, this is realism and understanding that it is impossible to force and, moreover, there is no point in forcing the entire world to dance to someone's tune and that everyone is free to live as he wishes, at the same time, not necessarily being the "enemy of everything that is progressive." Finally, this is a real realization that all of us are equally threatened by a common danger and that the ashes of socialism will differ in nothing from the ashes of capitalism.

However, these are only the first, although very important, steps.

V. I. Dashichev: "For the accomplishment of such a fundamental task as the restoration of political trust between the USSR and the West it is necessary to solve an entire set of priority problems; first, our internal development. It is precisely by this that the West will primarily judge the nature of USSR foreign policy. After all, it is well known that foreign policy is determined by internal policy and is born at home. Suffice it to recall how under Chernenko Molotov was rehabilitated and reinstated in the party. After that it was begun to be written that Stalin's complete rehabilitation was contemplated and this had a very negative effect on the West's attitude toward Soviet leadership and Soviet policy—it sharply swang away from a search for agreements.

Second, our military might always formed the basis for the West's fear of the Soviet Union. To this day we maintain a very big army—perhaps, the biggest in the world. However, is there a need for this? In addition to the fact that in itself it is absurd to have a huge land army during the nuclear missile age, another question arises: Who really threatens us now? Who can attack us—the United States, England, France, or the FRG? These countries are not at all interested in a war. Therefore, now it is absolutely unrealistic to talk about aggressive schemes of Western powers with respect to the USSR. Obviously, the time has come to give thought to radical reductions of the armed forces and their fundamental reform. This process has already begun, but it should continue and proceed simultaneously with a constant improvement in the system of general European security and cooperation along the path of establishing purely defensive armed forces—in their arms, structure, and deployment—at the most minimal

level with the withdrawal of troops from foreign territories so that neither in the West, nor in the East would there be fears in connection with a possible attack.

Third, it is necessary to change the concept of the goals of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe. According to how we build relations with socialist countries the West will begin to judge the nature of our policy in general. After all, how was it earlier? Stalin, in an attempt to establish political rule in Eastern Europe, tried to completely unify all socialist countries according to the image and likeness of the Soviet Union of that time and to make them fit into the same pattern. Brezhnev acted as the protector of the system established by Stalin. He hindered in every possible way the implementation in socialist countries of any reforms whatsoever, although they were long imminent. Our present leadership proclaimed, as one of the main foreign political principles, the freedom of choice, embarking on the path of partnership based on equality and noninterference in the internal affairs of socialist countries. Now they seek forms of a social-economic and political system most suitable for themselves and each country will have its own specific features. This should not be hindered.

Fourth, on my part I will add the following: Previous errors and failures in our foreign policy became possible owing to the lack of competence, as well as of control, on the part of our previous top leadership. The most important decisions were adopted secretly, in a voluntaristic manner, and often by two or three people. Such a practice is deeply faulty. Within the framework of the reform of our political system it is necessary to establish mechanisms (in many other countries they have existed for a long time and function efficiently), which would make the process of adopting foreign political decisions open and democratic and, consequently, effective and insured against distortions and mistakes. They could be permanent commissions on foreign affairs under both chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet endowed with the right to discuss, correct, approve, or reject draft solutions proposed by the government. Naturally, primarily scientists, experts, and public figures well familiar with all the nuances of the foreign political process should participate in their work.

Finally, the last consideration. It is necessary to finally and most decisively remove the vestiges of the "iron curtain" and to open our country so that Russia may cease to be "mysterious" for the West and it, an accumulation of all kinds of nasty things, the Sodom and Gomorrah of the 20th century, for us. Enough of thinking that every foreigner comes to us only, as expressed by Bulgakov's Fagot, to "spy like the worst son of a bitch." Enough of protecting the "ideological effectiveness" of the Soviet people—they will not be recruited. "Voices" are no longer suppressed, censorship stamps have disappeared from Western journals and newspapers, and they have come out of special library storage rooms. This is good, but not enough. There is a need for a wide exchange of information, books, music, and, above all, people. True international relations are impossible without unrestricted mass communication among nations.

Discussion of 'Peaceful Coexistence' As Form of Class Struggle

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[Letter from a reader and comment by A. Podberezkin, lead scientific associate with the World Economy and International Relations Institute, under "Contemporary World: Problems, Trends and Contradictions" rubric: "Peaceful Coexistence in the Light of the New Political Thinking: Letter from a Reader and Point of View of a Scientist"]

[Text] There was a time when an important thesis in our international publicist activity was the idea that the peaceful coexistence of states with different social orders is a specific form of class struggle. But subsequently this thesis was removed.

Books and articles at the end of the 1970's and beginning of the 1980's paid great attention to the fact that certain principles of peaceful coexistence extend only to relations between states and not to "relations of systems" and it turned out that there were two spheres of politics: relations between states on the basis of peaceful coexistence and relations between socialism and capitalism. In the latter case, the class antagonism is not ceasing but is spreading to antagonism between the two systems.

It appears that this theory arose in the course of political antagonism with the West on the question of the nature of detente. The United States and several of its allies understood detente as the "rules of the game" regulating not only the bilateral relations of our countries but also their relations with states, parties and social forces. But was it not apparent here that the West desired to limit the ties of the socialist countries with the movements for social and national liberation? For the United States itself did not intend to reduce its support of proimperialist regimes and counterrevolutionary movements!

Political practice and especially the negotiations between Gorbachev and Reagan and their results show that flexibility in politics requires certain compromises and reciprocal concessions for the achievement of higher objectives—the lessening of tension, disarmament (the first step was the INF Treaty), and the resolution of the problem of regional conflicts. But then what is to become of the postulate on the class-antagonistic nature of the contradictions between socialism and capitalism?

This is when our theoreticians worked out the concept of the division of relations between states and relations between systems: detente and consequently compromises and concessions are possible only in the first area, whereas in the second there must be a continuation of the irreconcilable class (ideological) struggle. It seemed that this saved the position on the antagonism of the two

systems. At the same time, there were demands not to allow the spread of the ideological conflicts between systems to relations between states.

In summary, our international publicist activity, criticizing in the 1970's the American idea of the "end of ideology," simultaneously criticized Reagan for "ideologizing" foreign policy. Apparently all of this theoretical confusion was influenced by the general state of our social sciences that had bogged down in a swamp of dogmatism, apologetics and conformism during the period of stagnation.

It is obvious that international relations are not equivalent to relations between states. But what we understand by "relations of systems" is embodied in the relations of specific states and their coalitions and organizations. This is perhaps especially apparent in the work of such "channels" of the ideological struggle as propaganda and the exchange of information. Thus, direct television broadcasting by satellite became an acute problem in relations between states.

As I see it, today it is necessary to seek common interests not only in relations between states but also in the area of the interaction between socialism and capitalism, that is, between systems. The unacceptability of mutual destruction is obvious and one cannot permanently live on the verge of war....

Let us recall the New Delhi Declaration on the Principles for a Nonviolent World free of Nuclear Weapons signed by M.S. Gorbachev and R. Gandhi (1986). It expresses a new understanding of the very idea of peaceful coexistence: "Peaceful coexistence must become the universal norm of international relations...." Faithfulness to these principles was also affirmed in the course of the December (1988) visit of the Soviet leader to India.

Thus, coexistence of two systems? And not for a short time but for an entire historical epoch. But this means that the systems must engage in continuous dialogue, adapt to each other, enrich one another and compete. Not to the detriment but to the benefit of the future!

We must now look at the Western world in a different way and free ourselves of stereotypes that demonize capitalism. I believe that this is very important at the present time, when we are taking the first steps in accordance with the principles of the New Delhi Declaration.

[signed] Captain of the Reserves Yu. Darbovskiy, head of the department for computers and programming of the Ternopol Finance and Economic Institute and member of the party committee.

FROM THE EDITOR'S OFFICE: In our view, the author of the letter stated interesting but not entirely undisputed opinions on the approaches and criteria for the assessment of contemporary international relations and

expressed his own view of peaceful coexistence. But what do specialists in international affairs think about this? We asked A. Podberezkin, a lead scientific associate at the World Economy and International Relations Institute, to respond to this letter. He is the author of numerous works on military-political problems and on contemporary international relations and a candidate of historical sciences.

The explosion of interest in theory and the quite professional approach of people who would seem to be outside international practical affairs is a characteristic feature of our time. This means that theory, including the theory of international relations, has ceased to be exclusively a matter for professionals. And the area of the foreign policy of the CPSU has ceased to be a "zone of silence" and has become accessible to critical examination.

Yes, all of this indicates an increased interest of the Soviet people in the foreign political activities of our state and in the overall democratization of the process of preparing and making the most important political decisions. The letter from Yu. Karbovskiy serves as an example of this. Without in any event claiming absolute correctness or the official statement of positions, I would like to express my opinion and, in some instances, argue with Yu. Karbovskiy, believing that this dispute may be useful to readers as well.

The author of the letter considers the thesis of peaceful coexistence to have disappeared without a trace. But it is not just that there have been and are disputes about this. They were reflected in party documents, including the materials of the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

Yu. Karbovskiy quite justifiably, in my view, noted the contradictory nature of the treatment of the thesis on peaceful coexistence as a specific form of class struggle. On the one hand, such treatment reduced relations between states to simple relations "without wars" and, on the other hand, it acknowledged the antagonistic character of such relations and the class nature of the struggle as applied to relations between social and political systems.

It is indeed difficult to hide the contradictory nature of such treatment, which, of course, did not remain a secret for foreign ideologists either. They skillfully took advantage of this contradiction and made extensive use of it in their ideological and political actions. The dialectical interrelationship between the contradictions of different systems and between states is obvious.

The application of the thesis on peaceful coexistence as a specific form of class struggle caused considerable confusion and objectively contributed to the undermining of belief in the humanism and antiwar nature of our foreign policy. All of this allowed E.A. Shevardnadze to declare with complete justification the erroneousness of this thesis and the fact that the "anti-Leninist principles on

peaceful coexistence as a specific form of class struggle" had a negative influence on the ideas of the world public about the Soviet Union and its policies.

The priority of common human interests over class interests in the present day is a most important theoretical conclusion of our party and a specific manifestation of the new political thinking in theory. This is why the recognition of the erroneousness of this thesis is one of the key aspects in the understanding of the essence of the reassessment of priorities that took place in our country after the April (1985) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and requires a more detailed examination.

It appears that the acknowledgement of peaceful coexistence as a specific form of class struggle is one of the dogmata of thought inherent in the period of stagnation. For this dogma essentially denied the evolution of forms of struggle that have quite definite differences in different periods of history.

Humanity in the last third of the 20th century is distinguished, and fundamentally so, from humanity at the beginning or even middle of our century. The acceleration of scientific-technical progress, the transition to an information society, the profound structural changes in the economy, integration and, finally—the main thing—the appearance and subsequent exacerbation of global problems are "acquisitions" of the current stage in the development of civilization. All of this indicates that qualitative changes took place in humanity itself and in the nature of the stage of development being experienced, changes that do not permit the mechanical utilization of the criteria and concepts of past decades.

And today it seems wrong to think that the primary tendency in world development is the conflict of two social and economic systems and their struggle (even excluding the crudest and most direct forms of armed coercion).

From the "Noosphere" of Vernadskiy to New Thinking

It is becoming more and more clear that the interconnection and interdependence of the world, our house for all mankind, is now becoming paramount. Completely new circumstances are forming for the development not of some particular state or class but of all mankind.

As early as the first half of the 20th century, the great Russian scientist V.I. Vernadskiy put forth the concept of a "noosphere" (sphere of reason) as a concept for an interconnected and interdependent world. Under these conditions, in equating international relations with class struggle, it is difficult to reconcile this struggle with the acknowledgement of the possibility and inevitability of peaceful coexistence as the highest universal principle and mutually advantageous cooperation of states with different social and political orders.

An extremely dangerous situation arose in the world in the first half of the 1980's. Mankind had never before in its history faced a military threat of this qualitatively new and extremely dangerous scale and nature. There was an increasing need for the urgent resolution of the global problems facing humanity: ecological, economic, political, military, etc., the uncontrolled development of which began to threaten human civilization and life itself on earth.

The resolution of these problems, having been put off year after year, became an urgent necessity requiring the combined resources of all mankind and the implementation of a coordinated and long-term policy for a high degree of cooperation and mutual understanding. The "mere" absence of wars during a continuing arms race with dangerous technological consequences as well as the larger and larger scale of the arms trade has already become clearly inadequate for the effective escape from the existing situation.

In this way, individual states, peoples and continents found themselves not only interconnected but also interdependent. Their actions—whether they so desire or not—are determined to a considerable extent by objective reasons, including the reaction of public opinion in other states. The example of Chernobyl is just one, albeit very spectacular, event illustrating this conclusion.

The 27th CPSU Congress not merely drew the conclusion about the interrelated and interdependent world but also showed the specific directions for the elimination of obstacles in the way of the development of this tendency. And the scientific-technical revolution, which entered a new stage at the beginning of the 1980's, presented mankind with a large set of urgent problems.

In essence, the scientific-technical revolution is now developing "explosively," in a number of cases completely changing past notions on scientific-technical progress, the economy, information, and the social life of the society. The "computerized society" of the 1980's is in many ways a society completely different from, let us say, that of the 1960's. Unfortunately, progress in our country has not been as apparent as in the West, where the computer has become part of the everyday culture and ordinary life of the individual.

Precisely these processes, as was noted at the 27th CPSU Congress, "initiated a gigantic increase in the material and spiritual possibilities of man." But they also raised very acute problems, two of which I would like to point out: how to prevent the utilization of the latest achievements of the scientific-technical revolution to the detriment of mankind and—even more to the point—how can man get control over his development. For if the situation remains in its previous "uncontrolled" form, in a manner of speaking, then inevitably a catastrophe will occur.

The second problem is how to avoid being left off the main paths of development of the scientific-technical revolution, how not to lose time and therefore not be cast aside by history, and how not to become "technologically dependent" upon advanced countries. Both of these questions are so major that they have attained extremely great political importance. Today they have become top-priority political problems facing governments as well as the public of all states.

These trends coincided in time with the coming to power of conservative circles in a number of Western countries, circles that openly proclaimed that they were betting on "social revenge" in the world. It appears that such a coincidence was no accident. At the beginning of the 1980's, the political forces of the conservative (and sometimes rightwing) persuasion that had taken the helm of foreign policy in a number of Western countries formulated their ambitious and hegemonic objectives rather clearly. It is very important to remember that the goal of leaving socialism on the "rubbish heap of history" and of attaining the possibility of victory in a nuclear war was openly formulated by the administration of the United States.

Under R. Reagan, there was a search for new means and forms of utilizing military force as an instrument of foreign policy and as a means of putting pressure on the policies of the USSR and other states. There was an increase in adventurism and hegemonism in Washington's political course throughout the world. All of this provided justification for the conclusion drawn at the 27th CPSU Congress that the leading circles in the United States are clearly losing touch with reality in this complex period of history.

The political aims of American leading circles and their striving to utilize the achievements of the new stage in the scientific-technical revolution led to the arms race entering into a qualitatively new stage of development. It encompassed all types and systems of weapons and military equipment and all forms of military activity. In other words, a qualitatively new process of mass overarmament began.

The new leadership of the CPSU quite precisely assessed this level of danger hanging over humanity, having declared at the party conference that never before in the postwar decades had the situation in the world been so explosive and therefore complex and unfavorable as in the first half of the 1980's.

This qualitatively new level of military danger also required a search for qualitatively new means of overcoming it. The previous traditional means and forms turned out to be ineffective. In my view, among such ineffective measures were military technical means of foreign policy, which in past years were given more attention than political means in a number of cases. The

exceptional nature of the situation within our country and in the world as a whole required exceptional measures, nontraditional approaches and decisions.

The search for such effective and exceptional measures aimed at utilizing "even the smallest chance to stop the trend toward greater military danger before it is too late" required a rethinking of previous foreign policy concepts and approaches. And in the light of the new political thinking, it required recognition of the previous skewness (in a number of cases) in the direction of military technological means of guaranteeing national security.

Nontraditional Approaches

It was also natural to reconsider the thesis on peaceful coexistence as a specific form of class struggle. But the recognition of this in theory and in practice hardly means that the policies of states have ceased to be class policies and to be determined by the interests of the ruling classes, social strata and groups. And such an approach "does not repeal" the inherent laws on class struggle and the conflict of interests of states in the political arena. To think this way is knowingly to idealize the situation in the world and the policies of the ruling circles of the capitalist states.

No, the world has not turned into some kind of "paradise without conflicts," where complete harmony prevails and there is absolute conformity of interests! Today it is essential to maintain balance in assessments and to watch the development of international events closely. And, as V.I. Lenin taught us, it is necessary always to be on the alert.

What is the meaning today of the incorrect recognition of the thesis on peaceful coexistence as a specific form of class struggle? The common human interest is put above all other interests (state, class, strata, groups, individuals, etc.). It has priority over class interest. In this way, peaceful coexistence became a universal need and a principle of international relations.

Many may not agree with me but I personally like the point of view of the well-known publicist and international specialist A.Ye. Bovin, who thinks that the principle of peaceful coexistence does not boil down to nonaggression and the nonuse of force but represents a complex political and legal structure, elements of which are the general democratic standards for relations between states.

Here I might add a high level of cooperation of states in the resolution of bilateral as well as international problems. But if one considers that peaceful coexistence (which integrates such general democratic norms as noninterference in internal affairs, respect for sovereignty, development of cooperation in many areas, including extensive contacts between citizens of states, etc.) is equivalent to a form of class struggle, then such an identification is quite contradictory.

In my view, then, the principle of peaceful coexistence is a universal common democratic and common human principle for the development of mutual relations between states with different social and political systems, and sometimes with different interests and objectives, in the achievement of which it is necessary to consider the priority of common human interests and objectives.

In touching on this problem at a meeting with representatives of the "Trilateral Commission" in January 1989, M.S. Gorbachev emphasized: "We need to approach the very idea of peaceful coexistence in a different way, taking into account the current formidable risks as well as the circumstance that all of us have become substantially more dependent upon each other. The attempts to overcome conflicts between systems by way of the arms race and the preparation for war turned out to be unrealistic and extremely dangerous. There is only one way out: let each system show its capability to adapt to new realities and processes, whereas differences need to be viewed as an incentive for exchange and interaction and as a beneficial source for both sides."

The principle of peaceful coexistence now meets the main foreign policy objective of the USSR and other states of the Warsaw Pact. This is the provision, primarily through political means, of peaceful and favorable conditions for the successful development of socialism in fraternal countries. Hence the appearance of a phenomenon such as the new political thinking. It required a drastic renewal of our foreign policy and a mechanism for its implementation.

The essence of such renewal is to see and find new possibilities for opposing the policy of force on a broader, more democratic and more humane political basis than before. This thought expressed at the 19th All-Union Party Conference is extremely important. It develops, as it were, the theme of the 27th CPSU Congress that the security of states cannot be guaranteed through military technical means alone. Yes, we recognize that the bias in the direction of military technical means of ensuring national security that has taken place in our policies was not only erroneous but also hopeless. The focus of efforts in guaranteeing national security in our time is shifting in the direction of political means.

In my view, this tendency will continue to develop with the humanization of international relations, their demilitarization, and the increased importance of moral standards, legal guarantees and the influence of public opinion and international organizations.

Defense Policy: Priority of Qualitative Parameters

How can the principle of peaceful coexistence be viewed from the position of the recently announced defensive character of Warsaw Pact doctrine? Obviously international relations must develop in the direction of the maximum optimization of defensive measures. But in

practice they must be developed and realized taking into consideration the main requirement—the prevention of war and the lowering of the level of military confrontation.

At the same time, the priority of political measures does not at all mean that military technical means have completely lost their importance. The emphasis on military force by the United States and NATO requires from the Soviet Union and its allies constant readiness to defend themselves through military means as well.

The question of what means and how they should be employed became one of the central questions. An answer was given to it at the 19th Party Conference from the positions of the new political thinking.

Today, as never before, the capability of the armed forces to be effective in carrying out the set tasks does not depend upon the number of systems for armed combat but upon their quality. Quality, as you know, is determined by the level of the technological, scientific-technical and economic development of the state. And the very concept of "state power" is increasingly being determined not by the criteria of its military might but by the level of the technological and economic development and moral-political potential of the society.

The concept of reasonable sufficiency, or sufficiency for defense, has become an integral part of the military doctrine of the USSR and Warsaw Pact. From the point of view of international relations, it is called upon to dispel fears still existing in the West with respect to the intentions of the USSR and its allies in the military area. So this concept serves to establish a more favorable political and psychological climate on the planet.

The major initiatives of the USSR for the reduction of armed forces and arms declared on a unilateral basis by the Soviet leadership in December 1988 as well as analogous initiatives of our allies in the Warsaw Pact serve the cause of strengthening peace, security and trust. And do the data that we published at the end of January 1989 on the strength of the armies and arms of the Warsaw Pact member states not help strengthen the climate of trust?

Today it is no longer possible to resolve a huge number of increasingly acute common human problems under the conditions of hostility and increasing confrontation. Ideological and political disagreements must not become the focus for the formation of international relations of a new type and the interrelations of countries and peoples. Such disagreements are not a subject for dispute with the help of military force but the subject for political discussions and the search for nonmilitary means of resolving conflicts.

Just as before, of course, we see the depth of the differences between the two social forces but this is no reason for a power confrontation and confrontation of states.

In this way, the principle of peaceful coexistence concentrates an entire complex of positions of a common democratic and common human nature. The policies of new thinking, which have guided Soviet leaders in recent years, not only recognized the erroneousness of its treatment as a "specific form of class struggle" but also saturated it with essentially new political content.

This is why, in returning to the letter from the reader, one can generally agree with his treatment of peaceful coexistence and with his conclusion that the systems must remain in continual dialogue, adapt to one another, and enrich each other and compete, not to the detriment but to the benefit of the future.

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'Integration' of International Islamic Community Examined

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[Article by correspondent A. Shumilin: "'Brothers' from an Underground Mosque: Report from the Center of Islamic Integrationism"]

[Text] "I ask only one thing: don't argue with them—it would be useless, and things could even end badly for you," my Algerian colleague cautioned me as I was leaving. And so I set out for the university, or more precisely, for one of its affiliates in the capital's Buzarea [transliteration] District. It was there, in the institute of psychology and education, that one of the centers of Islamic integrationism, which has recently been having an increasingly more tangible influence upon Algerian youth, can be found.

It is not hard to find the psychology institute building. Several wall newspapers and slogans cover the terrace at the entrance. The texts are written by hand, and only in Arabic.

Where were the motley crowds of students? What invisible boundary separated this institute from the buildings of the other faculties situated not far away? There was no bustling, and moderation could be sensed in all things: People in the halls and on the stairs moved sedately; young people (mostly with close-cropped beards) gathered in groups, talking about their own matters; young girls (almost all of them in long dresses, with covered heads) gathered separately. No one paid any attention to me. I entered the building. A direction sign caught my eye: "Mosque."

The basement corridor was not lit—light penetrated from the street only through slatted window frames located along the sides of the room. There was no talking to be heard here. In the mosque, in breaks between lectures and seminars, the students can pray: the girls in the room to the right, and the boys to the left.

"Brother," someone placed his hand on my shoulder, "you forgot to leave your pack." Silently nodding in assent, I placed the pack containing my tape recorder next to a pile of shoes before the entrance to the men's half of the mosque.

"Where are you from, brother?"

"I'm a journalist from the Soviet Union," I replied. The other was clearly confused. He switched to the polite form of address.

"Were you given permission to enter?"

"No one prohibited me...."

"Are you a Muslim?"

I shook my head. Another two came up to me and stopped at my flanks.

"At any rate, the mosque is open to all," that same person said, dissipating the tension.

These, then, were the integrationists, about whom so much is now being said and written. They are unified organizationally and ideologically. At the very beginning of March, creation of two political Islamic groupings was announced in Algeria: The "Islamic Front of Salvation" which clearly leaned toward extremism, and the relatively moderate "Islamic Appeal League."

Had Muslims not been "seduced" by foreign money, had they adhered unwaveringly to the postulates of their religion and the values of the Koran, their communities would not be experiencing their present problems. But even today it is not yet too late to cure the illness of modern civilization by returning to the initial purity of Islam—this is what my "brothers" said to me in the underground mosque, proposing in all seriousness "a return to Islam."

Muslim fundamentalists have loudly proclaimed themselves in periods of crisis and at the turning points in the development of their society in almost all Islamic countries. Their recipe has remained invariable for almost a century: a return to the purity of Islam, the preaching of asceticism, rejection of the "gifts" of technical progress, and so on. And just as invariably, the fundamentalists remain in opposition to the official, usually secular authorities (modern Iran is of course an exception). One of the first manifestations of fundamentalism in this century was the movement of the "ikhvan" [transliteration] ("brothers") in Saudi Arabia. Their uprising in 1927 was accompanied by slogans prohibiting motor vehicles, telegraph and other innovations (in addition to certain political demands).

Abbas Madani is a modern man. Each morning he drives to the institute building in Buzarea in his cream-colored Mercedes, and on stepping out of his vehicle, he immediately finds himself at the center of attention of students and instructors standing nearby.

A short, lively, middle-aged man with a red beard, Sheikh Madani gives lectures in Buzarea on the problems of education in Islamic society. It is said that it is hard to get into his lectures. And during the breaks he is usually surrounded by a throng of students. In the latter part of the day Madani gives sermons in the private mosque of Beyt-el-Arkan [transliteration], not far from the university town. And there he is attentively listened to by crowds of true believers who value Madani's oratorical skills and the novelty of his interpretations of the problems of Islam. A graduate of London University who speaks fluently in three languages, Sheikh Madani prefers Arabic—the language of the Koran. And sooner or later, he feels, everyone will adopt the institutions of the Koran.

Madani's words, and equally the phraseology of other Algerian Islamists, are extremely close to the speeches of their Egyptian colleagues, who usually do not conceal their membership to the "Muslim Brotherhood."

The "Muslim Brotherhood" political-religious pan-Islamic association was founded on 11 April 1929 by Khasan al-Banna [transliteration] in Egypt. Branches were established in Syria and Lebanon in 1937, and later on in Iraq, Jordan, Sudan and Palestine. The end goal of the "Muslim Brotherhood" is to restore the caliphate on the basis of unquestioning fulfillment of the prescriptions of the Koran, and to make the Islamic shariah the basic law of society. It is organizationally structured according to the "iceberg" principle: Part of the members engage in legal religious and sociopolitical activity, while another part work in illegal subunits performing terrorist acts.

It is impossible to talk long with Sheikh Madani. He is in a hurry, he is awaited. Dozens and perhaps hundreds of students listen to him with delight. He brings them the "refined integrationism" of Islam.

But the idol of tens of thousands of young lads from the poor quarters of the capital of Algeria and other cities of the country, and the advocate of the so-called "street of Islam" is not he but Ali Benkhadh [transliteration], who is referred to as the "imam of the young." He may be encountered not behind the walls of the university but near the mosques of the poor quarters.

That is where I went.

I must admit that I never saw such large numbers of idle young in any district of the capital of Algeria as in Bab-el-Ued [transliteration]. To get through the rather narrow lanes, you literally have to push your way through an endless mob of young people who, as my local journalism colleague feels, have "nothing but their mosque."

The Sunna Mosque—a three-story red brick building—is located in one of the narrow alleys of Bab-el-Ued. This is where you can usually find Ali Benkhadh as he slowly climbs up the street to the mosque on foot. Tall, skinny, and wearing glasses, the "imam of the young" is never alone: He is escorted by a crowd within which the imam's "brothers" can be distinctly distinguished, vigilantly watching over his safety.

I was unable to push my way through to the imam, but one of the "brothers" promised to talk with Benkhadh, and perhaps organize a meeting. I was asked to wait by the entrance to the mosque. A quarter of an hour later a "brother" signaled to me.

"Would you like to attend the sermon? Please. But the imam will not give an interview; you probably know how much noise and clamor resulted from the first interview of his life, with the local newspaper KHORIZONT [transliteration]?" the "brother" said.

He was right. Following its publication in KHORIZONT in February of this year, the talk was about nothing but Benkhadh for several days.

My conscience is clear: Because I was unable to meet with Benkhadh, I feel it would be proper to recall some excerpts from his sensational interview.

"To me, a Muslim is one who accepts Islam in its entirety—that is, as a social, economic and political system, and as a way of life. Those who advocate this are called 'Muslim brothers'.... We do not borrow any ideas from either the West or the East; we are an unrepeatable nation."

What is this—nationalism, chauvinism? What social and political categories do we turn to in order to define this phenomenon? After all, in the interpretation of extremists, pan-Islamism means "a single Muslim nation" from Morocco all the way to Indonesia.

"What is your opinion concerning a multiparty system?"

"If pluralism makes the appearance of political parties bent upon propagandizing atheism and blasphemy possible, then it should be outside the law.... Muslims cannot agree to the creation of parties, ideas and slogans which conflict with Islam."

It is common for integrationists who have declared themselves to be the "true Muslims" to claim to speak in the name of all Muslims. But the overwhelming majority of the faithful with whom I spoke in Algeria reject Benkhadh's claims, interpreting Islam to be a religion which tolerates other religions, and as a complex of views compatible with a secular way of life, compatible with social and technical progress. Nonetheless the imam has many followers, including among the young. After all, the young are the ones who are suffering the most from the crisis occurring in today's Algeria. Around 70 percent of the country is now less than 30 years old. Because the birthrate is extremely high, like in most developing countries, objective social problems are inevitable. To minimize unemployment among the young, each year not less than 800,000 work places must be created.

"It is impossible to introduce the shariah instantaneously—certain conditions must first evolve. Of course, it would be unrealistic today to introduce 100 lashes as punishment for adultery when places of debauchery thrive (incidentally, fundamentalists include movie theaters, clubs and discotheques.—A. Sh.), and the forces of

law and order protect them.... We tell the people: Put an end to the places of debauchery, put an end to coeducational schools and universities."

"Are you against all forms of joint activities between men and women?"

"Absolutely all! The place of natural self-expression of a woman is in the home. If she is obliged to leave the home, she must observe certain conditions: not to walk next to a man, and to work exclusively among women.... A woman is a producer of men, and she must not produce material goods."

"I would like to know what a woman does when her husband dies, and she is left with five or more children. If she went to Ali Benkhadh, would he help?" An elderly woman taxi driver commented on the imam's statement with bitter irony.

Can the activities of fundamentalists be treated as but the vestiges of withering democracy? In my opinion, no—they are in fact an expression of a new democracy, of the political and ideological pluralism that came into play following approval of a new constitution by the Algerians in late February. Several parties have already been created, including of a progressive orientation. And as things go, Islamic fundamentalists have also obtained a possibility for legalization, for political self-expression. At the same time, owing to democracy, the positions of the ruling National Liberation Front have grown noticeably stronger, and its membership has risen. Whom will the majority of the Algerians—and this is chiefly the young—follow? This is the paramount question in the country's internal political life.

And it will be for the Algerians themselves to answer it.

Foreign Economic Relations Minister Views 1988 Trade Results

18250059 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA
INDUSTRIYA in Russian 31 Dec 88 p 3

[Interview with Konstantin Katushev, USSR Foreign Economic Relations Minister: "Facing the Market"; date, place, interviewer not specified]

[Text] [Question] Konstantin Feodorovich, how would you evaluate the results of foreign economic activity for 1988?

[Answer] Important steps were taken in 1988 to reorganize foreign economic ties and significant changes were effected in their management structure.

There was a significant increase in the number of organizations obtaining the right to operate independently on the foreign market. Today this number includes 55 ministries and more than 140 enterprises and organizations. Foreign trade associations on republic level have begun to conduct export-import operations. Today 22 percent of export operations and 32 percent of import operations have been shifted over to direct-to-producer activity.

Preliminary data show that the foreign trade volume for 1988 grew in comparison to that of the previous year, reaching 132 billion rubles. As in previous years, however, the country's main exports remain fuel-energy resource products. The export of machine-building production increased insignificantly and comprises about 15 percent of total export value. We cannot be satisfied with Soviet export structure, technological rate of growth, quality and, consequently, the competitiveness of our export production. The expansion of export potential is one of the central tasks proceeding from strategic directives of the party and government. A resolution issued by the USSR Council of Ministers 2 December 1988 is aimed at accomplishing these tasks.

We must also streamline the import structure and concentrate primarily on importing machinery and equipment for enterprise modernization, means of output production, light industry and food products. Foreign economic relations has made its contribution to the accomplishment of tasks connected with the social reorientation of the economy and the replenishment of the country's production and raw material resources.

[Question] Our newspaper has begun to devote significant attention to the problems of developing foreign economic relations. How would you evaluate the paper's contribution and what would you like to see in its pages?

[Answer] In my opinion, the attention shown by your newspaper and other mass media to foreign economic relations in the context of developing machine-building export potential has been timely and worthwhile. Our lagging behind in technology and production organization

and in the technical level of USSR production as compared to modern achievements in the world trade market has led to a situation where Soviet machine-technology production in a number of formerly successful product lines has lost its competitiveness. Machinery and equipment comprises less than four percent of Soviet exports to the Western countries, the USSR losing its share of this production to a number of developing countries.

In this regard, the need for developing the export of machine-technology production is acquiring primary significance and is becoming the main provision in augmenting the dynamics of USSR foreign economic relations. A long-range program for development of the export base envisions a threefold increase in our country's foreign trade volume by the year 2005 as compared with the 1985 level. Plans call for the percentage of machinery and equipment exports to reach roughly 40 percent.

The main goal of the reform underway in our foreign economic relations is to close the gap between material production and the foreign market, to turn a production-efficient "face" to the market which is dictating quality level and determining production competitiveness. Foreign economic activity and its specific results are becoming tangible matters to the producer, exerting a direct influence on his cost-accounting management.

In connection with the right, effective 1 April 1989, which has been granted all enterprises, associations, production cooperatives and other organizations to conduct foreign economic activity directly, we are seeing a significant increase in production that is competitive on the world market and in the role of the mass media as a tribune of universal education in the foreign economic sphere.

I would like to wish SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA success in this important endeavor.

In my view the newspaper's efforts can be directed towards the following: disseminating the most progressive and advanced experience in the foreign economic cooperation of industrial enterprises; seeking its optimal forms; regularly advising the readership on various aspects of international trade and scientific-technological cooperation. Without a doubt the "Business Club" section of the newspaper has been useful. This practice should be continued and supported.

[Question] What are your plans for the coming year?

[Answer] The first stage in the reform of foreign economic activity has been reached. More complex tasks lie ahead in its further development and sophistication—enhancing the effectiveness of foreign economic ties, increasing the professional level of all of its participants, insuring more precise coordination of foreign economic activity in international markets, and enhancing the development of the Soviet Union's production base for competitive export products.

'Alternate Scenarios' for Economic Reform Reviewed

18200378 Moscow *PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK* in Russian No 10, May 89 p 9

[Comments by S. Shatalin, member of the academy, on five basic models of the radical economic reform in the USSR summarized from several dozen foreign sources: "According to the Model and in Actuality"]

[Text] From the Standpoint of Foreign Specialists

The method of alternative scenarios is widely used in foreign practice to forecast the development of the radical economic reform in the USSR. An analysis of several dozen foreign sources has made it possible to identify five basic models of reforms along with the assessments given them by sovietologists:

Name of the Model of the Economic Reform	Proposed Analog	Basic Characteristics	Forecast Consequences of Application	Estimate of the Likelihood of Application in the USSR
Neo-Stalinist model	Traditional Soviet model	Recentralization of planning and management. Use of methods external to the economy to reinforce work discipline and for redistribution of labor resources among sectors and regions. A policy of autarky in foreign economic relations.	Precludes the transition to economic methods of management. Increased bureaucratization in society. Decline in production and consumption. Deepening crisis in the economy and politics. Could bring a certain improvement in the short run.	Close to zero
Model of conservative modernization	Model similar to that used in the GDR	A certain decentralization of management, still preserving predominantly administrative rather than economic levers. Restructuring of central planning without altering the fundamental bases of the administrative-command system of management. Introduction of narrowly targeted incentives, especially for scientific-technical progress, redistribution of labor resources, and development of contractual relations. Increased use of prices for distribution of scarce consumer goods.	Continuation of predominantly extensive economic development. Possibility of maintaining negligible rates of economic growth for a limited period. A certain rise in labor productivity and improvement in discipline. Continuing divergence of planned and actual investments. Conditions not brought about for radical modernization of the economic mechanism.	It is this type of model that is now mainly being used.

Model of radical reform oriented toward the market	Similar to models being used in Hungary, China, and Yugoslavia	Elimination of administration by directive, renunciation of the setting of targets for economic entities at the lowest level. Orientation toward profit as the sole indicator of economic efficiency. Partial preservation of centralized management and monitoring in a number of the most important spheres of economy—investments, pricing, and regulation of income. Use of indirect economic regulation. A majority of enterprises continues to be state enterprises, and the cooperative develops. No mechanism for increased competition.	Higher efficiency related to offering real independence to enterprises. The market mechanism goes into operation to bring supply into line with demand. Appreciable acceleration of scientific-technical progress. Saturation of the consumer market and improvement of product quality.	The probability that this type of model will be used in the future is increasing, in the opinion of the experts.
Mixed model type	Models used in Hungary, Yugoslavia, and China	Combination in varying proportions of centralization and decentralization, the plan and the market, and state and private enterprises. In the state sector, which embraces the most important branches, there is centralized planning, pricing, and material and technical supply. In the private sector, the market, supplemented by instruments of tax policy and credit policy, serves as the regulator.	Instability of the economic mechanism because of contradictions between centralization and decentralization and between the plan and the market. Possible deepening of the contradictions that exist and emergence of new problems.	Some possibilities for transition to this type of model persist, although, according to the statement of Western specialists, the combination of centralized planning and a restricted domestic market will fail, as is evident, in their opinion, from the example of Hungary.
Model of transformation of a planned socialist economy into a capitalist market economy	Models used in the capitalist world	Reprivatization of property. Radical decentralization. Free labor market, capital market, and market for machines and equipment.	Opportunities open up for development of production on the basis of the most recent technology.	Practically nil

Commentary of S. Shatalin, Member of the Academy

The first thing that needs to be said immediately is that the use of the method of alternative scenarios of the radical economic reform in the USSR is undoubtedly constructive. My colleagues and I, although in a manifestly formalized version, always resort to it in working

on problems of the socioeconomic development of the USSR. To a certain degree the method of alternative scenarios has been used by Soviet economists—practitioners and theoreticians—in preparing the model of the economic mechanism now in effect. Although, to be fair, we need to say that this is clearly not enough. We also need to note that the estimates by sovietologists of the

possible models of radical economic reform in the USSR are not tendentious in this case and are undoubtedly scientific. There is no need to look in them for any "anti-Sovietism." We need to use them to our own advantage. After all, this is only a case of everyone believing him a strategist when he watches the battle from the sidelines. According to Goedel's theorem, the principle of external supplementation is necessary for a truly scientific analysis of the functioning of systems.

And now we will comment briefly on the five basic models of the economic reform in the USSR and the estimates given them by the sovietologists.

Neo-Stalinist Model

The authors consider the traditionally Soviet model to be its analog. I fully agree with them. The present state of the Soviet economy, the course toward socialist pluralism, thorough democratization of the political system, and the present public opinion in all strata of society, including the country's political leadership, make the likelihood of applying this model nil. Pessimism and conservatism are always necessary, but I think I will not sin against the truth when I say that Soviet society is not threatened by a plunge into neo-Stalinist economic and political structures.

Model of Conservative Modernization

In the opinion of the sovietologists, this model is being used in the GDR. I suppose I agree with all the characteristics of this model, with the consequences of its application, and with the idea that approximately this type of economic mechanism is actually in effect at the present time in the USSR. But there are no chances at all of its remaining the basic model. To a considerable extent, I have already explained why this is the case. The political leadership of the USSR cannot limit itself to halfway measures. Fundamental steps toward restructuring are being undertaken now in all spheres. It is also important that there is greater political activity of society, which will not allow itself to be deceived once again. It is really difficult to appropriately evaluate this situation from outside, even if you want to be perfectly objective. In addition to scientific knowledge, one needs political, economic, and social intuition. The increasing dynamism of all the processes in the USSR, in my view, make the status quo absolutely unreal. The model of the economic reform being carried out in the country will unquestionably evolve.

Model of a Radical Reform Oriented Toward the Market

The sovietologists include among the characteristics of this model that a majority of enterprises would still be state enterprises and that there is no mechanism to encourage competition. These two prerequisites, it seems to me, cannot be mandatory characteristics of the model of a radical reform oriented toward the market.

The dominance of state ownership is not an inseparable characteristic of the socialist economic model. Incidentally, I would note that in describing the alternative models the sovietologists are essentially ignoring processes taking place in the social sphere. And this is one of the most important conditions for choice of the appropriate model. Especially since, in my opinion, economic efficiency and social justice are not antipodes. On the contrary, they support one another. I agree fully with the sovietologists that the likelihood of this type of model (with possible additions) being used in the future is increasing.

Model of the Mixed Type

It seems to me rather idle to examine this extremely special and manifestly eclectic model, which divides the economy into enclaves difficult to identify. I am convinced that for the USSR this type of an extremely vague and internally contradictory model is absolutely unsuitable. It could be a "stopgap," but never a basic model.

Model of Transformation of the Planned Socialist Economy Into a Capitalist Market Economy

This model is the fruit of speculative ideologization and the description of its characteristics and consequences is extremely superficial and a priori, framed in the terms of free competition, and it is by no means a universal description of the models used in the capitalist world. Neither Japan nor Sweden, for example, fit it.

Life is considerably more complicated. In a real economy, regulating procedures and instruments seeming to be the most incompatible are frequently closely intertwined, contradictory processes develop alongside one another, and sometimes economic instruments and incentives of utterly different character operate together. There is, of course, no question whatsoever of any transformation from socialism to capitalism in our country. But the conclusion about the practically zero likelihood of application of elements of this model in the USSR is also offered without evidence and is extremely lightweight. To be specific, we have already been moving step by step toward a mechanism in economic organization that is oriented toward major changes in the technological base of production.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize the manifest advisability of continuing research in the field of alternative economic models of optimum economic activity. In that effort, it would be important to strengthen the study of social, political, moral and ethical, and cultural aspects inherent in the different versions of the economic reform.

Georgian Foreign Trade Chief Interviewed on Joint Ventures

18070621 Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
12 Mar 89 p 2

[Interview with Grigoriy Tsalkalamanidze by Valeriy Budumyan: "Entry Into Foreign Market"]

[Text] In the number of joint ventures with foreign firms, which have been established and registered in the USSR

Ministry of Finance, the Georgian SSR holds the third place in the country. The RSFSR and Latvia divided the first two between themselves. However, there are nine of them on our republic's territory. They are Fazis in the city of Poti, Yustro in Makharadze, Gudauro in the settlement of Gudauro in Kazbegskiy Rayon, Marten in the city of Rustavi, and Aris, Kavkasioni, Metekhi, AITI, and AsT International—all of them in Tbilisi.

What kind of ventures are these? Who is their founder? What are the directions in the activity of each one? This is by no means the full list of questions, which interest us today. After all, the reform in foreign economic activity has opened up great opportunities for the republic's production collectives.

"In connection with this," Grigoriy Tsalkalamanidze, head of the Department of Foreign Relations of the SSR Georgian Council of Ministers, says, "an appropriate state and public apparatus operates in Georgia. It is called upon to give assistance to enterprises, which wish to enter into partnership relations with a certain foreign firm; for example, the Gruzimpeks Foreign Trade Association, which has been successfully functioning for almost 1 and 1/2 years. The responsibility for export and import operations virtually in all national economic directions—from the delivery of handicraft-art articles abroad to the construction and reconstruction of hotels and tourist complexes—is placed on it.

"In this respect a big role is assigned to the Administration of the Authorized Agent of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations under the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers. The Georgian SSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry has also expanded its functions. It now has the right not only to organize exhibits and fairs, but also to make foreign trade deals. The Department of Foreign Economic Relations of the republic's Gosplan is being strengthened. It is called upon to coordinate export-import operations with the national economic planning of foreign economic activity."

[Correspondent] However, Grigoriy Dmitriyevich, let us turn to joint ventures. What problems connected with their establishment does the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers solve?

[G. Tsalkalamanidze] Many. This is primarily an examination of applications for the organization of joint ventures and the issue of assignments to the above-mentioned organizations and other interested ministries and departments concerning the presentation of conclusions or rendering of assistance in conducting negotiations, as well as the preparation of necessary documents concerning the acceptability of establishment of the proposed joint venture on the republic's territory.

Having received an answer, we notify the republic's participant in the joint venture of this. Then an order on the formation of the joint venture is adopted and individual problems of its functioning are examined.

After all this the direct supervision of a specific joint venture is transferred to sectorial departments of the Administration of Affairs of the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers.

However, a clarification is needed here. The presented stages in work are carried out basically with respect to ministries and departments of republic jurisdiction. Projects of Union-republic and Union jurisdiction work out these problems primarily through their Union bodies.

[Correspondent] As already mentioned, nine joint ventures exist on Georgia's territory. Tell us about them at greater length.

[G. Tsalkalamanidze] This is not a simple task, because a great deal can be said about each of them. I think that it will be better to unify them into two groups—production and so-called service ones. The former includes Fazis of the Poti TMO and of the West German Firm Wilfred Post. The joint development and production of competitive furniture on a metal base, first-class yachts, medical accessories for one-time use, caffeine, and protein are the venture's spheres of activity.

The Caucasian geological expedition Kavkazsamotsvety and the Austrian firm Weissenbacher became the founders of the joint venture Kavkasioni. This joint venture specializes in the extraction, processing, and sale of articles made of stones and semi-precious stone raw materials.

With regard to the Tbilelektroprivod Scientific Production Association, it together with the Ivanovo Machine Tool Building Production Association and the firms Indramat G. m. b. H in the FRG and Ansaldo in Italy organized a venture for the production of integrated electric drives on the basis of thyatron motors for machine tool building.

Marten—this is the name of the joint venture established by the Rustavi Metallurgical Plant and the French firm Meyzin [transliterated]. Its goal is to produce and sell compact gas ranges, sewn articles made of natural leather and sheepskin, and other consumer goods.

Finally, the joint Soviet-Cypriot venture Yustro in Makharadze. It undertook the production and sale of products made of perlite.

The second group of joint ventures consists of service ones. They are Aris, whose founders are the Georgian Polytechnical Institute imeni Lenin and the French firm Aris. This joint venture specializes in research and development, engineering plans in the field of systems for managing production processes, and computer servicing.

The joint venture Gudaure of the republic Gruzkurort Association and of the firms Ungarotelz in Hungary and ATS in Austria provides for the sale of services of the Gudaure tourist complex.

The joint venture Metekhi. Its founders—the TMO of the Tbilisi City Executive Committee and the firm ABV in Austria—undertook the planning, construction, and, subsequently, operation of a hotel in Tbilisi.

And the last joint venture—AsT International—is the result of an agreement between the Georgian SSR National Economic Achievements Exhibition, the exposervice cooperative Tengo, and the Ahorn Agency, a West German firm from Munich. It organizes and conducts international exhibits and fairs, conferences, seminars, and symposiums both on and outside USSR territory.

[Correspondent] Grigoriy Dmitriyevich, as of 1 April all the country's production collectives receive the right to enter the foreign market. However, most probably, precisely joint ventures are the most effective form of development of international economic cooperation. What are the further prospects for their establishment in our republic?

[G. Tsalkalmanidze] First of all, I would like to note that up to 100 industrial enterprises, which already export products abroad, function in Georgia now. These products have quite a long list—up to 400 items of a total value of 300 million rubles. However, the capabilities of the republic's industry are much higher. Suffice it to say that we are the owners of the richest natural resources. They include building materials, products of the agrocomplex, curative sources of mineral waters, and even the climate. Many foreign experts and businessmen, who come to us, are amazed at how poorly we develop them. At the same time, they are inspired by the opportunity to make contacts with us. In my opinion, the organization of joint ventures is the most acceptable form of cooperation.

More than 40 applications from various enterprises in Georgia for the establishment of joint ventures are now being considered by foreign economic bodies. Of them

19 such requests have been received from enterprises of the Georgian SSR Ministry of Local Industry alone; 7, from enterprises of the Ministry of Light Industry; 4, from Gosagroprom; 6, from Gruzkurort. Moreover, the republic's ministries and departments also have proposals for the establishment of joint ventures from many interested foreign firms. As we see, the interest is mutual.

However, there also is what is called another side of the medal. Is a certain enterprise or organization of ours ready to enter into such contacts? It is no secret that as yet we do not have sufficient experience in this area. At the same time, most foreign firms, which offer their services, are well familiar with all the fine points of the business and even have a reserve of clever methods, so to speak, in order, first of all, to operate more profitably for themselves. Here it is necessary to be extremely attentive. Our production collectives must first study their potential colleagues thoroughly and then enter into contacts with them. Incidentally, the Interbyuro advisory-intermediary service for problems of foreign economic activity, which functions under the republic's Chamber of Commerce and Industry, can give enterprises considerable help in this. Its work is aimed at searching for a foreign partner, studying and evaluating its activity, and preparing constituent documents.

In brief, versatile work, which takes into account the interests of both parties, is carried out here. I believe that the steps taken by our production collectives, which are first coordinated both with the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, in particular, with the Interbyuro service, and with other competent organizations, which we have discussed at the beginning of our talk, should bring positive results without fail. Let us be optimists. Let us hope that the products produced in the republic will finally meet our needs and win an appropriate place on the international market.

And last. The establishment of joint ventures should be carried out from unified national economic positions. That is, they should promote the development of the sectors of industry, the agrocomplex, and the service sphere that correspond both to the principle of the all-Union division of labor and to the specific capabilities and aims of our republic's economy.

Criminality Among Soviet Emigres to U.S. Noted
18070668

[Editorial report] Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian on 17 June 1989 publishes on page 5 a 1,200-word article which it identifies as a reprint from the NEW YORK TIMES, discussing the existence of criminal organizations, with roots in the Soviet Union, among Soviet emigres living in the Brighton Beach, Brooklyn

area. The article is headlined "A Thief Is Still a Thief in America: The Activities of Criminal Groups from among Soviet Immigrants Are Causing Serious Concern in U.S. Law-Enforcement Organs" and prefaced "Today the Western press is continuing to exaggerate the question of immigration from the USSR. But, alongside the "human rights" theme in this area, new, unexpected overtones have appeared. Undertones, for example, like the article below from the NEW YORK TIMES."

First Report from New Correspondent in Belgium
18070658

[Editorial report] Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian on 11 June 1989 publishes on page 3 a 1,500-word article by its own correspondent, V. Golovyashkin, headlined "At the Crossroads of Europe." The article is prefaced: "SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA's own correspondent V. Golovyashkin has started work in Belgium. We publish his first reportage from Brussels." The article deals with the problems posed for the city of Brussels by its status as headquarters for NATO and the European Communities, Belgian economic problems, and Belgian-Soviet trade.

Role of Peace Movement in Belgium's Political Process

18070241 Moscow *RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNYI MIR* in Russian
No 1, Jan-Feb 89 pp 135-140

[Article by Patrik Sutuyusen, lecturer in political science at the Free Flemish University: "The Peace Movement and the Political Process in Belgium"]

[Text] A notable new phenomenon has emerged in Belgium's political life in recent years: the main points of the country's foreign and defense policy have become the subject of keen discussion. Questions concerning not only the neutron bomb or cruise missiles but also American foreign policy (SDI, the situation in Central America) are debated heatedly and problems of the "third world" (particularly relations with the former colony—Zaire) and Belgium's participation in the international arms trade are discussed in parliament. This phenomenon is interesting for two reasons. First, since WWII the various political parties, the media and society as a whole had not considered these problems important and had paid them very scant attention. Second, for a long time Belgium's leading political forces were practically unanimous with regard to the need to abide by the commitments ensuing from the country's participation in NATO and continuation of the policy of nuclear deterrence and the orientation of foreign and defense policy toward the course pursued by the United States. Problems of Belgium's security were discussed only by a small group of like-minded functionaries. They had no need to take account of public opinion or heed critical observations.

It may be maintained now that all foreign policy or defense problems have been politicized. Ever increasing significance is being attached to arms and disarmament issues in the eyes of the public, and they are engendering friction within parties and between them. Even the installation of 16 cruise missiles in Florennes in the first half of the 1980's did not stop the development of this trend. On the contrary, the debate over the orientation and content of policy geared to Belgium's security is leading to further political demarcation.

The article attempts to answer in quite simple manner the question of why in the past 2 years the process of politicization has affected all aspects of foreign and defense policy.

We would note right away that the interpretations of this problem offered until recently were, according to the general rule, fragmentary and engendered more new questions than they provided clear answers. Explanations were frequently sought within the framework of the problem itself, which led to new contradictions. It was a question, for example, of the fact that the change in the international situation, the "new cold war," escalation of the arms race, the possibility of limited nuclear war in Europe, the inhumanity of such weapons as the neutron bomb and other such phenomena had forced public opinion and the political parties to recognize the problematical nature of a security policy based on nuclear weapons. However, such arguments do not explain why the preceding periods of international tension did not lead to any political contradictions but, on the contrary, contributed to a strengthening of the existing consensus. In the past the storage and deployment of nuclear arms on Belgian territory was beyond the sphere of public and political interests. The explanations given earlier distinguished merely certain essential points, which are necessary, but insufficient conditions for politicization.

In addition, such explanations are without theoretical justification. They are built in accordance with the inevitable, automatic chain reaction type—from objective problems to subjective recognition, concern, assertiveness and politicization. Having encountered an "objectively serious" situation, the population resorts almost automatically to political activity. This is undoubtedly a naive, mechanical view of human activity. Any activity is characterized by a subjective dimension, that is, how the situation is interpreted by the individual and becomes particularly meaningful for him. For this reason human activity cannot be reduced to automatic behavior per the "irritant-response" type.

For a convincing answer to the question raised let us turn to conceptual ideas concerning the politicization process.

Analytical Approaches

In what way does something become an object of the political process? What imparts to a phenomenon a political coloration? Political research has been conducted more often than not without regard for these base questions. The proposition that particular situations are characterized by something which converts them into problems, that certain problems have by nature a political coloration and that all political problems are recognized by the authorities in one way or another precisely as political has very often been taken as going without saying. It is evidently necessary for this reason to begin with a definition of the subject of discussion.

Politicization is a process as a result of which the attention of the governments of certain political systems is attracted or not attracted to certain topics. We may for convenience distinguish various phases of this process: situation, problem, demands, actualization.

Problem is a situation which comes into conflict with certain standards, norms or values. A problem for whose solution political decisions are necessary may be defined as a *demand*. We shall call an actualized demand a question to which the political authorities actually pay attention.

It is important to remember that the conversion of a situation into a problem, demand or actual issue does not occur automatically. However problematical this situation or the other may appear to experts, it will not necessarily automatically be recognized as such by public opinion. A problem attracts the attention of various social spheres far more rapidly if it becomes a political reality. There is nothing to make it political in essence. One and the same problem may, depending on time and place, be solved by entirely different methods. What in a particular society at a specific moment is seen as a typically political problem will in a different or in this same society at another time be viewed as a religious, moral, technical, economic and so forth problem. If, however, a problem is defined as political and has thus become a demand, it is necessary that it compete with other demands to attract the energy, attention and time of the representatives of political power. For this reason only a small number of demands become actual issues.

It would seem possible to ascertain the mechanisms regulating the politicization process. These regulatory mechanisms determine the contentious issues at which the attention of representatives of power will ultimately be directed. A situation becomes a problem as a result of a choice based on cultural traditions. Depending on the political culture, the situation will be recognized as problematical in accordance with various standards. The conversion of a problem into a demand is determined not only by the political culture but also the potential strength of various social groups. And, finally, the conversion of a demand into an actual, widely discussed issue ensures the interaction of the influence of active social groups and the actual dominant coalition.

The concept set forth above makes it possible, it would seem, to understand why there has in recent decades been a politicization of Belgium's security problem.

Conversion of a Situation Into a Problem: Changing Political Culture in West Europe

The concept of "political culture" may be defined as a particular type of attitude (cognitive, emotional, evaluative) toward political objects (community, regime, authorities) wherein there is a political system. In other words, the set of values in accordance with which the political system operates. The political culture of a given

society attaches particular significance to political objects and influences the forms of political activity. Depending on the dominant political culture, some questions are recognized as suitable for political activity, some, not. The dominant political culture determines primarily what the sphere of policy is. All that is included in this sphere—problems, demands and actual issues—is carefully selected. The dominant political system determines the main style in politics, ways of solving problems and demands and so forth. Shifts and changes in the political culture of a given society could change the significance of individual phenomena. Situations and problems which previously were without political significance in this case acquire a political character.

Finding empirical manifestations of the theoretical concept "political culture" is very difficult. Two approaches may be distinguished in literature on this subject. The first is a vast quantity of polls studying the opinion of the "man in the street". The second is the growth of interest in the sociology of changes in culture, and authors attempt in this case, what is more, to reflect the "spirit of the times". An interesting synthesis of these two approaches is presented in the works of the American political scientist Ronald (Inglhart) on the reassessment of values and the change in political culture in Western societies. He expresses very interesting considerations on this question.

R. (Inglhart) defends the proposition that in modern societies the value priorities of different age groups differ appreciably. He does not consider these differences the result of the influence of life cycles or a kind of conflict of the generations but believes that they reflect the changed socioeconomic conditions in which these generations have grown up. (Inglhart) bases his theory on two hypotheses. The first—the so-called deficit hypothesis—is as follows: people are inclined to see as the most subjective value that of which they do not have a sufficient amount. The second is the socialization hypothesis: the value priorities of a personality are the result of the socioeconomic conditions in which this personality was formed.

Taking the data of wide-ranging public opinion polls as a basis, (Inglhart) concludes that representatives of age groups which lived through the economic crisis of the 1930's and WWII attach great significance to material values: economic stability, physical security, legality and order. Younger generations, which grew up in a relatively peaceful period and consider material sufficiency the norm, give pride of place to nonmaterial values such as individual freedom, participation in the life of society and self-fulfillment. Another important conclusion is that the younger generations have not only a different value system but also (thanks to the high level of education) possess greater political knowledge and ability than their elder, more materialistically oriented fellow citizens.

According to (Inglkhart), the said changes in value priorities have exerted a tremendous influence on the political process. The growth of the post-materialist consciousness could lead to a situation where political disagreements are based not predominantly on socioeconomic problems but on opposite value orientations. This could lead to the formation of new political dimensions. (Inglkhart) highlights individual manifestations of such new politics. First, some new problems and social movements are quite manifestly of a post-materialist nature: the clashes over the problem of abortion and the use of nuclear energy, disputes on problems concerning human rights, questions of the "third world," the environment, the feminist movement and the peace movement and the demands for more direct democracy. Second, there are obvious changes in political styles: the readiness to resort to nontraditional political methods and actions and the emergence of a political climate which is characterized by a challenge to the elite, and not subordination to it.

This idea of a changing political culture also has a bearing on our subject. It may be said that for a large part of the postwar period the dominant political culture was directed against those who wished to call in question existing policy in the disarmament sphere. The main political approaches were formulated as a result of the varying experience of the generations, for example, the economic crisis of the 1930's, WWII, the role of the United States as the liberator of West Europe, the "cold war".... The predominant value orientations were directed toward economic growth, the creation of a "welfare state" and the deterrence of real or supposed aggressors.

Concerning the present situation, (Inglkhart) believes that the younger generations of a post-materialist persuasion are more open to a critical perception of the vitally important ideas concerning defense and security. As distinct from the materialists, the post-materialists are inclined, perhaps, to perceive national security as something that has already been achieved. Correspondingly, they more often call in question such traditional stereotypes as the "Soviet threat". They believe that the American presence in Europe is not essential and that the additional spending on arms is superfluous. Possessing better political knowledge and skills, their activists are capable of mobilizing the masses for the support of their ideas.

Thus we can affirm that (Inglkhart's) theory explains why for the first time since WWII considerable numbers of the Western public have begun to treat defense and foreign policy issues with such seriousness. (Inglkhart's) theory helps us understand the particular features of the emergence of an environment which has been conducive to the politicization of fundamental aspects of security policy. However, (Inglkhart's) theory is not capable of answering the question why and in what way these problems have been converted into political problems or demands. We will attempt below to answer this question also.

Conversion of a Problem Into a Demand: Role of the New Peace Movements

In order for a problem to become a political demand the intervention of political activists or groups is necessary. Two key aspects may be distinguished in the very intervention process. First, politics is always a confrontation of various notions of reality. Different groups of people hold different views on the nature, sources and ways of solving problems. The groups whose interpretation of the problem has prevailed determine the place of this problem in social spheres and ways of its solution. For the ideas of some group to become generally accepted it is necessary first of all that this group itself and its ideas be deemed legal.

Second, if it is recognized that a problem requires a political solution, it becomes a demand. Different groups, presenting different demands, will compete among themselves to ensure that the representatives of political power attend and devote time precisely to their demand and thereby actualize the problems, raising them to a new level. In this competition of different pressure groups it is extraordinarily important to possess great potential and resources of power. Influence is exerted on the upper strata's choice when giving their support by money, good connections, the number of supporters who could be mobilized in the course of collective action, the necessary infrastructure for the organization of a political campaign and, finally, a capacity for attracting new votes at elections. In countries with a parliamentary democracy the initial potential of a pressure group amounts to the persuasion of politicians of the existence of broad public support for this group's demands and that politicians' response to these demands could influence appreciably the course of the next election campaign.

We may with the "legality" and "potential" concepts analyze changes in the intensity of the peace movements throughout the postwar period. Three waves may be distinguished in the history of the Belgian peace movement. The upsurge of the first pertains to the start of the 1950's, when 300,000 signatures were collected for the Stockholm Appeal and a campaign against German rearmament and the plans for a European defense community was deployed. The second wave reached its zenith at the start of the 1960's with a record number of marches against nuclear testing. The third wave—the new peace movement—began at the start of the 1970's in connection with protests against the neutron bomb and cruise missiles.

The difference between the new peace movement and its early forms is obvious. The new movement is of immeasurably greater scale and has a far more complex makeup of its participants. The previous peace movements were traditionally confined to the left wing of society and were strongly influenced by the communists and left socialists. The political significance of these movements was slight.

The peace movement in the 1950's was composed on the one hand of pacifists far removed from politics. They did not involve themselves in the formulation of demands in the political sense. Their activity was mainly of an ethical nature. In addition, they transferred problems of peace and security to nonpolitical spheres (religion, "change of consciousness"). On the other, the communists and people sympathetic toward the Soviet Union were participants in this movement. It was these people who formed the Belgian section of the WPC. Their problem was that they had no need to politicize their demands.

The peace movement in the 1960's was manifested in two forms. The first was marches against atomic weapons organized mainly by committees for the defense of peace created by the communists and also youth organizations, the left wing of the Social Democratic Party and the unions. The second was the creation of a number of broad alliances around vague political programs. Thanks to the unnoticed, but conscientious work of these groups in conjunction with mass organizations, the question of peace slowly, but surely became a legalized political topic. However, although the demands put forward by these groups did not differ appreciably from the wording of the security policy pursued by Belgium, their political effect was negligible.

For a better understanding of the successes of the new peace movement we need to call attention to certain changes which occurred in Belgian policy in previous decades. A new generation emerged at the end of the 1960's in Belgium, as in other industrially developed countries. This generation was interested in new problems and posed new political questions: problems of the "third world," emancipation, participation.... The traditional organizations (political parties, unions, the church) were frequently incapable of answering these questions. Considerable numbers of young people turned away from them and formed around these demands a whole number of new social movements.

Some of these movements were institutionalized in Belgium in the 1960's. We witnessed the growth of a network of alternative, independent organizations ("third world" groups, progressive Christians), which appeared even in the tiniest communities. At the end of the 1970's the new peace movement was able to take advantage of this network and its infrastructure to create a very broad organization.

Very important was the fact that by the mid-1970's the pacifist groups, new social movements and certain traditional (party, union, Catholic) organizations had begun to conduct a debate on problems of peace and security. In the course of this debate the traditional organizations acquired an opportunity to resume contacts with activists of the younger generation. Although the cooperation frequently proved very difficult, the new social movements knew how to use the debate platform

for the gradual enlistment of certain traditional organizations (socialist and Christian trade unions, the Socialist Party) with tremendous mobilizing potential in the campaign against the cruise missiles.

So it may be noted that the peace movement in the 1950's lacked the necessary politically active forces operating within the framework of the law. In the 1960's it acquired "legality," but at the expense of abandonment of a clear-cut program. In the 1980's the activity of the peace movement has been successful, first, because it was formed on the basis of new social movements, which, in turn, were the result of post-material cultural changes. And, second, it has proven capable of establishing the necessary relations with the traditional mass organizations as a result of gradual and imperceptible work, which has been performed under the cover of "umbrella organizations". For successful activity in defense of peace the new social movements have provided capable, experienced activists and the necessary organizational infrastructure. The traditional organizations have ensured the potential support of hundreds of thousands of people. Thus the new peace movement has acquired the legal basis and potential strength for the successful actualization of its demands. However, there needs to be an answer to the following question: why have the traditional organizations, the Social Democratic Party, say, suddenly conceived a desire to incorporate in the sphere of their interests demands put forward by the participants in the peace movement? The concluding section of the article will deal with this.

Actualization of Demands: Erosion of the Coalition Which Had Ruled Since the War

So what forced such organizations as the social democratic parties to adopt an attentive attitude toward the demands of the peace supporters? There are three possible explanations. The first is connected with the "changing of the guard" in the parties themselves. In the 1970's the old leaders, who had dominated the Belgian Socialist Party since 1945, were replaced by representatives of the younger generation. The political orientation of the new elite was formed in the 1960's, when its future participants were students. They apprehended the post-material philosophy and were linked with the new social movements, and, as a result, their political philosophy has much more in common with the ideas of the representatives of the current peace movement than with the philosophy of the older generation of social democrats.

The second explanation may be the opportunism of the new generation of social democratic leaders. In the 1960's the socialist parties lost contact with the youth. It seemed to the younger generation that social democracy was a thing of the past. Of course, this was not typical of all these parties. Even more dramatic, perhaps, was the position of the Christian democratic parties. As the secularization and radicalization of the church spread, a whole generation of young Catholics turned its back on

the traditional parties. The new leadership of the Socialist Party is attempting to attract these progressive Christians to its ranks. A special campaign was conducted for this. The enlistment of the Socialist Party in the new peace movement was a method of winning these voters' trust.

Opportunism has proven a successful strategy for the Belgian and—in more specific form—the Flemish socialist parties also. Recent elections have shown that the Socialist Party's electorate has ceased voting for the ecologists' party. However, the incorporation of the peace movement's demands in the section of the program dealing with Belgium's security policy could be a dangerous strategic line also. The party right has warned the social democrats that their attitude toward questions of the country's defense policy and their international ties make this party unfit for the role of governing party. Why did the Socialist Party decide to run this risk? To answer this question it is necessary to turn to the third explanation of the erosion of the ruling coalition which took shape following WWII.

Any stable political system is characterized by the presence of a ruling coalition. Such a coalition is not simply a government. This concept is far broader and consists of a whole bloc of parties and lobby groups, which has greater political power than other groups or coalitions. The partners in such a coalition are necessarily unanimous apropos the nature of the policy they pursue. The joint political strength of the governing coalition helps it implement particular decisions. In this case the governing coalition has a stabilizing impact on the country's political system. The coalition partners know that in supporting a policy or demands which are outside of the framework of the coalition accord they are upsetting the political balance and running the risk of being thrown out of the group.

From 1947 through 1970 the Belgian political system was characterized by the existence of a governing coalition represented by the main political forces. This ruling coalition took shape around problems concerning socioeconomic policy (the Keynesian "welfare state"), domestic policy issues (relations between different nationalities, reconciliation of different political currents) and also foreign policy. The Atlantic orientation of Belgium's security policy was part of the consensus of the traditional political forces. Serious objections to the Atlantic orientation were expressed only by the parties of a communist persuasion, that is, parties which operated from standpoints of nonacceptance of the entire range of the said problems.

As of the start of the 1970's the governing coalition began to collapse. Secularization and the change in the values of the system shook the system of conciliation which had taken shape among the main political forces, the church and philosophical communities. The economic crisis complicated the solution of the main questions by the old methods. The neo-liberal offensive of

parties of the right undermined the socioeconomic framework of the "welfare state". The unilateral strategy of the United States in the field of international commerce and international relations made extremely more complex for the West European governments the possibility of continued adherence to Atlantism.

If all this is taken into consideration, the Socialist Party's policy is much easier to understand. The strategic orientation toward support for the demands of the peace movement and assistance in their actualization proved very successful and was reflected in salutary fashion in the course of elections. This is particularly important now inasmuch as a ruling coalition which could sanction the advancement of new political problems no longer exists. Fears that actualization of the new political demands could upset the balance of forces cannot be taken seriously inasmuch as the dominant coalition has already been undermined. The most serious blow against the postwar political consensus was undoubtedly struck by the forces of the right. It is perfectly obvious that they were attempting to form a new governing coalition of a neo-liberal and conservative persuasion. Their hegemonist plans envisaged the release of the economy from the effect of the Keynesian control mechanism.

A large part of the forces of the left responded to this offensive in a purely defensive sense. However, some social democrats attempted in response to create their own hegemonist project. It is thus that we should view the specific proposals of the Socialist International which it has put forward since 1976, the W. Brandt report on North-South relations, E. Bahr's "Second Ostpolitik" and P. Glotz's "Manifesto for a New Europe". A retaliatory economic strategy based on European cooperation and technological modernization, ecologically balanced development, greater independence of the United States and a strengthening of relations with the "third world" and East Europe—such are some of the main directions of this project. Unfortunately, the bulk of these proposals was at that time insufficiently thought out and bore too idealistic a stamp for them to have become the basis of an alternative political project in which the social democrats and the new social movements could have cooperated.

Bearing mind all that has been said above, the attitude not only of the Belgian Socialist Party but also of international social democracy toward the new peace movement and arms and disarmament problems could be interpreted in dual manner. First, it may be assumed that this was the result of a purely opportunist strategy. The social democrats are lending their efforts to the solution of questions unconnected with the economy like, for example, peace or the ecological situation in order to conceal the lack of an alternative economic policy for a way out of the crisis. The second interpretation is that we saw in the campaign against the Euromissiles social democracy's first attempt to shape a hegemonist project in an alliance with various new social movements.

It will be revealed in the very near future which assumption is correct. Meanwhile in Belgium, as in other West European countries also, the socialist parties are still in opposition. The question of the attitude toward the peace movement and the principles of security policy in West Europe will be decisive when they once again have an opportunity to become part of the majority in government. But now the social democrats are having to choose between flirtation and an alliance with the new social movements, between short-term opportunism and the long-term project of an alternative policy.

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Book on French Military Policy in Mediterranean
18070617 Moscow OBSHCHESTVENNYYE NAUKI V
SSSR: SERIYA 5—ISTORIYA (REFERATIVNYY
ZHURNAL) in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 88 pp 78-81

[Review by N. N. Mesyatsev of book "Frantsiya i Sredizemnomorye" (France and the Mediterranean) by T. G. Parkhalina, V. I. Gantman, editor-in-chief, INION AN SSSR (Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences of the USSR Academy of Sciences), Nauka, Moscow, 1987, 190 pages; bibliography at end of chapters] txt

[Text] This monograph consists of an introduction, five chapters, and a conclusion.

In the introduction T. G. Parkhalina, candidate of historical sciences (INION AN SSSR), formulating her research objectives, writes that, "not laying claim to an all-embracing examination of all the aspects of France's policy in the Mediterranean..., she set for herself a specific task—to analyze its directions characterizing specific French interests and priorities in the development of international relations in the region" (p 9).

The investigation of problems connected with the evolution of France's policy in the Mediterranean in the 1960's-1980's is brought about both but its particularly national ambitious interests and by the West's "common" interests, which do not coincide and give rise to ambiguous and often complex and contradictory relations with the United States and countries of NATO's "southern flank." This has determined the structure of this work.

The first two chapters examine the place of the Mediterranean in the foreign policy of the French Republic and the relations with the United States, NATO, and European states—members of this bloc. They show that many economic, political, and military interests invariably draw France into this region. "Mediterranean policy has always been one of the most important for the entire system of France's foreign policy, in essence, occupying a paramount and prestigious place in it" (p 12). At various historical stages its ruling classes have set different tasks and goals for foreign policy, at the same time, preserving an unchanging fundamental basis—direct

vital importance of their interests in this region. "It is precisely in France's Mediterranean policy," the book stresses, "that all the remaining directions in French foreign policy are revealed in a reflected, refracted, and often concentrated form" (p 23). Elements of "Atlantism," "Europeism," African and Arab policy, and policy with respect to the USSR and other socialist countries are displayed in it.

An analysis of basic directions and specific problems of French Mediterranean policy in the 1960's-1980's has enabled the author to draw the conclusion that under present conditions France is the main rival of the United States in the region of the Mediterranean and that it tries to ensure for itself an autonomous position independent of the United States in this region.

The author notes that a further evolution of the military-strategic situation in the Mediterranean largely depends on the correlation of detente and anti-detente factors in relations between the East and the West, on the correlation of centrifugal and centripetal forces, on the tendencies in interimperialist relations as a whole, on the development of the national liberation movement in this region, and on the foreign political course of France itself (p 67).

Problems connected with Spain are assigned to a separate chapter, because its role in the Western part of the Mediterranean has also determined the specific place of this country in France's Mediterranean policy. The book observes that military-political relations of France and Spain represent the most important aspect of interimperialist relations in the south of Europe. France, like other countries forming part of the so-called "Atlantic community," is interested in attaching states in the south of the European continent to itself as closely as possible and, at the same time, in stabilizing the positions of capitalism and the social and political situation as a whole in them. At the same time, France has sought the consolidation of its positions in the south of Europe and, in particular, in Spain with a view to weakening American positions and expanding its own influence there (p 72). In the author's opinion, Spain's admission to the EEC can signify a "new revival of French-Spanish cooperation in all areas" (p 103).

The last two chapters are devoted to an analysis of France's policy in the subregions of North Africa and the Near East and to attitudes toward conflicting situations. It is stressed that in the beginning and middle of the 1960's France, having lost the last and biggest bastion of its colonial possessions in North Africa, that is, Algeria, began to reexamine its Mediterranean and African policy from a number of aspects and to develop the strategy and tactics of neocolonialist penetration into lost imperial territories. The implementation of this neocolonialist policy led to the strengthening of France's positions in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. Owing to the Chad problem, relations between France and Libya remain tense (p 133).

With regard to France's Near Eastern policy, it is determined by the dependence on the "oil factor" and the vital interest in markets of Arab countries (p 180). Practice shows that pragmatism and economic interests will also be an important factor in France's realistic policy in the Near East in the future.

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Machinebuilding Specialist on USSR-FRG Trade
18230054 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA
INDUSTRIYA in Russian 13 Jun 89 p 3

[Article by Raymond Hert, manager of the International Department of the Union of West German Machinebuilders: "In the Role of Pioneers"]

[Text] After a 3-year decline in the export of machinebuilding output to the USSR, enterprises in the FRG were able to turn this process around in 1988: the volume of deliveries exceeded 2 billion marks in 1988. Thus the Soviet Union assumed 11th place among the FRG's most important world customers in this sector. In 1987 the USSR held 13th place after the PRC, though the latter has passed ahead of the USSR now as well.

The FRG holds first place among Western states in deliveries to the Soviet Union of machine tools, metal-lurgical and rolling equipment, test stands, woodworking machines, precision tools, motors, motor vehicles, pumps, equipment to turn out building materials, rubber products and plastics, mining machinery, deep drilling rigs, machines for the food and textile industry, and so forth.

None of the industrially developed countries and none of the Soviet Union's CEMA partners have as many companies in the Soviet market as the FRG. There are 1,400 to 1,500 machinebuilding firms alone. They know the Soviet consumer much better than their competitors and have long-standing traditions, authority, and good service.

Because of the major Soviet projects to build steel mills and petrochemical complexes and for laying pipelines, the firms that specialize in delivering the appropriate equipment are playing the role of pioneers by laying the groundwork in the USSR for small and medium-sized companies.

This year, in the experts' opinion, shipments to the USSR may increase to 4 billion marks. This prediction is supported by Soviet plans for technical renovation of the metal-working, food, textile, leather and shoe, and light industries. In the leather industry, for example, the Soviet Government intends to modernize—and West German firms have already received their first orders—80 shoe factories altogether and to build several new enterprises with the help of "Salamander," the leading manufacturer in this field in the FRG, including in the form of an SP [joint venture].

A credit of 3 billion for our Soviet partners from a consortium of banks headed by the Deutsche Bank also provides a basis for optimism. This huge amount of credit is directly linked to West German deliveries. Some contracts have already been concluded. For example, 300 million marks for the delivery of equipment for making pastries and bakery products, dry cleaning machinery (1,000 units annually), and construction of a plant to turn out processed cheese and a furniture enterprise.

The program of investments announced by the USSR Gosplan at the end of 1988 to develop mining in the Asian part of the country has aroused considerable interest among West German mining equipment manufacturers. Soviet official organs have made it clear that mining the raw material here is desirable with the help of Western technologies and equipment.

The plans to modernize the mining industry on the Kola Peninsula are being viewed in the FRG with the same hope. Some 25 projects are being discussed with Western countries; some of them will be carried out with the support of consortiums, including the establishment of joint ventures.

Our machinebuilding holds a prominent place in the deliveries of equipment to the USSR. In 1987 it was responsible for more than half (51 percent) of all Soviet purchases of this output in the West. The prospects for 1989 and 1990 are good as well.

This assessment is based on several factors. The main one is the expansion of motor vehicle production in the USSR. At the end of 1988 the volume of Soviet orders totaled about 500 million marks. If transactions are completed with the Daimler-Benz and Volkswagen concerns, deliveries will increase even further. In the 1970's, the motor vehicle plants in Tolyatti and Kama were supplied to a significant degree with machine tools from the FRG. The time has now come to modernize them quickly. Negotiations are now being conducted successfully with the (Libherr) group to build a plant to manufacture engines for the AZLK [vehicle produced by the Moscow Motor Vehicle Plant imeni Leninskiy Komsomol] in Moscow.

Business for the suppliers of special tools is also developing well. This sector has long-standing ties with the Soviet market and holds leading positions in it. In 1987 the USSR's imports of this output from industrially developed countries reached 124 million marks. The FRG's share amounted to 80.4 million.

West German machinebuilding's strong position in the Soviet market is based on excellent marketing and participation in numerous specialized exhibitions. Not one country has been represented in the USSR in this sector by as many firms as the FRG. It has taken part in a considerable number of licensing and cooperative contracts.

Companies in the FRG are playing an important role in cooperative ties as the suppliers of licenses and "know-how." In 1988 they became the leaders in the number of joint ventures established in the USSR. This position may become stronger in the course of M. S. Gorbachev's visit to the Federal Republic.

Krasny Proletariy, FRG Firm To Produce Semiautomatic Lathes

18230055 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA
INDUSTRIYA in Russian 13 Jun 89 p 1

[TASS item: "Long Range Cooperation"]

[Text] The West German firm "Emag" has become an active manufacturing partner of Soviet machine tool makers. Jointly with the Moscow association "Krasny Proletariy," specialists from the FRG have developed and successfully tested an experimental model of a semiautomatic lathe with NC. In accordance with the agreement concluded on the principles of international cooperation, long range prospects for further cooperation have been determined.

Thus, on the basis of this successful "first," it has been decided to create a series, which will include a number of variants depending on the designation of the aggregates.

FRG Environment Protection Activities Viewed

18070643 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 May 89
Morning Edition p 5

[Article by correspondent Ye. Bovkun: "Ecological Strategy: Experience of West German Concerns in Environmental Protection"]

[Text] Aggravation of the ecological situation in the FRG in the late 1970s brought the "Green" Party into being. Now each political party has its own ecological platform. The problems of pesticides getting into food, poisoning of water basins, the air and the soil by toxic wastes from chemical production, die-off of the forests, and disposal of domestic and industrial wastes have become common. Since 1980 the country has made serious ecological adjustments in its Criminal Code. But the statistics of "ecological crimes" continue to grow. While 2,321 transgressions upon the habitat were recorded in 1973, 17,930 were recorded last year. This is, by the way, an indication that enforcement organs have started working more effectively: Before, many such crimes were simply undetected.

At the beginning of this year, H. Kohl's cabinet proposed the following amendments to the law: imposing stricter punishment for damage to the natural environment, raising the responsibility of industrial enterprises and their workers, and providing the state with an additional source of profit by imposing high fines upon those who profit from violation of nature protection regulations.

For a long time the ecological situation was felt to be the most alarming in the large industrial centers. The government of Nordrhein-Westfalen Land, in which the Social Democrats have been in power for many years, has managed to achieve significant successes in the fight against ecological crime precisely where this was the hardest of all—in the Ruhr region.

Special significance is attached to development of the ecological strategy of the enterprises and to cooperation between industry, science and the local authorities. I acquainted myself with the experience in developing and applying such a strategy at the Bayer concern, part of the trinity of West German chemical giants.

G. Shtolpa, a scientific and technical advisor to the company, is one of its 800 associates involved exclusively in the problems of environmental protection. Later on I was also able to talk with other Bayer specialists, and attend a press conference on the opening of a new water treatment plant.

The West German press often labels the chemical enterprises as "poisoners." The word "chemistry" itself is spoken by members of the Green Party and friends of nature as a unique sort of curse. Given the existing level of society's technological development, couldn't we do without chemicalization of the economy?

"Unfortunately the prejudice against chemistry has spread, despite the fact that it provides everything man needs," G. Shtolpa admitted. "But I and most of my colleagues do not suffer from any such complexes. Moreover, concern for nature protection is one of the main commandments of our production operation. Chemistry is fighting against chemistry."

"Nature protection and maintenance of safety," G. Shtolpa continued, "are inherent parts of the strategy of business planning. They are accounted for with every new capital investment. Just upgrading product quality is not enough to satisfy the requirements of ecology. We also need to think about how and where we are to dispose of the wastes."

"What do ecological regulations begin with in industry? Perhaps with careful observance of safety rules. We try to maximally exclude accidents and trouble. A special conception of safety is developed for each new area of production on the basis of systematic analysis of the possible sources of error. Both technical ones and those depending on man. And in general, nature protection begins early, in the laboratory, where specimens of new products are born and tested. Each of them is meticulously checked in regard to its effect on the environment."

"The main objective is to economize on resources. That is, to switch to new methods requiring fewer outlays of energy and raw materials. After that comes lowering emissions—that is, reducing discharges of toxic substances into the atmosphere, and liquid waste treatment."

And finally, we are striving to minimize the quantity of wastes. Because this is an additional load on nature's "restorative" mechanism. This is why wasteless production is acquiring increasingly greater significance."

Before going on to Leverkusen I asked ecologists their opinion: How effective is state control over the activities of chemical enterprises? Over 200 legislative prescriptions and instructions on environmental protection are presently in effect in West Germany. Experts feel that it would make no sense to issue new laws. It would be more important to implement the existing ones. This is what the Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Conservation and Reactor Safety and the corresponding land ministries do. In certain cases, for example with pollution of the Rhein by chemicals from Switzerland's Sandoz concern, the ecological violation is discussed by deputies of the Bundestag, and it becomes a subject of investigation by a parliamentary commission and even the procuracy.

I can offer the following figures to those who like statistics: In Nordrhein-Westfalen Land, the area of which is significantly less than Moscow Oblast, there are more than 500 enterprises directly involved in nature protection problems. Is this a lot or a little? I think that it is enough, if you consider that a third of all breakthroughs in ecological technology originate here. In Duisburg for example, the Niksdorf [transliteration] computer company is creating the first databank of the most toxic chemicals, designed to accommodate 5,000 units.

In the last 10 years Bayer spent 8 billion marks on ecological research and introduction of new methods. Three whole institutes belonging to this company are working on this. From 15 to 20 percent of all investments cover the needs of ecology.

Environmental protection is a long-standing tradition of the company. A liquid waste commission was established back in 1901 in Leverkusen—something unusual for those days. With time, the tasks of the ecologists widened. Now their responsibilities include not only cleaning the water and air and disposing of wastes, but also fighting against noise and creating new measuring instruments.

I asked G. Shtolpa how things were going with ecological education of personnel.

"It begins with the first day of work at the enterprise. All associates regularly attend safety classes and special courses. The public affairs division publishes an illustrated journal, prepares other publications and conducts seminars and press conferences. Blue and white collar workers receive bonuses for ecological ideas. In 1986 they introduced around 3,000 efficiency proposals. Maintaining constant public awareness is an important component of our ecological conception. Prior to the beginning of the planting season, specialists from the

company speak to the peasants, telling them which pests might multiply especially intensively this year, and consequently which pesticides should be used primarily. Similar measures are also carried out by the land plant protection department. Bayer chemists have now been working for many years on the development of pesticides which would decompose into innocuous components in a minimum time after their application.

There is an experimental station in Bayer's biological center in Monheim, a few kilometers from Leverkusen. Each year it tests 23,000 new compounds. Most of them are rejected by the controllers. There are but few "survivors." The research includes toxicological experiments on animals and earthworms. Scientists verify how the new substance affects genetics, and into what reactions it enters in water and soil. Only after this does a competent commission of a Federal biological department, staffed by experts from the health and nature conservation ministries, make its decision.

Another important direction of ecological enquiry is the processing of various chemical production wastes into useful raw materials, and introduction of a new system of liquid waste treatment with a closed biological cycle.

Such measures are also helping to clean up the Rhein. I recall standing on a quay at Koln 10 years ago, when you could smell the unpleasant odor constantly coming from the water. Now it has become significantly cleaner. I was able to see sports fishermen taking eel of respectable weight with rod and reel. According to the experts the presence of impurities in river water decreased by 70 percent in this time.

Bayer associates have 25 movable measuring stations at their disposal, making it possible to monitor the state of the environment. Special "green telephones" for the public have been installed in homes within a radius of several kilometers around the enterprise. They can be used to report ecological trouble. In addition the enterprise is visited almost monthly by representatives of the parliamentary control commission.

When water and air are purified, residues which do not decompose into their components accumulate during recycling. What is done with them? The most effective means of their disposal is thermal destruction. Until recently a significant proportion of industrial refuse was burned aboard vessels in the North Sea. The slag and ashes, which often contain toxic substances, were tossed overboard. Bayer process engineers proposed a different method—a thermal unit with a practically closed cycle.

Nonetheless wastes remain even in such ovens, be they insignificant. The sole solution is dependable burying.

Riding the roads of West Germany, I have often seen garbage pits covered over with a thick layer of earth, and then revegetated. Former garbage dumps are transforming into recreation zones. Things are done differently

when toxic wastes are buried. The bottom of the pit is lined with especially strong synthetic film, and electronic instruments carefully check the seams in order to prevent possible leaks.

There is perhaps no other area in which ideas are being exchanged as intensively as in ecology. But from all appearances the future lies with ecologically clean, economically profitable wasteless designs in a reasonable combination with bioengineering.

Experiments in this area are being conducted in the laboratories and scientific institutes of many industrial associations. Does Bayer readily share its secrets in nature protection?

"I believe that there should be no secrets in this area," G. Shtolpa told me. "Everyone is equally interested in preserving the natural balance. We are actively cooperating with other companies, and we take part in international symposiums and conferences."

Bayer also has some reasonably good contacts with the Soviet Union. Experimental greenhouses covered with strong water-repellent film were built in summer of last year near Moscow, Kiev, Murmansk and Sochi. A representative delegation headed by USSR Deputy Minister of Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Industry L. P. Karpenko visited Leverkusen in the fall. But when it comes to cooperation, that's another subject.

British Firms' Management Methods Detailed
18250162 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 May 89
Morning Edition p 5

[Article by B. Kononov, IZVESTIYA special correspondent: "A Means Against Monopolism"]

[Text]

Why should the West trade with us?

Often we have occasion to hear: Does the Western economy really need the Soviet market? Can't they do without us?

Of course they can. Yet, objectively they need our market. This stems from the very nature of the Western economy. Its basis is comprised of stockholding companies, or firms, as they are most often called in everyday conversation. In their own countries they live under conditions of anti-monopolistic legislation. It was introduced in different countries in various years, but today it is in effect practically everywhere, giving rise to a number of most important consequences. We need to understand them.

Our economy developed under the flag of specialization of individual enterprises and sectors, which thanks to its large scale was to have led to a sharp reduction in production outlays and to yield a great economic effect.

In fact, however, ministry-monopolies have been formed, which, undergoing planned expansion along the horizontal, occupy the entire ecological niche of their sphere of activity, cutting the living "body of the economy" with their departmental boundaries.

In the West they understand no worse than we do the benefits of specialization, large series production, and mass application of scientific-technical achievements. Yet the anti-monopoly legislation does not permit grasping the entire "horizontal" of a specific sector. And the large Western companies, comparable in scope with our ministries or even surpassing them, as a rule expand along the "vertical", which includes the entire complex—from extraction of raw materials to sale of the finished product.

This may be clearly demonstrated on the example of the oil and gas complex. In our country, preliminary geological and geophysical exploration is performed by the Ministry of Geology, while the Ministry of the Petroleum Industry and the Ministry of the Gas Industry engage in extraction. God help us if the same deposit contains both oil and gas! This immediately leads to a bundle of departmental confusion. The Ministry of Construction of Petroleum and Gas Industry Enterprises lays the pipelines. The Ministry of the Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Industry and the Ministry of the Chemical Industry refine the oil. The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations sells the oil and gas on the foreign market. Each of these ministries holds a monopoly in its sphere of narrow specialization, and the bureaus of the USSR Council of Ministers ensure their interaction, with the activity of these bureaus being coordinated by the USSR Council of Ministers Presidium. The method of operation is a system of meetings, orders, directives and resolutions.

In England I became acquainted with the work of the British Petroleum Company—one of the largest companies in the world oil and gas business, and rather typical among its "sisters" in its character of specialization. It encompasses the entire complex in 70 countries: It performs geological surveys and oil extraction, builds pipelines, provides shipping by its own fleet, conducts petroleum refining and processing and engages in large-scale chemical production, as for example plastics production. In addition, it is the largest producer of fodder for cattle and fish and the owner of a network of gas filling stations. All the subdivisions of British Petroleum (and this is an entire conglomerate of companies) live off the sale of the finished product. Or, as we say today—from the end result.

Yet British Petroleum has been given only 30 percent of the areas of oil and gas extraction sites in Great Britain. It cannot become a monopoly holder in its sphere of activity. The anti-monopoly laws keep it from doing so. The government also has economic levers. It can stifle the company with taxes if it tries to become a monopoly.

The procedure of obtaining stocks is also controlled. On the London stock market, after buying up 5 percent of the stock of any company, the "buyer" must make a public announcement of this fact. Then the second stage ensues—he can buy 29.9 percent of the stock. After this he must make an official announcement regarding his future intentions. If there is a threat of his obtaining the entire company, then the head of the London Fund Market hands the matter over to a governmental commission on monopolies, which can prohibit further buying or order the prospective monopolist to sell off part of the stock. Thus, for example, recently the governmental commission prohibited Kuwait from buying up more than 29.9 percent of the British Petroleum stock.

British Petroleum is an example of a large conglomerate of companies. In England they are called groups, and in the USA—corporations. It specializes in a comparatively narrow sphere of economics. Yet there are also many "omnivorous" groups into which companies with the most varied specialization unite. Such a "ministry" to us would appear quite strange. In England I had occasion to become acquainted with the Trafalgar House group, which unites around 60 companies. This group engages in shipbuilding, maritime shipping, hotel building, building remodelling, planning and automating the most varied types of production, and construction of marine platforms for oil and gas extraction. It has also developed tunneling shields for laying a tunnel under La Manch. In our understanding, this is a loss of specialization. Yet, it turns out that it is profitable. Last year the group increased its income by 229 million pounds sterling (the exchange rate today for 1 pound is for 1.8 dollars). Together it is easier to solve complex tasks. Such groups are now typical for the Western economy.

The most important result of anti-monopoly legislation and the natural desire to increase profits is the internationalization of business. Today all the large groups and corporations are transnational. If they cannot lawfully realize their advantages and their technology in their native country, then why not do so in others? And it is specifically for this reason that the Soviet Union is objectively very necessary to the transnational corporations.

At British Petroleum, R. Stobi, the manager in charge of development of regional business, opened up a map of the world dotted with little green circles—the places where the company is operating, and regretfully motioned his hand over the territory of the USSR.

"Here we have a 'blank spot'," he said, "and we would like to change this situation. We are very interested in the Soviet market".

This is characteristic for the entrepreneurs throughout the world. They cannot calmly accept the fact that this huge country remains a "blank spot" in their sphere of activity.

It is difficult to deal with us primarily because the ruble is still not convertible. Yet for the "omnivorous corporations" this is not the main problem. We can settle accounts in any kind of goods which the firm is able to sell on the world market. Unfortunately, for now this is primarily raw goods—material or intellectual "know how"—knowledge and technology. The companies which live under conditions of stiff competition do not care where they get the "know how", as long as they can get ahead and offer the best goods and new services. And here everything depends on the broadness of our contacts with the Western companies.

I repeat, they need our market. Yet our need to enter the world market no less strong. Not only for some specific achievements. That is very important, but perhaps even more important is the fact that a broad entry into the world market will inevitably force us to understand the value of anti-monopoly laws and their most important consequence—competition. After all, it is specifically thanks to it that the dictate of the consumer over the producer reigns throughout the world, and not vice versa, as in our country. It is because of this competition that quality has become an economic category, and scientific-technical progress—a necessary and vitally important element of development.

While interacting with foreign companies in our own and in the world market, let us take a closer look at them. After all, in one form or another we too are beginning to form our own firms. For us today stocks and leases are becoming the norm. Therefore, let us become more closely acquainted with the everyday life and work of the British firms who are beginning to form joint enterprises together with us.

John Brown paves the way

The John Brown Engineering Company has conducted business relations with Russia since 1840, when it first supplied equipment for steel processing. In the 30's, John Brown provided tunneling shields for the construction of the Moscow metro. During the height of Stalinism there were declines and even an interruption in relations with the Soviet Union. Today there is an upswing. In 1988, contracts in the sum of 380 million pounds sterling have been concluded with our organization. This is more than in the preceding 14 years.

The company has an office in Moscow, which today serves all the companies in the Trafalgar House group, where John Brown is included as a "sovereign" unit. One enterprise has already been created jointly with us. A second is currently being organized.

John Brown specializes in engineering and design business. Yet today it has taken as a rule the full complementation of facilities built or modernized in the USSR, and their submission "under key" to contractors.

Individual firms of "John Brown" have had the longest relations with the USSR in the port city of Portsmouth. Val Mc Husen, director of the project for construction of a large polypropylene plant in Budennovsk, proudly shows us the Soviet prize "Zolotoy Mercuriy" [Gold Mercury]

"I have worked with Soviet organizations for 15 years now," says Mr. Mc Husen. "From a professional standpoint it is easy to get along with our Soviet colleagues. The negotiations bear an open character. And when you understand in full measure all the limitations and prohibitions which operate in your country, you marvel at the fact that Soviet specialists are nevertheless able to get the job done. Well, of course, the difficulties are tremendous. When we work in the West, a maximum of 3 years goes by between the time the contract is concluded and the time the facility is submitted for operation. When exactly the same facility is built in the USSR, we make wagers amongst ourselves on how many years this will take—6 or 10. This is due primarily to your bureaucracy and your highly refined system of coordination. I as the director am fully answerable to our firm for the project, for its technical accuracy, financing, completion schedules, and fulfillment of the contractor's demands. We generally trust the person in charge. You do not. I must coordinate all the documentation with the Giproplast head institute, with Tekhmasheksport in Moscow, with the institutes in Leningrad, and with the contractor in Budennovsk.

Really, when we were in Portsmouth, there were 22 Soviet specialists working there. Five more were supposed to come that evening. All this was to coordinate the details of the project. It is interesting that the most material consumptive part of the production—the reactors for manufacturing 200,000 tons of polypropylene a year—John Brown ordered from Tekhmasheksport, and they are currently manufactured in Volgograd. For quality control, since John Brown answers on the whole for the entire project and must insure the high quality of the equipment, the firm employs one inspector in Volgograd.

Let us not be coy. It would probably be very easy also to reduce the number of our inspectors at John Brown. After all, their presence in England is included in the cost of the project, which we are paying for. And the large number of people in the Soviet team is, in essence, one of the forms of supplemental payment for our engineers, whose salaries are much lower than those of the English specialists.

They pay well here, but they also consider literally every hour of work. If need be, Mr. Mc Husen may hire any associate from other departments to his project. Yet he pays for every hour from the funds allocated for his project. It is his business how many people he hires. Yet

if in the end there is no profit, that means he is not able to handle his responsibilities. They will not entrust the next project to him, and the team he has selected will be disbanded.

That is why he counts every hour. He also takes an hourly account of the productivity of each one of his associates, evaluating how much time he will need for the assigned task. Each worker fills out a weekly table of the work performed and indicates how much time was spent on each job. The project director, after discussions with the associate, may feel that his productivity was unjustifiably low.

"One phone call by me to the accounting office," said Mr. Mc Husen, "and the week will not be paid. I do not fire people. That is the business of the personnel service. I simply say that I will not pay a certain specialist out of my project. He can be transferred to another manager if he considers the conflict to be the result of my lack of objectivity. Yet three such labor conflicts are enough to legally dissolve the contract with the specialist if the firm is not satisfied with him. Therefore, in England one can criticize the government and parliament, but it is very risky to criticize one's manager. Here they are not chosen, but rather it is they who choose. If you don't like it—don't hire on with such a firm. It is tough. It is strict. Yet you do not find people wandering around with nothing to do.

I pointed out a characteristic detail during Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's visit to the electronics company Case Communications. A worker whom he stopped to watch smiled pleasantly, but did not interrupt her work for even a second, although, of course, no one would have reprimanded her for this. It was a habit.

We went to many different offices and production areas where engineers and workers are employed. No one ever paid any attention to us. Usually these were large halls. The manager sat behind a glass partition and could see everything that was going on.

The lack of excess people, which is characteristic for our scientific-research institutes and design bureaus, was particularly apparent in Coventry at the John Brown Automation Company, which operates as an independent subdivision. This is a young company, only 20 years old, but it is one of the most highly qualified in the field of automation. It has a subdivision in Chicago. In Coventry it employs 140 people. There are 60 engineers and the rest are workers in experimental production. Half of the production goes to export, including to the USSR, specifically to our automobile plants. Yet the company has a very broad spectrum. It engages in automation in machine building, electronics, and the electrotechnical and chemical industry. In our country, each ministry has its own huge institute which deals with automation of only its own sector on a monopolistic basis, and God forbid that it encroach on someone else's territory. Yet would not the national economy benefit if each of these

institutes engaged in automation along a broad profile? There would be competition between them, and the consumer would have a choice. There would be no additional expenditures. On the contrary, these organizations would themselves reduce their numbers with real cost accounting, and at the same time would automate their labor.

The John Brown Company everywhere uses systems of automated planning with modern personal computers unified into a network which provides access to large machines.

But here is what is characteristic. The portion of automated design is about 80 percent. The rest is traditional drafting tables. Manual labor! Sitting at the drafting tables are older people, and at the computers—young people.

What is this—altruism?

"No," they told us at the firm in Coventry, "everything is dictated by economics. There is an entire series of the simplest blueprints for which it is simply inexpedient to spend machine time. It is easier to do them 'by the old way'. And those designers who cannot get used to computer designing are forced to do the simplest blueprints.

Real cost accounting

Everything is accounted for at the firms, and even where, it would seem they are wasteful, profit shows through upon close examination. There is no wage ceiling. The director of the British Petroleum Company makes more a year than the Prime Minister of Great Britain or the president of the USA. The stockholders believe that with such a salary he will fight more effectively for their dividends, and they themselves approve it. At the same time, his salary depends significantly on the company's profits.

Yet in this same British Petroleum, where there are 126,000 employees on all continents, in the London headquarters there are only 10 personal chauffeurs. In the more humble headquarters of the John Brown Company, which has only 10,000 employees, there are only 2 personal chauffeurs. And John Brown Automation (140 people) does not have a single one. If they need a chauffeur, they hire one temporarily.

British firms which operate on real cost accounting have long ago come to the conclusions that personal chauffeurs are not needed. It is cheaper to issue a company car. And already starting with the position of senior engineer or group chief, for example, everyone has a car purchased by the company for their personal use. They pay for the gas, servicing and taxes themselves. For business trips by junior engineers, the companies have cars for 5-6 people, but without chauffeurs.

The firms pay the government for medical services provided to the employees and their families, so that they do not have to create their own system. Yet often they may pay for treatment also in a private clinic which is more expensive, but also more intensive and leading to a more rapid recovery. Is this charity? No, once again it is real cost accounting. After all, there are no excess personnel. So that the work does not stand idle, it is necessary to hire someone from the outside. It is cheaper to cure one's own employee more quickly.

The British Petroleum company offers sumptuous lunches for a token price: 5 pence per pound sterling (about 5 kopeks from a ruble, according to our official exchange rate). The law prohibits free lunches. That is how they get around it. We might ask: Would you not value your company for this alone?

All the firms try to keep their valuable personnel. There is an entire system for their securement. Specifically, pensions. Usually, the employee himself contributes 5 percent to his pension fund, while the company contributes 6 percent. The longer you work, the higher your pension. If you work long enough, you will get the maximum pension from the company—two-thirds of your salary.

A strong stimulus for retaining personnel is the possibility of stock acquisition. After a certain time of work, the companies allow the employees to acquire stock (depending on the length of service and position, although everyone has an upper limit). The stocks yield annual dividends. Usually these do not exceed 10 percent of the annual salary. However, this too is a significant bonus. Moreover, the stocks are retained after retirement and are handed down to the beneficiaries.

Thus, it turns out that every full-time worker of the company is interested in its economic flourishing. In our country, however, the omnipotent ministry monopolies often still, despite the law, take away profits from enterprises which work well in order to give them to those which operate at a loss. Of course, this undermines the desire to work hard. It is no accident that fraternal Bulgaria, which quite recently blindly copied our organizational structures, has liquidated all sectorial ministries and starting this year is changing its national economy over to the system of firms.

The idea of creating competing firms fits very well into socialism. Even in the pre-war years under Stalin, competing design bureaus were created in the aviation industry. However, unfortunately, the economic content was leached out of this endeavor. The laws on the state enterprise and leasing allow us to inspire new content in the firms, which must conduct leading developments, have production and the possibility of freely selling their products on the domestic and world markets. A network of leading cost accounting firms competing with each other can revitalize our economy. And the better their associates work, the better they will live.

Reasons for Polish Hostility to USSR Discussed
18070586 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in
Russian No 14, 5 Apr 89 p 14

[Article by L. Pochivalov: "The Poles and Us; From a Writer's Notebook"]

[Text] Thirty-eight years ago, as I stood at the door with a suitcase in my hand, my father said to me: "Remember! Whatever they say there about the Poles—and they have said different things since ancient times—know one thing: You are going to a worthy people. They are ready to perish to the last man, but will not get down on their knees before occupationists. Use this as the starting point in your relations with the Poles". My father had participated in the civil war. He knew and had seen much.

Our little plane landed at Warsaw airport, and I stepped out onto Polish soil for the first time. I was to work there as a correspondent. There were two banners hung over the airport terminal building. They read: "People's Poland is building socialism" and "The example of the USSR, friendship of the USSR, help of the USSR—the basis for our success". Along the way to the city there were many other slogans waving on red banners along the road, and all were filled with optimism.

Right at the airport I was given a pass to my first work assignment and told to go there immediately. I dropped off my suitcase at the hotel and raced to the specified address. It was a massive, dark building. Three times I presented the pass to the surly guards, and finally I entered the hall. In a few minutes I heard the words: "Na kare smerts!" [The death penalty], "Na kare smerts!" Behind the railing stood those to whom these words were addressed. They wore dress uniforms without shoulder straps. Stalinism was reaping one of its final bloody harvests before dying out. It was 1951. The trial of the highest officers of the Polish Army had just been completed in Warsaw. They were accused of high treason. That is how I began learning Polish:—"Na kare smerts!" may be understood even by one who does not know Polish.

...I went out of the gloomy court building onto the streets of Warsaw. The linden trees were in bloom in Lazenkovskiy Park. Above the crowns of the trees there rose the silhouettes of bombed-out streets. A mass of people flowed along the sidewalks, hurried and concerned. They were Poles...

Man as a social creature is inclined toward stereotypes in his thinking. The stereotype of the Pole has been formed in our consciousness since ancient times. He is multifaceted. His negative side has some not too flattering definitions: He is unreliable, arrogant, and everything like that. "...Enough, I am ashamed to belittle myself

before the proud Polish woman". And an epoch later it was: "The Ataman dogs remember, the Polish pans [gentry] remember our cavalry blades"... All this was formed into the stereotype.

The years which I spent in Poland were a time of breaking these stereotypes. I lived among a courageous people. How much I had heard about the glorious feat of Warsaw which had risen up—even nuns fought on the barricades. In Warsaw my house was on the Polish First Army Street. Everyone knows about this unit. It fought heroically side by side with Soviet units, and entered Berlin together with them. Many good things have been said also about the bravery of the Lyudovoy Army, which fought against the Hitlerites in the underground. But what about the Krayovoy Army? Poles spoke about it in whispers, glancing over their shoulders. It was not under the control of the communists. Moreover, it was subordinate to London, it was "not ours". We did not recognize it. But why? After all, it fought on our side—against the occupationists.

Often Poles were judged prejudicially also in labor. "If you're a Pole, you're a Cracovienne", not disposed to labor, empty-headed, living by the principle: "Either a pan, or begone". This is one more detail of this capricious stereotype! These people are great workers. Today when I hear that they are striking again somewhere in Poland, I wonder: How can the hands of the Poles be idle for so long, how is it that they do not ache from boredom? Evidently they are striking not to get a rest, but often out of desperation. For decades these hands have known no rest, yet they could not create true well-being. But these hands do have something to be proud of. In 3 years, the almost totally destroyed Warsaw was rebuilt from ruins before my very eyes, everything anew—according to the old plans, everything as it was, exactly as it was! Some of our orthodoxists said with irony: "Polish whims! They live in cellars and mud-huts, and yet they rebuilt the ancient prince's castle brick by brick". They also rebuilt the ancient churches brick by brick, and in Staryy Myast they placed the medieval houses one next to the other—everything as it had been, as if for an exhibit! Yet they themselves lived in cellars! Watching their labor, I remembered how my grandmother had wept when they blew up the cathedral of Christ the Savior. During those bitter times the Poles did and were forced to do many things as we did—they sent off innocent people to slaughter, they fought against cosmopolites, but in regard to their own national values they stubbornly acted in their own way. Our people would laugh at them: "They are showmen, they like to put on the dog!" If we only had a tiny bit of such show! Recently we were driving in a car around the "Zolotoye Koltso," and I was embarrassed before my Polish companions at the beat-up Pereslavl-Zalesskiy and Rostov Velikiy, at the ancient churches by the road which had been turned into garages and warehouses. I was also embarrassed to have them see Moscow—run-down, trashy, I cannot remember that a capital was ever so

uncared for. A month ago I was walking through Warsaw. The city was clean down to the last speck of dust. So much for showmanship!

The Poles are invariably inclined toward humor. They like to laugh at themselves—a fruitful trait for any nation. Recently a group of Soviet publicists spent 2 days with 3 members of the PZRP Central Committee Politburo, including the PPR Council of Ministers chairman and other high officials. We were informed about the situation in the country. The situation is difficult. Yet there was no depressing seriousness in the way our hosts talked about all this. There were always traces of humor which shone through in their conversation, and it certainly was no evidence of thoughtlessness. As ancient wisdom says: Humor is the child of philosophy. As long as we are smiling—that means we have not given up!

I was fortunate enough to meet the leading writer Yaroslav Ivashkevich shortly before his death. We spoke of the national peculiarities of the Poles. Ivashkevich said: "A Pole may spend his whole life saving groshen by groshen, saving, scrimping, maybe even swindling someone along the way, just so he can build a house no worse than his neighbor's. But if the hour of national flight should come—without thinking he will turn his house into a barricade, and with a weapon in his hands will die on the ruins of his own wealth". It is a trait which we do not understand very well, but it does exist! We must respect it!

Yes, the Pole likes the spectacular. Even in his fateful moment. In his appearance, his speech, and his actions. I always wondered: Why is the army so popular among the Polish people? Not only by its courageous feats of bygone times, but also in the way by which it knows how to present itself. You cannot tear your eyes away from a Polish officer. He is stately, smart in appearance, clean-cut, elegant, and precise in his movements. Here you will not find, as with us, pot-bellied ensigns and soldiers who forget to salute their superior officers. Traditional army discipline testifies to one's self-assurance, and this means to one's reliability. The Poles are proud of their army. And it is no wonder that in the recent difficult years of dissension that it is specifically the army which has become the stabilizing force in society—because it was trusted.

Perhaps, of all the peoples bordering us, we know Poles better than the rest. This is natural. For over 100 years Poland was part of the Russian state. The October Revolution made it independent. Our historically intertwined relations with the Poles have been so complex that whatever string you pull—it will all be unexpected. The ball of twine, although prickly, is nevertheless a ball, held together with age-old internal unbreakable ties. What there has not been in this ball: a Polish woman who wanted to become the Russian czarina, the sound of shackles on the road from Warsaw to Siberia, and standing side by side in defense of the barricades of the Paris commune. Among the Poles who rose up against

czarism there were also Russian officers, and Decembrists had close ties with Polish revolutionaries. Pushkin bowed before his fellow poet Mickiewicz who, in the words of Pushkin, dreamed about that time "when peoples would put their differences aside and join into a great family". Tens of thousands of Poles took part in the October Revolution, and their names have become a part of Russian revolutionary history. Lenin performed the theoretical preparations for October while living in Poland. In the pre-war periods of enmity between the two states, it was the intelligentsia which did not let the traditional spiritual ties be broken. They were maintained, despite all obstacles, by scientists and musicians, writers and artists. Even in recent years, in the periods of persecution of dissenting intellectuals in both countries, they found help and support in each other. Everything was nonsynonymous in this intertwined ball. Their common Slavic origins brought them together, and at the same time there was the dissimilitude of traditional ideology. On both sides of the border they were Christians, but almost incompatible: In one country there was Catholicism, and in the other—Orthodoxy. In the 1000 years of existence of Catholicism in Poland and Orthodoxy in Russia, the head of the Polish church found himself in the capital of the Russian state in... 1988—at the anniversary of the Orthodox Church.

Our historical fates have at times become so closely intertwined that Poles became part of the Russian, and then also the Soviet people. They fled to us to the east, were taken by force to the endless Russian expanses, and many have lived in our land since ancient times, considering it to be their homeland. How many families there are which can trace their Polish roots! And even today there are over a million Soviet Poles living in the USSR—they are part of our people.

Poles have left a notable trace in our history—in culture, science, and in politics. We are not too well aware of their Polish origins, or at least do not emphasize them—they are ours! The revolutionaries Dzerzhinskiy, Markhlevskiy, Varynskiy, Vorovskiy, the geographer Cherskiy—the gigantic mountain ridge in Eastern Siberia is named after him, the artist Vrubel, the scientists Tsiolkovskiy and Przhevalskiy, the first Russian polar aviator Nagurskiy, the daring Levanevskiy who perished in the Arctic... This list can go on and on.

In my years of contact with Poland, I gradually attained that which from the outside was hidden from view, and was sometimes unexpected and even strange. I suddenly learned that the name of Suvorov, which we so revere, is unpleasant to the Poles—he quelled a Polish rebellion; that they hold a secret grudge against Dostoyevskiy and Gorky—for their unflattering portrayals of Poles. Once at a concert in Krakow a pianist performed the etude by Chopin three times to loud applause. A worker from our consulate who was at the concert with me concluded in a surly manner: "Antisovietism!" As it turned out, the

concert was held on the anniversary of the day when our forces entered the lands belonging to Poland in 1939, and by his famous etude Chopin had called upon the Poles to resist czarism.

Once, PPR Council of Ministers Chairman Juzef Czirankewicz invited me to go in the airplane with him. We were flying to Katowice for the dedication of a new blast furnace which had been built with the aid of the Soviet Union. We had helped the Poles to rebuild their plants and factories and to create industry. In Katowice they gave us an ingot of the first Polish pig iron as a souvenir. I still have it. It is heavy, just as this help was a heavy burden for us in those days. After all, we ourselves had not yet recovered from the war. But we were proud of our example, our friendship and our aid! After a day I returned to Warsaw and learned that the day before they had buried our young communications officer. He had climbed up onto a pole to repair a military line, and they shot him from the bushes, like a little bird. The war had been over for 6 years, but in Poland its sparks were still flying. During those years I twice found myself in shoot-outs on the roads.

I understood ever more that the concept of the "Polish question" relates not only to the past, but also exists in the present day. Far from everything in it is so clear and visible as the first smelting in Katowice. In Poland I became interested in the Catholic Church. I was amazed when I learned that not one of the Polish Roman-Catholic priests had marred their dignity by cooperating with the Hitlerites. Our people did not encourage my interest. "You had better write about how the Polish youth is building socialism!" We were not too interested in such "vestiges of the past" as the church. How could I have guessed at that time that 36 years later I would become the first Soviet journalist whom the head of the Polish Church agreed to see, and that a year after that I would be greeting him, the Primate of Poland, Cardinal J. Glemp, as an honored guest of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA at the entrance to the publishing house?!

Need I say what one experiences when one sees the countless graves of our soldiers on Polish ground... 600,000 hearts of Soviet people stopped beating on this ground. Yes, we paid dearly for our right to be good neighbors. Yet this blood is not an advance on mandatory acceptance in the future. It is not an eternal promise of returned gratitude. It was our contribution to our own freedom, as well as to the Polish, and to a peaceful future on Earth. And the Poles have not forgotten this. It is nonsense that they supposedly profane the epitaph to the fallen, as recently occurred in Krakow. These are either provocateurs or irrational extremists who have no relation to the true sentiments of the people.

We must never forget that Poles are devout Catholics, and that Catholics have an especially reverent attitude toward the memory of the deceased, whoever they may be. Stalin declared that everyone who had been taken

prisoner was a traitor, and even their graves were trampled in contempt. Yet the Poles, simple religious people, always cared for the unmarked graves of our unfortunate fellow countrymen who had died on Polish ground in Hitler's camps. There is a cemetery here where 80,000 are buried... And they still care for it. Yet we have just now barely come to the conclusion that it is time for us to "reveal" these burials.

I often felt badly when they asked me questions which I could not answer, which I simply did not know how to answer. Why did the Comintern disband the Polish Communist Party? What happened to its Secretary General Julian Leshchinskiy? (Only this year in a publication of PRAVDA did I get the answer to this question: Leshchinskiy was called to Moscow by the Comintern in 1937 and was executed there the same year.) What happened to the Poles who were deported in 1939 from the western regions of the Ukraine and Belorussia, and from other rayons of the USSR? There were over a million of them. Why did the Soviet Army, which stood on the opposite bank of the Vistula in the fall of 1944, not come to the aid of the Warsaw uprising? Why was Marshall Rokossovskiy, who had brought his armies to the walls of Warsaw, to the city where his father was buried, suddenly transferred by Stalin to the other front?

Questions, questions... I was young, just a correspondent of a youth newspaper, yet they asked an accounting of me in those years, as a Soviet citizen I was held responsible for all of this. And already then I understood that each of us bears personal responsibility for everything. Poland has tied its post-war fate with the USSR, and the Poles want to know first of all: Where are we going together? Where? To the bright far-off lands? What kind? When will they be revealed to us, these bright promised lands?

I often argued and tried to prove my point of view. After all, we have difficulties too! Yet we are helping you in a brotherly manner, building your cities, supplying ore, rock coal and fuel at low cost, tools, machines, and cotton. For example, in '47 we helped you out with wheat in a difficult time, even though we ourselves were hungry. Now they have built a multi-story Palace of Culture and Science in the center of Warsaw. I myself saw in those years how much work, effort and will our people put into this structure. In my opinion, it is cumbersome in its architecture, it does not adorn the ancient city, and it is expensive to serve... But it is a gift! The unflattering comments on this gift of our country were bitter. Sometimes they hinted to me: "With this house Stalin is trying to pay us off for not coming to the aid of Warsaw when the Germans were destroying thousands of our homes". It was painful to hear this. Once I even demonstratively walked out of a concert which was being held in the Palace hall, when a sharp-tongued master of ceremonies made an ironic remark about the building where the concert was being held.

Behind all this was that which was left unsaid and unexpressed—insults, suspicions, and often a basic ignorance of the true facts. And we enhanced the suspicion, since we tried to hide these true facts, we were afraid of them, and even now are not too quick to expose the truth about some of them. The relations between the two fraternal countries could be more direct, simpler, and more natural if we took into consideration these nuances, and the "Polish traits" in the Poles. Without having a good knowledge of the people, their traditions, and the peculiarities of their psychology, we would cut from the shoulder: "We have to!", we would say. And yet, although they were neighboring Slavic peoples, although they were tied together by many things in the historical past, this past is still not all that similar. The Poles did not know the Tatar yoke, serfdom, or the unchallenged authority of absolutism. They even selected their own kings. Thus, they have a little better understanding of democracy than we Russians do, and it is quite understandable why they react with great sensitivity to any encroachment on their independence. Yet all too often we resorted to peremptory shouts. They told me that even President Boleslaw Berut once could not stand it and called Stalin: "Your ambassador Popov is ordering me around like the secretary of a rural raykom". Popov was recalled, but the style changed little.

When he came to Warsaw, Khrushchev allowed himself "not to notice" the fact that among his greeters was Vladislav Gomulka, who had spent a year in jail for no reason and who once again headed up the party. Khrushchev did not like Gomulka. I once had occasion to meet the editor-in-chief of the newspaper *POLITIKA*. He invited me to his home, and we spent many hours talking with him about the fates of our countries. When I told them at the consulate about this meeting, they reprimanded me: "You shouldn't have gone! The newspaper *POLITIKA* has its ins and outs, and its editor is a complex man... You should have consulted with us first". This year I met this "complex man" for a new discussion. He shook my hand and smiled in a friendly manner, recognizing me. This was PPR Council of Ministers Chairman Mieczyslaw Rakowski.

We should long ago have sought contacts with such "complex" figures in Poland, but we shied away. Our newspapers published many superficial articles, often by incompetent authors, about the events in Poland in 1981, and these articles only evoked irritation among many Poles. We imposed Stalinism upon the Poles, and we imposed Brezhnevism. In the recent history of this country such figures emerged in power who could only have appeared under the influence of our stagnation. Thank God, it seems, all this is behind us. It is another time, with other leaders and other ideas. There have never been such great possibilities for true cooperation of the two peoples as there are today. This has been noted by everyone, even by the representatives of the Polish Roman-Catholic Church and "Solidarnost". But, they stress: Only on the basis of mutual understanding and respect.

PZRP Central Committee Secretary and Politburo Member Yu. Czirek also stressed this point during our meeting. "We must get to know each other better," he said, "and delve deeper into the specifics of our problems. Understanding is the best way to agreement". I was amazed: So many years we have lived side by side, yet the question of mutual understanding is still a key issue—it seems, not only with the USA, but even with our long-time ally Poland. Perhaps only now have we and the Poles begun to understand how little we know each other—not only in our not too clear present, but even in our history-book past. In Kostroma they told me how they took a group of Polish tourists up to a monument to Ivan Susanin in the center of the city. The Poles had no idea who this Susanin was. The young tour guide, who had a sense of humor, explained: "Well, how can I tell you... He was also kind of a tour guide. The first one for the Poles in these parts".

My long-time friend Richard Badovskiy lives in Warsaw. He is a well-known publicist in his country. He graduated from Moscow University, worked for several years in Moscow, and knows our country well. He devotes much time to gathering materials on Poles in Russia. He has a rich collection of books and documents. It seems that much is published on this topic in Poland. Unlike us, the Poles have a much more serious interest in the mutual relations of our two countries. In the post-war years we did not try very hard to make sense of and understand this neighboring people which we so loftily called "fraternal". In our own country we treated national peculiarities without proper respect, and even more so as far as foreign countries were concerned. However, in our past the leading intelligentsia held different positions. Here is an excerpt from the two-volume publication of "Polish Kingdom", published in Petersburg 100 years ago: "Among most Poles you can find many examples of high morality, noble chivalrous understanding of civic dignity, endless and selfless love for their mother country". Are we capable of such characteristics in the present time of mistrust? We are always afraid of praising too much.

There have always been anti-Russian and anti-Soviet sentiments in Poland. But do they run deep? Badovskiy believes that the Poles and Russians are traditionally cautious toward each other, but this is to the overall mass. Yet to each one individually they have a positive attitude. In other countries, explained Badovskiy, Poles and Soviet citizens are invariably drawn to each other. No matter how you look at it, they are "kin". "We have a 'sick love' for you", smiled my friend.

Let us not deceive ourselves. In Poland there are those who fervently fan anti-Soviet sentiments or who try to heat up the situation with ill-thought out actions. Today there is a process of rapprochement of our peoples. We are opening Polish schools in the USSR and creating Polish clubs. Border contacts have significantly improved. Many Polish specialists are going to work in the USSR, and cultural exchange is growing... And then

suddenly I learn: Recently in certain districts of Poland there has been some doubt expressed as to the need for learning Russian in the schools. There is currently a rapid breaking of stereotypes in our relations—both ancient, new, and most recent. We believe that the customs war which has recently arisen between the socialist countries does not facilitate an improvement in relations. Here it is called the "war of the have-nots". The Poles have exported much technology from the USSR—televisions, refrigerators, and washing machines. Today an end has been put to all this. "That's right!," a young customs agent in Brest categorically stated. "All Poles are speculators". And what about us? In the marketplaces of Polish cities you can now hear fluent Russian—some of our tourists are doing business. Some of Poland's cities have become handling centers for illegal shipments of black caviar from the USSR to France. So we know how to do this too...

Behind all these stereotypes stands historical experience. "After the war, they stubbornly tried to convince us Poles," they told me, "that our older brother the Soviet Union was better at everything. This caused a backlash. Such a thing even causes annoyance among the young children in a family". Another stereotype is that "the Russians brought the Poles freedom!" But now some different sentiments are emerging. Students at demonstrations are shouting: "Russians—go home!" The many years of presence on Polish soil of a large Soviet military grouping cannot help but leave an imprint on the sentiments of the local population. Especially since our soldiers do not always demonstrate exemplary behavior abroad. Yet we continue to ignore these "nuances"—to our own detriment. Recently another murmur rolled over the country. The USSR publicly announced a reduction in the number of its troops stationed in the GDR, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. But what about Poland? Did they forget about it? Or is it that they do not trust it, and keep the troops there just in case? The questions bothered the people. Fortunately, they soon came to their senses and explained that they were pulling troops out of Poland too! This is where real politics is, this is where it must be especially flexible and weighed in every detail! We now need diplomacy of the highest quality, including also in the socialist countries.

This is not the first year that the fateful word "Katyn" has resounded from the pages of the Polish press. In the forest near Smolensk, several thousand Polish officers interned by us in 1939 were executed. When were they executed? Who executed them? For years we maintained that it was the Hitlerites. Today this affirmation is being decisively questioned in Poland.

Last summer I met with Politburo Member and PZRP Central Committee Secretary Marian Oczechovski. The discussion centered around that which separates our people. "In the past," said Oczechovski, "it was the politics of the ruling classes that separated us. These classes in Poland always looked to the East in search of expanding their living space, while in Russia they looked

to the West with the same purpose in mind. Such relations lasted until 1945. Their history reminds us of the Polish troops in Kiev and the Soviet troops at the walls of Warsaw at the dawn of Soviet power. The rumor started: They gave Poland her independence and then suddenly decided to take it back. The second thing that separates us is Stalinism, the tragic fate of the Polish Communist Party, the deportation of hundreds of thousands of Poles to Siberia, and the liquidation of Polish national rayons in the USSR. And the third thing is the heritage of the past, the so-called "white spots" [gaps]. Oczechovski particularly noted: "This is certainly not that account which we present to the Soviet Union. Everything has another side. In our Polish history there are also many "white spots" in regard to Russia, as for example in the Polish policy regarding the Belorussians, Lithuanians and Ukrainians. In fact these are "black spots". But the most tragic of such spots is Katyn. As a Pole who knows the sentiments of his people, I believe that this is a key question. If we do not clarify it, then the clarification of other "white spots" will lose all meaning.

Professor Ya. Machishchevskiy, co-chairman of the Soviet-Polish joint commission on "white spots", told me the same thing. This was also a serious discussion on restoring historical fairness in our consciousness: through truth—towards understanding. Unfortunately, the restoration is proceeding slowly, especially on the matter of Katyn. "Many in Poland are convinced," said M. S. Gorbachev during a recent visit to this country, "that this is the work of Stalin and Beria. The history of this tragedy is today being thoroughly studied. According to the results of the study we will be able to judge to what degree certain judgements and evaluations are justified".

In 1952 I once had the good fortune of speaking with Marshall Rokossovskiy in Warsaw. We talked about the peculiarities of the Russian and Polish soldier. The Marshall said: "The Russian is capable of waiting for battle in a trench for days on end. The Pole cannot do this. He is impatient. He must immediately have either victory or death, or he will jump up and go under the bullets".

The Pole is impatient... That is another detail of that old stereotype. Perhaps a precise detail. Rokossovskiy knew what he was talking about. And it must be considered not only in combat, but primarily—in politics. Eight months have passed since M. S. Gorbachev was in Warsaw. The time, of course, is short for a thorough investigation. This time when I came to Poland, everyone I met would ask me about Katyn. And in this, you must know the Poles, they do not depart from their own. In 8 months we have not said a word, but Poland is seething. There is no real proof yet? The investigation is still being conducted? Let us say directly: Wait, friends, there are still some things which are unclear, there are still some doubts. We need to look at the archives again, we need new excavations in Katyn. Silence is ruinous. Even if everything is not yet completely clear. Let us be politicians! "The Pole

is impatient! Ye. Urban, the PPR government press representative, told me that Poland is forced to unilaterally publish new documents which have been handed over to the Soviet side. It is forced to do so because the opposition is making use of Moscow's silence.

I am far from placing all the blame for the shady sides of our relations in the distant as well as the recent past on the shoulders of my Homeland. The Poles came to the Volga as attackers, and the czarist troops—to the Vistula. At various times there were mutual insults and injustices. And in this article I have no intention of bringing up the old accounts of the Poles. On the contrary, as a citizen of a great power I would like to appeal that we, Soviet citizens, ourselves think about what we did wrong yesterday so that these things will not be repeated tomorrow. But to critically think about certain facts of their own history—that is a matter for the Poles themselves.

During his meeting with Soviet publicists, M. Rakowski constantly made comparisons between the current situation in our countries and stressed the similarities, as for example the common problem of the change of generations. The military generations, which were ready for patience, are fading away. The new ones are braver. They do not have the "barrier of fear". They easily formulate opposition currents. At the same time M. Rakowski persistently stressed the differences—each country has a different character of society. "For example, we do not have 'our own', Russian Pope, but we have the Roman Pope—a Pole. This plays a great role in the thinking of the population". And again he referred to the common: the political and economic position of the present day. The West is convinced that the socialist formation has entered a deep crisis and that it should not help it survive. "We and the USSR cannot quickly help each other, and some difficult years lie ahead for us," said the Polish premier.

Nevertheless, the hopes for mutual support are great. Here too we must seek understanding. PPR Council of Ministers Deputy Chairman I. Sekula stressed in his conversation with us that for Poland not everything is smooth in its economic relations with CEMA and the USSR. There are many unrealistic prices and rates of exchange, and the trade balance is not beneficial to Poland... We might add, our people affirm, that it is also not beneficial for us, and it is unclear how everything can be restructured...

We are not indifferent to the political situation in Poland today. This is because it is a fraternal country, because it is a neighbor, and because it is among our most decisive allies in the policy of perestroika. The Poles are also not indifferent to the fact that they are thinking about their affairs there, beyond their eastern border. Radical changes are coming to a head in Poland as well. To what will they lead? Will the country emerge from the crisis? What course will it take tomorrow?

Understandably, whatever happens there in Poland is the business of the Poles themselves, but it is also important for us that there be a successful, healthy, and friendly state on our western border.

When I first came to Warsaw in 1951, Maria was recommended to me as a translator. Her fate was remarkable. The young Leningrader who had just completed the language institute had been assigned to our trade delegation in the republic of Spain. At one of the receptions she met a young Pole, a worker at the Polish embassy. During the Franco rebellion, Jan came to our ambassador in Madrid together with Maria. "I am a Pole and a communist. I love this girl. She has agreed to be my wife. Today we are going to war together". They went through all the fronts of the Spanish war together. Once Maria carried her wounded husband out of the mountains on her shoulders. After the fall of the republic they moved to France. When fascism came here too, they entered the underground ranks of the maquis. Jan was awarded the French Military Cross—for bravery. After the war they came to Poland. But here trials awaited them. During that bitter period of militant injustice, the participants in international brigades in Spain were under suspicion. Their life was difficult, and they were needy. Jan was often sick. In order to feed the family, Maria worked as a translator. "It is hard for you?", I once sympathized with her. "It's not easy!", admitted the woman. "But then Jan and I are remarkably lucky. No matter what happens, we are side by side".

It is with this long-ago story that I would like to conclude the article. I believe that we are very fortunate to have the Poles at our side. No matter what happens.

Slovenian Delegation Visits Belorussia
18070669 Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in
Russian 23 May 89 p 3

[BELTA item: "Guests from Slovenia"]

[Text] On 21 and 22 May a delegation from the Socialist Republic of Slovenia was in Minsk. The delegation was headed by Janes Bojaric, deputy chairman Executive Vec of the Skupshchina. The guests visited the Krintsa Production Association and the Minsk Automotive Factory. The delegation was received by N.A. Makayed, deputy chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers.

While the delegation was in town, questions of further cooperation between the Socialist Republic of Slovenia and the Belorussian SSR were discussed.

Belorussia To Receive Yugoslav Television
18070666 Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in
Russian 5 May 89 p 1

[BELTA item: "Contacts Are Growing Stronger"]

[Text] The republic's television viewers will be able in the near future to regularly see reports of Belorussian and Yugoslav journalists from Slovenia. There was discussion

of this and other forms of mutual contacts at a meeting of executives and employees of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting [Gostelradio] and Ljubljana Television. The basis for such cooperation was laid three

years ago, at the time of the Days of National Cultures, when the first exchange of delegations and of television and radio programs was also set up. Today it has been decided to significantly expand the ties and to make them permanent.

View of PRC in 1989, Gorbachev's Visit

18250159 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
11 May 89 p 3

[Article by V. Solovyev and V. Shaykin, special SELSKAYA ZHIZN correspondents: "China: May 1989"]

[Text] The just over 8-hour non-stop flight from Moscow to Beijing is not such a long distance for those who make business or tourist trips from one country to another. However, it took decades for the top leaders of the two largest socialist countries with a 7,500-kilometer common border to meet again. This is the key to the unusually widespread interest of our two countries and the entire world in M.S. Gorbachev's upcoming visit to the PRC. Everyone understands very well that these 8 hours of flight time will bring closer the moment when a new chapter will be written in the mutual relations of our two states.

There is probably no need, therefore, to talk about our condition and thoughts during the minutes the Il-62 took off and headed for Beijing. First of all, we were the first journalists of SELSKAYA ZHIZN who were sent to that country after more than a quarter of a century break. In addition, we understood well all the complexity of the task facing us—after a 2-week trip around China, to tell the Soviet readers about the present-day country on the eve of such a major event and to familiarize the newspaper's readers with the life and labor of the rural population. Of course, we were relying on help from the Chinese newspaper journalists from NUNMIN ZHIBAO, the largest peasant newspaper that had invited us.

The two weeks flew by, as if one day. Behind us were, as our escorts calculated, more than 5,000 km on trains and in cars and a pile of used up writing tablets. The precious cargo delivered to Moscow was the agreement on establishing relations of comradely cooperation between the editorial staffs of the two newspapers planned for the long term: the largest agrarian newspapers agreed to exchange people and information and to provide all possible assistance in establishing direct ties between rural organizations and populated areas.

In short, our hopes were justified. What is more, what we saw and heard changed many of our ideas both about the life of the people and about the economic situation in the country. We saw for ourselves how the Chinese people were waiting for the arrival of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. There was almost no conversation in which this visit was not mentioned. Du Junsheng, who is called one of the architects of today's agrarian policy of the PRC, also talked with us about this. This prominent figure in the republic, who heads the office on agrarian policy issues under the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and simultaneously the scientific research center on questions of development of the rural economy under the PRC State Council, talked to us in detail about the problems that reform has encountered

and about the plans for its further progress (we will come back to this conversation later in more detail). Concluding our detailed conversation, he phrased his attitude toward the upcoming visit:

"We are really looking forward to M.S. Gorbachev's visit and will be happy to welcome him to Chinese soil. It is vitally necessary for us to put an end to what is called the past and to open up that which is called new. Cooperation is needed by both you and us. I think that its expansion will mutual benefits to both countries. And it is especially important," he added with a kind smile, "in the agrarian sphere. We are watching very closely how perestroika is going in this area and deriving considerable useful experience. When I read M.S. Gorbachev's address at the March CPSU Central Committee Plenum, where he not only assessed the previous policy but also talked about future directions of development of agriculture, I saw much interesting and similar. I agree completely that the peasant himself must be the boss on the land and that it is necessary to reduce administrative-command pressure on him. In short, we have something to talk about and experience and opinions to share."

This desire to share experience and learn more about one another was also sensed in the constant questions: "What is it like in Moscow?" "How is perestroika going?" The Chinese people have a great interest in what is going on in our country. This is understandable, too. People of the older generation remember the years of our close cooperation, when 156 industrial projects were constructed in the PRC with the help of the Soviet Union. And if a convenient instance appears, they remind us: "Soviet specialists worked here in the 1950's." On the roads of China, the trucks in which we could recognize without difficulty the once popular "ZIS's" became sort of a symbol of those times. True, these, produced up until recently, had long ago been given Chinese model names. Both in the cities and in the countryside, our "Volgas" and sometimes a "Zhiguly" flashed by. Trade between the two countries has stepped up noticeably in recent years. Border trade, resumed in 1983, is developing particularly actively. Last year, its volume reached a record figure of \$274 million American. It is curious that the "Vladivostok" store, opened at the end of last year in the city of Suifenhe (Heilongjiang Province), already in the first quarter of 1989 sold Soviet goods amounting to more than 1.5 million yuan. Cooperation between our countries is also being strengthened in the field of agriculture. Thus, as a result of an agreement reached during the recent trip to Sichuan Province by V.V. Nikitin, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Agroindustrial Committee, Chinese plant growers in Chelyabinsk and Novosibirsk oblasts, using their own agricultural equipment, will grow rape and vegetables on 90,000 hectares. The Soviet side will supply them with seed, fertilizer, herbicides, and tools; the Chinese side will supply specialists, workers, technicians, and high-quality rape and vegetable crop seed.

The rate of growth in the volume of border trade is promising. It is gratifying that interest in developing

trade ties is growing not only in the border zone. Thus, in the provinces of Anhui and Shandong, which we drove all over from one end to the other, we repeatedly saw how both industrial and agricultural enterprises were already entering the Soviet market, although both provinces are far from the border. Their interests are represented by partners from the border districts.

In the notebooks there remained quite a few names and addresses of those who would like to expand cooperation with our country and enter into direct ties. Here is a typical statement by Sun Guantsi, director of the committee on foreign trade of Mupin District, Shandong Province:

"Although there are only 570,000 people in our district, the potential for development of trade ties is great. And they can take various forms. For example, we now have 31 enterprises in operation, created jointly with foreign firms—Japanese, Hong Kong, and from other countries. In principle, it is possible to set up branches of them in the USSR, too. As far as trade is concerned, we are conducting negotiations through Harbin and have signed a number of protocols of intent. Thus, Soviet comrades have proposed to us to build a brickyard in Khabarovsk, a clothing factory in Uzbekistan, and to engage in vegetable farming in Tyumen Oblast. Negotiations are under way with Volgograd comrades on a photo equipment factory. But everything is developing very slowly, since it is being done through intermediaries. It is extremely important to enter into direct ties and not waste time."

The director of a refrigerator plant, Xuian Zhuzhang, in Chuzhou, Anhui Province, also spoke about this. After completion of construction, this expanding plant will be the largest in Asia. It has the most modern equipment. The plant's products—refrigerators, coffee grinders, microwave ovens, vacuum cleaners, electric hair dryers, and other household items—are exported to Australia, many Asian countries, and to the African continent. Nevertheless, the director began the conversation saying that the plant was interested in the Soviet market and was even willing to open a branch in the USSR.

There were quite a few conversations of this sort. Everywhere we sensed a vital interest in expanding contacts between the two countries, but it would be wrong to reduce everything down to the economic aspect. In China there is a great interest in everything that is taking place in our country, a great interest in our culture and music. Here is but one curious example: We stopped at a restaurant to eat supper in a small provincial city. A tape recorder was playing something painfully familiar: a Chinese orchestra was playing "In the Nizen Attic," "Polyushko-Pole," and other of our songs. Our appearance here was by chance, so we could not suspect that anyone had specially selected the repertoire.

Chinese television shows much subject matter about the Soviet Union, and newspapers and magazines publish articles about today in the Soviet Union. One more important detail: M.S. Gorbachev's book, "Perestroika and New Thinking," is already in its third edition in the PRC. The first experimental issue of the new magazine MOST (Bridge) was published during our stay. It will be published in Russian language by the Weiwen printing house and, as is noted in the foreword, is to "promote the exchange of thoughts, ideas, and experience, and the strengthening of friendship."

The title of the magazine is deeply symbolic of today's stage of development of our relations. The secretary of the party committee of the Chinese Communist Party in the village of Dong Qu Kung Xiangleng, whose guests we were for the May Day holiday, put this well:

"It turned out that there was a large hole between our countries, filled with a lack of understanding, misunderstanding, and silence. But it is impossible to live this way very long. We must build a bridge across this hole. With efforts from both sides, the bridge will be built twice as quickly. The more people we have building the bridge of friendship, the wider and stronger its foundation will be and the faster that former hole will disappear under a cover of the roadbed."

He was right—this elderly peasant who had worked nearly 3 decades as a brigade leader and had seen quite a bit in his lifetime. When we listened to him and looked at his worn-out hands, we understood that he was talking about what the peasants just like him were thinking.

Lately, quite a bit is being done to see that the traffic over the newly created bridge of friendship is heavy already now. The agreement in effect since last year on visa-free exchange for official trips will promote a wide exchange of people. The exchange of delegations from cultural and public organizations who depart under the policy of direct ties is also expanding.

The people of China are preparing to welcome M.S. Gorbachev and are associating with his arrival hopes for a decisive change in our mutual relations. We encountered evidence of that right up until our last hours on Beijing soil. Literally 30 minutes before our departure, we had to give a curious consultation to a salesgirl at the airport. Having heard Russian speech, she asked us in English to write for her on a small sheet of paper the Russian phrases: "Hello!", "Welcome!", "Thank you!" and so forth. We did so and asked her why she wanted this. The girl smiled and explained: "We hope that soon we will have many many Russian guests. And we have to study at least beginning words."

But this was at the end of our business trip. At the beginning, we familiarized ourselves with the Chinese countryside, its out-of-the-way places, its problems and achievements. We will talk about this in subsequent reportage.

PRC-Vietnam Cross-Border Trade Increasing
*18070296 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in
Russian 23 May 89 p 3*

[Article by A. Denisovich and A. Papandin: "Mine-Clearing: Cross-Border Trade Between Vietnam and China Develops"]

[Text] Beyond the barrier at the checkpoint, the road wound downhill. After an abrupt turn, a small valley in which houses and farm buildings were hidden among the trees and lush shrubbery opened up before us unexpectedly, like in the palm of one's hand. Nearby an ancient pagoda towered toward the sky. It was a beautiful and comfortable place. And judging from everything, it had been chosen by people as a place to live back in ancient times. Now, however, TASS correspondents in Vietnam report to the editor's office of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA that this village, called Dong Dang, bears the mark of desolation. It was evident from far away that the valley had almost no inhabitants left. Only rarely did the figure of a cyclist or pedestrian flicker by along parts of the road within sight. When we came closer, it seemed as if it was not that the houses were hiding in the luxuriant jungle vegetation, but on the contrary that nature itself, covering everything with greenery, itself wished to conceal from the casual observer the traces of devastation, the vacant orbits of the broken windows, the sagging roofs and deep shell craters. The houses had been abandoned, and the farms had been deserted.

This was the picture that greeted us at the Vietnamese-Chinese border. And at this moment it seemed as if all of the reports of the press, radio and information agencies concerning gradual normalization of relations between the two countries and on establishment of cross-border trade were greatly exaggerated. The impression was created that at any moment one might hear the whine of a heavy artillery shell carrying death and destruction. But it has already been over 2 years that the gun barrels have been hooded. All other combat equipment has also been withdrawn from the borders. Only the combat engineers have a lot of work left. Chung and Tuan—two young soldiers from the platoon operating in this area—said that each of them has to disarm from 20 to 25 mines daily. Many of them had in fact been laid over the time of the conflict between the two countries, which lasted several years. These were necessary measures at that time, but now they have finished serving their purpose, and judging from everything, forever. In any case, everyone—both the Vietnamese and the Chinese that we met—very much wanted to believe this.

"We have no doubts about this at all," said Khoang Zyay, deputy chairman of the peoples committee of the province of Lang Son. "In recent times the people have become firmly convinced that living as two good neighbors and trading with each other is better than looking at each other through a gunsight."

The market in Lang Son has now become a visible confirmation of this. One observed a real abundance of Chinese goods in the numerous stores and tents, and even simply beneath fabric and bamboo mat awnings: tape recorders, television sets, electric lanterns, insulated bottles, porcelain dishware, clothing, fabrics of all sorts, ruddy apples, beer, and various agricultural implements. And one of the vendors was even offering a tractor engine. All of this had been purchased by merchants in China, which has been allowing them to enter unrestricted since August of last year. But as they say, this is not a one-way street. In Lang Son one can also encounter Chinese who had come here to acquire goods of interest to them. We learned that they have a special demand for certain food products—pork, rice, crabs, fish and salt, as well as some household goods and articles made from nonferrous metals.

As we roamed through the market we naturally priced some of the goods. We wanted to know how much their prices increase after they get to Hanoi and other cities of the country. We found that at the border, on the average the prices on these goods were twice lower than in other regions of Vietnam. We were told that this is connected with the high transportation and other expenses, as well as the higher demand, for example, for those same apples, insulated bottles and dishes.

"We have now concluded," noted Khoang Zyay, "that it is time to begin establishing cross-border contacts and signing some sort of official documents in this regard. You would have to agree that order is needed in every matter, and all the more so in something like international relations."

The newspaper NYAN ZAN noted that the possibility for uncontrolled border crossing has also generated negative phenomena such as deliberate misappropriation of state property. Thus, on learning that there was a great demand for telephone wire in Chinese border regions, malefactors began removing dozens of kilometers of it from telegraph poles! A unique "statutory price" was also established—2 kilograms of wire were exactly enough for one insulated bottle, and 20 kilograms could be traded for a tape recorder made in China. Another problem made itself known as well—a food problem. It is no secret that sizable quantities of food products, which are delivered with great difficulty to the border provinces from the country's central regions, have started "drifting away" into China. Attempts to establish adequate surveillance at the checkpoints in this regard have not yet produced the desired results, since the local inhabitants are quite well acquainted with all of the trails along the border, which could be used to make one's way to an adjacent territory without interference, and carrying anything one likes. In addition rapid development of cross-border trade tempts many people to "participate" in it who had never engaged in this business before but who feel that there is a real possibility for quickly rectifying their financial status. In the province of Cao Bang for example, up to a third of the agricultural

laborers have abandoned farming and taken up private entrepreneurship. Moreover dozens of state organizations having no relationship to trade have also begun taking part in this business.

There are still many problems remaining. But that is not perhaps the main thing. What is important is that tendencies toward restoration of good-neighbor relations between the two countries have started manifesting themselves with increasing clarity. And one need not go very far to find examples confirming this. Thus in the words of Khoang Zyay, efforts to rebuild motor highways and railroads connecting Vietnam to China have already been started in the province of Lang Son.

Warm weather always comes with spring. People on both sides of the Chinese-Vietnamese border are welcoming the advent of springtime in the mutual relations between the two peoples.

China's Deng Xiaoping Profiled

18070288 Moscow IZVESTIYA in
Russian 14 May 89 Morning Edition p 5

[Article by correspondent Yu. Savenkov: "Deng Xiaoping: Political Portrait"]

[Text] Deng Xiaoping once said: "Some take me to be a reformer, while other comrades believe me to be a conservative. Yes, I am a reformer, this is true. If one who advocates the four basic principles (a socialist path, communist party leadership, democratic dictatorship of the people, Marxism-Leninism and the ideas of Mao Zedong) is a conservative, take me to be a conservative. But generally speaking, I am neither a reformer nor a conservative. To be precise, I am a realist. The formula I follow is this: 'Practical experience is the criterion of truth.'" Deng Xiaoping was witty, unique and thought-provoking.

The movement under the slogan "Practical experience is the criterion of truth" is one of the brilliant pages from his political biography. This movement occurred in the second half of the 1970s (at the eve of the December 1978 Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, at which it was decided to initiate a new era in the history of China). The discussion of the role of practical experience in attaining the truth was not academic in the debates of the philosophers. The subject of the discussion was the ideas of the "great helmsman," who was declared to be absolute in the time of the Cultural Revolution. The leader was dead, but two principles were actively introduced into the life of society: Absolutely all decisions made by Chairman Mao must be steadfastly defended, and absolutely all instructions of Chairman Mao must be invariably observed.

Deng Xiaoping had just returned to the political arena after his second expulsion when he immediately went into combat: "It is improbable for every phrase uttered

by a person to be correct, for it to be absolutely true." Creative boldness and political courage were needed in order to decide on such a step.

The deification of Mao Zedong had its roots in feudal China's 2,000-year tradition of subordinating the will of all powers to one. In the old society, everyone was obedient to the emperor. Simple people were obedient to officials. A son was obedient to his father. A wife was obedient to her husband. The spirit of disobedience was brutally suppressed. If the emperor gave the order to die, then every person had to accept this as a lucky gift, and gratefully pass on to the other world. If the husband died young, the wife was obligated to live all of her life alone in the name of chastity.

China has traveled a long path of feudal development. Revolutionary explosions shook these foundations and challenged the psychology of ignorance, servility, hypocrisy and idolatry, but they were unable to tear the "traits of slavery" out of the people by their roots. And when the Cultural Revolution set in, all of the surviving conservative culture took heart as it reasserted itself from above. It seemed to many unenlightened foreigners that ultrarevolutionary forces had won, while what really occurred was a pseudo-revolution: a purely feudal means of expression—exalting the leader—came into dominance.

That was a time of thinking about the destiny of the country, and of searching for the right path. People who had been repressed in the years of the numerous campaigns returned, having comprehended the burdens of the life of the masses. They seriously studied the situation, and sought the sources of their woes. That was a time of the economy's stagnation and decline of standard of living. And quite recently, cadres poisoned by ultraleft politics persuaded the people that they must "taste the sweetness of life in the new China, and perceive the bitterness of the old China."

Deng Xiaoping saw the sources of misfortune in an incorrect ideology, in false representation of socialism as universal poverty. Mao Zedong's subjective wishes were contrary to objective laws. The certainty that we are living in an era of world proletarian revolution and preparation for war caused efforts to be concentrated on the class struggle, which was supposedly to solve all problems—social, economic and political. Development of productive forces was ignored.

The mind had to be released from bondage—this is what Deng Xiaoping said at the eve of the December Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. "The people fear uttering an extra word. They simply sit there and transcribe everything from the hieroglyphics, mindlessly copying them and passing them up the channels. Responsibility to higher authorities is placed in

juxtaposition to responsibility to the people." Deng Xiaoping made an appeal to release the mind from bondage, to base actions on reality, to unite, and to look ahead.

His appeal was heard. The plenum became a historical turning point, shifting the center of gravity from the class struggle to modernization, to development of productive forces. He opened the road into the present era, which is defined by two key words intimately associated with one another—reform and openness.

When I asked Chinese about their attitude toward the times in which they live, and about their assessment of the role played by Deng Xiaoping, very many of them defined it by the word "kaifang"—openness. "Kaifang" is a concept, a symbol of faith, a means of existence, a broad view on the nature of things, and a process of surmounting stereotypes and chauvinistic conformism. In the narrow sense it is a window opened to the world, though the openness is developing within the country as well.

Before, they lived in closed space, in self-isolation. Mao Zedong, many of my interviewees said, focused on construction of sterile socialism behind closed doors. Deng Xiaoping preaches a different morality: "When you sow a closed society, you reap poverty." One scientist recalled the thoughts of the great writer Lu Xin: "Feudalism is an iron chamber in which all Chinese are locked. However, feudal consciousness has a unique feature: It does not notice the iron walls." And so, the scientist reasoned, the door was opened in the 1980s, and the Chinese learned that the surrounding world which they had been persuaded was in decline, had actually overtaken them by a hundred years. Deng Xiaoping's words "catching up to the era is the meaning of our reform" acquired material meaning. Everything has been placed into motion. Foreign trade and tourism are growing, including inside the country, and a migration of the population has begun, naturally carrying with it its own problems. (It is initially a Chinese saying, after all, that an ox fears a new plow like a person fears a new place).

The matter lies not only in numerical indicators, even if they are impressive: The proportion of export in the national income is 15 percent, foreign trade turnover has increased by a factor of 20 since the mid-1970s, 16,000 companies operating with the participation of foreign investments have been registered, and 7,000 of them are already producing. "Kaifang" became an impetus to socioeconomic development.

Talk has also started about change in the Chinese citizen's social make-up in response to the development of commodity and money relations. Here are a few new traits: Aspiration for a better share. The people are tired of a boring, monotonous life. A taste for fashion has arisen. Individualism. It has been found that the interests of the individual do not necessarily conflict with

state and collective interests. The consumer syndrome (there are 37 color television sets for every 100 urban families): Chinese statistics confirm that this indicator is higher than in Japan, where per-capita income is far larger than in China.

Is this process proceeding in only one direction? There is no answer to that. Deification of money, which is accompanied by the loss of the ideals and faith of a significant fraction of the people, and the clear understatement of the value of education are troubling the society. Does Deng Xiaoping understand this? Doubtlessly. This is why he has often said: "Material civilization must be combined with spiritual civilization." Back in 1985, in a speech to an all-China conference, he said: "Without great ideals, without discipline, our country will become a loose pile of sand, like the old China. And in such a case, tell me if the success of our revolution and our construction is of any importance...."

Recently pondering the paths of reform, Deng Xiaoping recalled that the gross national product had doubled in 10 years, and that this had not been an easy thing to accomplish. But mistakes were also inevitable, ones "for which we veterans also bear responsibility." This is a significant fact. When Deng Xiaoping said "I also made mistakes," this was not campaign rhetoric but the view, the position which he consistently upholds. "We must not lay blame upon one leader—each of us carries a share." He is a resolute proponent of younger blood among the cadres, without which reform would be impossible. This is why he has often talked about retiring. His request was satisfied by the 13th Chinese Communist Party Congress: He was not elected to the new Central Committee. This was an example to others: The age of Politburo candidates and members elected at the congress turned out to be 7 years lower than that of the preceding body.

Deng retained only the posts of chairman of the Military Council of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and head of the Central Military Council of the Chinese Peoples Republic. But while he left "the front line for the second," the veteran remained the leader. His advice is sought on all strategy. Listen to his line of reasoning: "I am gradually leaving the stage, providing a possibility for others to lead, but the leaders should not feel that a weight is hanging over their heads. We veterans are obligated to remember this." And more. He opposes emphasis on his special role, "since such propaganda would create the notion that when Deng ceases to be, policy will change." The ancient Chinese philosopher Chuang-tsu once said: "Those things live, but the roots cannot be seen. To create—and not to appropriate. To create—and not to glorify oneself. To be an elder, but not to be imperious. This is known to be the deepest strength."

The reform, which has been implemented in order to shake the menacing bastions of Chinese traditions, social values and way of thought more than the whole decade

prior to 1978 had, has now entered its second decade. In Deng Xiaoping's mind it is now time to think about the path that has been traveled. Movement has slowed down somewhat at an abrupt turning point. Problems of stable and balanced growth, and of improvement of the reform have arisen. How is double-digit inflation to be stopped? Can the market be combined with the traditions of socialist society, and to what limit may market relations develop before the system ceases to be socialist? How is the conflict between aggregate social demand and supply to be eased?

Expenditures presently exceed the state's economic possibilities. A clear shortage of qualified manpower can be felt on a backdrop of surplus personnel and "invisible unemployment." The population problem has become more acute: For example, excessive employment is an obstacle to raising the effectiveness of production. Some economists predict that it would take not less than 15-20 years to form the new mechanism of economic control. Quite recently the Chinese leadership suggested a far shorter period. The recent student demonstration showed that the people demand democratization of the party and all political life, and more decisive eradication of corruption.

Deng Xiaoping once said: "Reform carries risk, we must be bolder, and we must not fear risk, since otherwise we will not achieve progress." But recently he spoke more categorically: "In the time of favorable development we lost our vigilance—and now there is a price to pay: The economy has started developing swiftly, but the proportion between demand and supply has become imbalanced, and the policy of population control has not produced the desired results."

Deng Xiaoping prefers to be in the shadows. Nonetheless I will risk a few lines about his nature. He likes family dinners, when several generations of the family gather together under the same roof. A native of Szechwan, he continues to show a liking for the spicy cuisine of his native land. He adores his grandchildren. He likes to play bridge. Soccer matches on television. Morning walks. The ever-present strong Panda brand cigarettes. Quiet pleasures that distract him from affairs of state.

"To always be useful"—such is his life's credo. He feels himself to be an optimist. "I am an old revolutionary. You can imagine the kind of storms I have survived." Twice he was forced to leave the political stage. During the years of the Cultural Revolution he was proclaimed "the second biggest head traveling the capitalist road"—the first was China's Chairman Liu Shao-chi. Then, at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, once again accusations of a desire "to restore capitalism." The grounds were fabricated—organization of "counterrevolutionary events" on 5 April 1976 in Tiananmen Square: On that memorial day Beijing's citizens came out to honor deceased Premier Zhou Enlai. Upon his first return, when he immediately assumed the struggle against the tyranny of political voluntarism and social

projectionism, he cautioned his troubled friends: "You must defend your views, and not be afraid that you will be overthrown a second time." It was precisely during his exile that Deng thought out his political program. His astounding capacity for quickly recovering physical and spiritual strength always helped him to endure the storms of fate.

The person who was intended by fate to play a key role in the most dynamic period of China's history was born in 1904 in the village of Paifang, Xiexing District, Szechwan Province. This was a time of maturation of the bourgeois-democratic revolution under the leadership of Sun I-Xian. Three generations of his ancestors had lived in the tiled-roof house. His father studied legal and political sciences in school, and worked as a clerk in the district government.

As an adolescent Deng Xiaoping participated in the boycott of Japanese goods. At that time his sense of citizenship did not go beyond the slogan "Industrialization will save the fatherland."

Together with some of his school-fellows he sailed for France on the deck of a steamship in 1920 in order to learn about industrial society. He had just turned 16, and he was the youngest among the travelers. This was the difficult time of the Depression. He worked at the Reno Plant, as a locomotive stoker, and in a restaurant kitchen. This French experience of physical work came in handy for him during the Cultural Revolution, when he was sent in exile to Jiangxi Province where he worked as a fitter at a plant.

Under the influence of his older comrades, and chiefly Zhou Enlai, he began studying Marxism. In 1922 he joined the Communist Youth Union, and in 1924 he joined the Chinese Communist Party. In early 1926 Deng Xiaoping (by the way, he was born with the name Xixian, and it was not until the period of the "White Terror" in the late 1920s, when the Communist Party went underground, that he, as a professional revolutionary, changed his name to Xiaoping) went to the Soviet Union, where he studied in Moscow, first in the Communist University of Laborers of the East, and then in the Sun I-Xian Institute. Deng Xiaoping remembers well one of his school-fellows, Chiang Ching-kuo, the eldest son of Chiang Kai-shek and subsequently chairman of the Kuomintang party on Taiwan.

In spring 1927 Deng returned to his homeland through the deserts of Mongolia and he received an appointment as chief of the political department of the Sun I-Xian Military School under the general staff of Feng Yuxiang's army. From that time on he was in the center of events in all stages of the difficult path of the Chinese revolution. For 13 years his combat activities were associated with the outstanding Marshal Liu Bocheng. In 1947 Liu's and Deng's 120,000-strong army crossed the Huang He: A campaign that marked a counteroffensive against Kuomintang troops on a countrywide scale began. Deng

Xiaoping was one of the leaders of the Huaihai operation (1948-1949), one of the three largest in the years of the peoples liberation war. In April 1949 the million-strong army destroyed the forward defenses on the Yangtze River and captured Nanking, the seat of the Kuomintang government.

In 1945 Deng Xiaoping was elected to the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. In 1955 he was elected to the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. And in 1956 he was elected Central Committee General Secretary. He remained at this post for 10 years. For many years he occupied important leadership positions in the party, government and army.

Researchers invariably turn attention to Deng's pragmatism, which has its roots in the midst of folk life. In his book "Deng: Thoughts and Deeds" the young sociologist Wu Zuoxiang formulated his credo as follows: I wrote this book from the position of a person who wants to understand Deng. It is understanding that leaders need, and not unqualified obedience or blind opposition. The author feels that the Chinese reforms, which were initiated by Deng Xiaoping, were an attempt to solve political and ideological problems from an economic standpoint. The scholar recalls a paradox stated once by the Chinese leader: "It is not important as to whether the cat is white or black, as long as it catches mice." This rings debatable at first glance, and in their time, the dogmatists used this thought against Deng Xiaoping.

But Wu Zuoxiang believes that this formula is precisely what reflects the spirit of the times and the conditions of the developing country, which is aspiring to surmount its backwardness and providing an opportunity for experimentally feeling out the paths and resources, without hurry and without yielding to the hysterics typical of the slogans of the party during the unsuccessful Great Leap Forward and the tragic years of the Cultural Revolution.

We know that the family contract became the beginning of reform in the Chinese countryside, in which ways to activate the peasant millions were found. Deng Xiaoping said: "We will select that method which will provide the best practical result." Since the late 1970s when the reform began, this was precisely the form selected by the peasants, even though it was resisted by the bureaucrats. But even here, folk thought won against bureaucratic dogma. The dogmatists were needlessly concerned that the cat Deng Xiaoping was of the wrong color: The choice between socialism and capitalism had never been questioned by him. "China can travel only the socialist road. Capitalism would be impossible in such a large country, with its population in the billions."

It was Deng Xiaoping who formulated the conception of "building socialism with a Chinese face" at the 12th Chinese Communist Party Congress in 1982. Scholars feel this formula of the "father of Chinese reform" to be a theoretical windfall: "Attainment of the level of a

society of modest prosperity as a symbol of the completion of the initial stage of socialism" (in this case he competently capitalized on national spiritual wealth, making reference to the social utopia of Confucius), and the now widely known conception "one state—two systems" as the basis for the motherland's peaceful unification.

Deng Xiaoping once said: "I decided never to leave China again, but if the obstacles are removed, I am prepared to rescind this decision and meet with Gorbachev even on Soviet soil. I am certain that such a meeting would have enormous significance to improving Sino-Soviet relations."

And so the long search for mutual understanding, the joint effort and the display of political wisdom resulted in this piece of news: M. S. Gorbachev is traveling to China in order to meet with Deng Xiaoping and other top leaders of the party and state, who together with him are guiding the country along the road of revolutionary sociopolitical transformations, and seeking the ways of renewing socialism.

A Chinese proverb states: "It is better to see a face than to hear a name."

Uzbek, Xinjiang Agricultural Performance Compared

18070271 Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 4 Apr 89 p 2

[Interview with Professor Sh. I. Ibragimov by UzTAG correspondent Yu. Bondarenko: "What I Saw and Comprehended in China"]

[Text] A delegation from the Central Asian Department of VASKhNIL [All-Union Agricultural Academy imeni V. I. Lenin] visited the Chinese Peoples Republic on an invitation from the agricultural administration and Academy of Agricultural Sciences of the Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region. The purpose of the trip was to become acquainted with the activities of Chinese scientists and to determine the possibilities for joint research in different areas of agricultural science and technology.

UzTAG correspondent Yu. Bondarenko met with Professor Sh. I. Ibragimov, assistant chairman of VASKhNIL's Central Asian Department and the leader of the Soviet delegation, and asked him to reply to a number of questions.

[Bondarenko] Shukur Ibragimovich, was your "Chinese" experience useful to us?

[Ibragimov] Why not? In terms of natural conditions this autonomous region of China differs little from Uzbekistan. The same sharply continental climate with a small quantity of precipitation during the growing period. Such that farming basically requires irrigation. Distant-pasture animal raising is well developed here as well.

The region is also comparable with our republic both in area of farmland (3.2 million hectares) and in population, the bulk of which is employed in agriculture. As in our republic, cotton, grain, vegetables and tobacco are grown in Xinjiang. Xinjiang is also famous for its fruits, melon crops and nuts. Meaning that we have many things in common.

[Bondarenko] But certainly there are many differences as well?

[Ibragimov] Yes, and unfortunately ones that are not in our favor. For example gross agricultural production is growing constantly here, with its growth rate being continually higher than the rate of population growth. Just last year production was increased by 11.7 percent. And this is considering the fact that the level of mechanization of agriculture there is significantly below ours. They use machinery to process only two-thirds of the farmland, and to harvest crops from 22 percent of the planted area. And although these indicators are among the highest in China, they do not in any way compare with ours.

[Bondarenko] How can we explain their successes?

[Ibragimov] Do you think such a question could be answered in a couple of words? There are many factors entering in here. Let us begin with the fact that their yields of agricultural crops and the productivity of their farm animals are higher. As an example they get 37.5 centners of wheat per hectare, 60 centners of corn grain and 26 centners of raw cotton. And consider animal husbandry. Certain breeds of cows give up to five and a half thousand liters of milk per year. Sheep raised at the breeding farm in Ziniguan [transliteration] sometimes reach 120-125 kilograms, and 20-25 kilograms of wool are shorn from each of them.

This happens because over there, the peasant is the true proprietor of the land. Over there, leasing has been introduced not in words but in deed. Moreover, not a leasing contract, but leasing per se, where the producer is the owner of what he grows—that is, he has the right to sell his yield to whomever he wishes.

For example we visited a certain state farm involved in cotton growing. Just seven hundredths of land are assigned to each member of the state farm. He himself sells the raw cotton at the procurement point. Moreover the expenses associated with depreciation deductions, fuel, oil and lubricants, and mineral fertilizers are covered by the state budget. If it is seed cotton, the lessee receives money not only for the raw cotton but more for the seeds as well. Add to this the level of the purchase prices—they are almost three times higher. Thus it happens that there is no need to force the peasant to grow what the state needs right now. He gets a feel for what is needed from what he earns.

[Bondarenko] But before something could be grown, you have to have something to grow. That is, good regionized varieties.

[Ibragimov] And they have them. Selected locally. We toured the laboratory of selection, technology and soil analysis at the Scientific Research Institute of Agriculture of the Kazakh Autonomous Okrug. The level of the work is very high.

The institute's breeders have created many new varieties of wheat and corn hybrids. The yield of the latter is 100-120 centners of grain. Irrigated wheat gives up to 36 centners of grain.

Let's look at cotton. It has been grown here since 1949. Soviet varieties were grown at first. Now they have their own—Xinruchrun-1. Its cultivation technology is interesting—it is grown under a film, which ensures the appearance of early sprouts without weeds, and it increases the yield by 30 percent. In the Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region, cotton grown beneath film represents almost 60 percent of the total area occupied by this crop.

We also visited an industrial crop growing institute. It has top-class equipment. For example they have an instrument made by Spinlab which can analyze the strength, color, maturity and other parameters of 400 fiber samples a day. As far as I know, in our country not even workers of the state strain testing station have such instruments.

[Bondarenko] And what specific results have you brought back with you from there?

[Ibragimov] We signed a protocol on scientific and technical cooperation between the Academy of Agricultural Sciences of the Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region and the Central Asian Department of VASKhNIL. In accordance with it, direct ties will be established and programs for creating high-yield crops and new equipment and procedures will be determined as early as in this year.

An agreement was also reached on commodity exchange deals. Chinese specialists were sold on cotton pickers and sowing machines designed in the Central Asian Scientific Research Institute for Mechanization and Electrification of Irrigation Farming. Ours were sold on agricultural product processing equipment, particularly a grape drying line. We are also exchanging apprentices in cotton growing, plant protection, animal husbandry and agricultural economics.

We gave Xinjiang scientists four Soviet varieties of cotton for research and testing, and we received as many from them.

On the whole, the trip was productive.

Book Review: Communist Party of Japan

18070240 Moscow *RABOCHIY KLASS* 1

SOVREMENNYIY MIR in Russian

No 1, Jan-Feb 89 pp 213-215

[A.S. Kaufman review: "The Communist Party of Japan: From its Origins to Our Day"]

[Text] The Communist Party of Japan [CPJ] is one of the biggest mass proletarian parties in the world and the most populous revolutionary party of the working class in oriental capitalist countries. It is an influential political force having a significant impact on domestic political life in its country. An important work by Prof I.I. Kovalenko,* well-known specialist in the history of the CPJ, is devoted to its arduous path—one of strenuous struggle marked not only by big victories but also severe trials and sometimes serious mistakes. Having made the basis of the monograph two of his earlier works on the same complex subject,** the author fundamentally reworked them and supplemented them with new material, important theoretical and political generalizations and also four completely new chapters on the contemporary period of the CPJ's activity.

On the basis of new material committed to scholarly circulation for the first time the author studies the particular features of the development of Japanese imperialism up to WWII, noting that propitious foreign policy circumstances contributed to its rapid growth. The historically evolved system of power in Japan, at the center of which was the monarchical machinery of state and which determined the specific conditions of the emergence and development of Japanese capitalism, impeded here the development of the revolutionary process in the country and created considerable barriers in the way of the worker and democratic movement. The enlistment of new material and sources has afforded an opportunity also for an examination in greater breadth and depth of the process of unification of the workers and the cohesion of their ranks on a professional basis at the end of the 1880's-start of the 1890's. The author comprehensively illustrates the activity of the outstanding Japanese revolutionary (Sen Katayama) and his closest comrades in arms, who played such an important part in the creation of the worker unions and the organization and cohesion of the workers movement on a class basis, and reveals the inevitable difficulties on this path. In other words, the book traces the process of the formation of the objective and subjective conditions for the proletariat's self-recognition as a social class, in the course of which the initial prerequisites for the emergence of the Communist Party—the separation and structuring of a proletarian vanguard—which everywhere is highly complex and difficult, gradually took shape also.

Against a broad historical backdrop and once again with the use of new documents the work studies the CPJ's activity in the first years following its formation (1922), specifically, under the conditions of the first punitive measures on the part of the authorities in 1923 and in

subsequent years, and its difficult struggle against liquidationism and "left" opportunism. The book illustrates more comprehensively than was done before the entire initial period of the CPJ's activity. Revealing the paths of the impact of the Great October and the forms in which this impact was embodied, the author emphasizes that the revolution in Russia, which powerfully boosted the worker and entire democratic movement in Japan, also contributed, of course, to the creation in 1922 of the CPJ, which proclaimed as its credo the ideas of scientific socialism. S. Katayama, M. Watanabe, K. Tokuda, S. Ichikawa, S. Nosaka and other revolutionaries from the ranks of those who were the founders of the party did much to propagandize these ideas. The Comintern rendered the cause of the formation of the CPJ great theoretical and political assistance. Nonetheless, in the first years of the party's existence a substantial part of its leadership, as a consequence of insufficient ideological and theoretical training, was unable to make a Marxist-Leninist analysis of the current domestic political situation and on this basis formulate the correct policy. In addition, a policy of liquidation of the party prevailed in the leadership, and in March 1924, without convening a congress, it decided to dissolve it, which did great damage to its authority and the cause of the further organization of the proletarian forces.

It took an immense amount of work on the part of the CPJ's healthy forces to recreate the party in December 1926. Despite the authorities' repression and the disagreements in the Central Committee which had still not been overcome, the party embarked on a restructuring of its ranks and their organizational and ideological strengthening. "As of approximately the end of the 1930's," the author observes, "a period of rapid growth of the communist movement in Japan began. The Marxist-Leninist nucleus of the party, which consisted of worker communists who had graduated from the school of stern class struggle, took shape and strengthened in the struggle against the opportunists" (p 135). In the supercharged atmosphere of chauvinist orgy in connection with the war unleashed by Japanese imperialism against China the Communist Party was the sole political force in the country to occupy an internationalist position.

The subject matter connected with the CPJ's activity to strengthen its theoretical armament is expanded considerably in this monograph. Revealing the positive role of the decisions of the Seventh Comintern Congress in 1935, when the urgent question of the need for the unification of all revolutionary and democratic forces was on the agenda, and approaching the illustration of this issue as far as it concerned the CPJ from new standpoints, the author notes that the said need dictated a revision of a number of outdated tactical principles. It was a question, specifically, of the renunciation of the incorrect assessment of social democracy as a permanent and invariable social prop of the bourgeoisie and also of the confusion of the "upper stratum" and "social democratic masses" concepts. The Japanese communists

understood that the creation of a broad popular antifascist front required primarily the achievement of the unity of the working class, but on the path of the accomplishment of this task the Communist Party encountered many difficulties. The matter was complicated by the fact that the CPJ was illegal and was being subjected to the most brutal repression, more, "it had been deprived of a guiding center and lacked permanently functioning party organizations" (p 235). Nonetheless, under the difficult conditions the Communist Party's organizations, abiding strictly by the rules of security, continued their work, in the period of WWII included. The Communist Party was the sole force which believed in the inevitability of the defeat of Japanese imperialism and the liberation of the Japanese people from the oppressor, of the military-fascist dictatorship. The Communist Party's faith and conviction subsequently inspired the working masses to the struggle for the country's national independence.

The events which occurred following Japan's defeat in the war began a new and important page in the history of the CPJ. In October 1945 the Communist Party's leaders were released from the prisons, and on 1 December the same year its fourth congress—the first legal congress in its history—began. The fifth congress was held a year later, in 1946. The new material enlisted by the author has enabled him to examine the decisions of the two congresses in greater depth and detail and make a more comprehensive and balanced assessment of the situation which had taken shape in this period. The main significance of the two decisions of the two congresses, the author emphasizes, is that they directed the party toward struggle for the elimination of the monarchical system, semifeudal land ownership and the domination of the monopolies and for profound democratic transformations.

An important part in the formulation of the party's new tactical and strategic assignments and specification of its positions on a number of domestic and foreign policy issues was played by the Sixth CPJ Congress (1947) and the party Central Committee 12th Plenum (1948), which followed it and which proclaimed the slogan "For Democracy and Independence and the Complete Withdrawal of the Forces of Occupation and Against the Conversion of the Country Into a Military Base". A positive role was also performed by the document "The Party's Basic Course in Respect of a Peace Treaty," which was adopted shortly after the sixth congress and which emphasized that the immediate signing of a peace treaty and the withdrawal of the forces of occupation were essential as important prerequisites of the building of an independent and democratic Japan.

The years 1950-1952 were a difficult period for Japan. The United States imposed on Japan the "Security Treaty," which laid the foundation for their military alliance, and the Administrative Agreement, which was signed on 28 February 1952 between the two countries, gave the United States the right to deploy on the territory

of Japan an unlimited number of troops, occupy any areas as bases and so forth. Japan remained in the position of semi-dependent country. The U.S. Army and also naval and air forces (which remain there at the present time) remained on its territory.

In this connection the book shows with great thoroughness how great under these conditions was the significance of the correct solution of a central problem for the party of the working class—that of the combination of the national and class tasks of the proletariat. Different viewpoints, however, associated with an evaluation of the current moment and the determination of party policy had emerged in the CPJ leadership, which led to sharp disagreements and then to a split in the party itself. On the basis of an analysis of numerous, including new, documents of the CPJ the author comes to the conclusion that a main reason for this split was the leftist course of some of the CPJ's leaders, who advocated direct armed struggle.

Later, however, the tactical course formulated by the CPJ at its sixth national conference (1955) contributed to cohesion and the strengthening of its unity. The decisions of the seventh party congress (1958) contributed to the consolidation of this process. The congress laid the foundation for the conversion of the CPJ into a mass party of the working class and all working people of Japan. An original creative approach marks the study of the CPJ's assertive activity in the 1960's on the political and ideological strengthening of its ranks and also the illustration of its work on expanding its positions in the masses in the period of the ninth (1964) and 10th (1966) congresses.

The book examines very extensively the CPJ's activity in the 1970's-1980's, when the confrontation of reactionary and democratic forces in the country intensified abruptly. The CPJ stepped up activity to rally all democratic forces, relying on positions among the working people and in the working class and left trade unions which had already been won. The program documents of the 11th-16th party congresses (1970-1982) are analyzed thoroughly in this connection. The party had repeatedly in these years to deal seriously with urgent questions of party building. The number of members of the CPJ in July 1982 had risen to 480,000, and the number of readers of AKAHATA, to more than 3 million (p 508). Support for the party on the part of the Japanese electorate is growing (see, for example, PRAVDA, 26 October 1987).

The author of the book pays great attention to an important and fundamental problem of the cooperation of the CPSU and the CPJ. He writes in this connection about such an important event as the negotiations between delegations of the CPSU and the CPJ. The author examines this question from the standpoints of political realism without ignoring the difficulties in the way of an improvement in relations between the two parties. The CPSU and CPJ delegations agreed to make

mutual efforts for a settlement of the problems that have arisen and the normalization of relations between the two fraternal parties, which have in fact been suspended since 1964, on the basis of the principles of independence, equality and mutual noninterference in one another's internal affairs. They declared that they would exert efforts for the further development of relations between the CPSU and the CPJ based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. This was an arduous process. An agreement on the two parties' cooperation in the struggle to prevent a nuclear war and for the banning and elimination of nuclear weapons was reached at negotiations in Moscow between delegations of the CPSU and the CPJ in December 1984. New prospects were revealed following the meeting on 15 March 1985 between M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and T. Fuwa, chairman of the CPJ Central Committee Presidium.

The CPJ arrived at its 18th congress in November 1987 as an influential political force conducting a successful struggle in defense of the rights and interests of the working people, for its country's peaceful democratic development, against the Japanese-American military alliance and against the country's militarization.

The important and complex work, which is marked by an in-depth knowledge of the problems studied and high professionalism, is not, however, without certain shortcomings and contentious assertions. It seemed to us that the analysis of the social roots of the mistakes of the CPJ leadership at various stages of its activity was not entirely adequate. More attention should have been paid to the particular features of the correlation of the national and international in the policy and tactics of the CPJ and such. As a whole, however, Prof I.I. Kovalenko has created a major scholarly work meriting high marks. It is the significant, very successful result of his many years of research.

Footnotes

* I.I. Kovalenko, "Kommunisticheskaya partiya Yaponii. Ocherki istorii" [The Communist Party of Japan. Outline of History], Moscow, "Nauka", 1987, pp358.

** See I.I. Kovalenko, "Outline of the History of the Communist Movement in Japan up to WWII," Moscow, 1979; *ibid.*, "Outline of the History of the Communist Party of Japan Since WWII," Moscow, 1981.

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Changes Noted in Mongolia

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[Article by Leonid Shinkaryev, IZVESTIYA special correspondent: "Mongolia: At the Junction of the Centuries"]

[6 May 89, p 5]

[Text] Ulan-Bator-Moscow—This country in the middle of Asia, which borders on Siberia and which is similar to

it in its landscape (steppes, forests, deserts, and mountains), excites the historical memory with the terrible figure of Genghis Khan and his hordes of horsemen in soft leather armor carrying banners with tails in their hands. The eight centuries that have passed since then and especially the last 60 years, during which the Mongols have traveled a non-capitalist path, have changed many things in this land. A distinctive civilization, which arouses an interest in peace, has arisen. I lived in the Mongolian People's Republic for four years (at the end of the Seventies and beginning of the Eighties) and I had hoped that I had a picture of its social and political situation. A recent business trip to Ulan-Bator, however, revealed unexpected subjects.

The work of the Fifth Plenum of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee was coming to an end when a well known artist, who had been shown consideration by the authorities and who had been conferred titles and awards, took the floor. The speaker said: "Friends, you know that I have painted portraits of Stalin, Choybalsan, Brezhnev, and Tsedenbal. I have continued to head the Union of Artists for 33 years. I cannot endure this armchair any longer, and my comrades are also no longer able to endure me. Accept my confession.... Free me!"

These days, one does not hear the usual speeches harkening back to the ancient Mongolian tradition of glorification (tsol). Another spirit, which is responsive to the new thinking, reigns. However, an excited confession, which is not the way of the Mongols, would have evoked alarm even recently: Were all the person's faculties in order? Had he overworked his mind? The ritual of public presentations and even speech stereotypes seemed unshakable and almost sacred. The country has discovered much in common with what was tormenting the motherland. However, beyond the capital and beyond the Bogdo-Ul mountains, the steppes buzzed with the winds: herds of sheep on the mountain sides, white yurt tents, camel caravans, quiet nomads moving with their families to a new place, like a thousand years ago.

The intertwining of the centuries-old and the modern has always distinguished Mongolian life, elevating old traditions and new items from a foreign soil to the crest of public interest. This has affected the external side of life but not the social psychology. The latter has been formed over the course of centuries and to a large degree has been directed by dead generations who have passed on the weight of their valor and errors as an inheritance. The Mongols have a reputation for slowness and are inclined to contemplation. Z. Agvan-Baldan, an outstanding 19th century thinker in protecting the world of bliss against active principles, wished his fellow countrymen: "Let there only be favorable events all of the time; let it rain continuously, let the grain grow, and let the people and state live harmoniously...."

Today, the capital is more crowded than before with people wrapped in deli and girdled with a sash (the national dress). You hear an argument about politics at a

bus stop. Demonstrating students have smeared statues of Choybalsan and Stalin with black paint (the Mongolian symbol for hostility) and have organized a meeting... But the discussions? You still hear in Ulan-Bator: "We have studied in school for a long time, content with explanations out of love for our teachers. However, it is impossible to live in the old way. Foreign experience is not given to being learned by heart. We will reorganize with a consideration for our traditions, conditions, capabilities, ..."—N. Tsultem, the artist, retells his penitential speech at the plenum to me.

The democratization processes in the USSR are also inspiring Mongolian self-awareness to grow. People no longer want to accept any dictum from the hierarchical heights as a truth. Public opinion condemns passivity in thinking, ostentatious unanimity and fear of change. It would be well if the radically attuned youth or enlightened urban intelligentsia came out in favor of political and economic reforms—all layers of the population require this. It inspires one to the social activity that was not present here before. The UNEN editorial board says "The influence of your newspapers," pointing to mountains of letters. The people are dying to express themselves on subjects far from their personal concerns. He, who has not mastered reading and writing, dictates to children and grandchildren.

One of the discussions concerned the Mongolian army. Does a country, which is still not too developed, need to spend a considerable portion of its national income to maintain troops and doom so many hands to idleness when a political thaw has already arrived in Europe and Asia? People are writing without missing an opportunity to demonstrate a critical opinion as a sign of growing civic virtue.

I never before heard Mongols reproach themselves with such frankness for their inclination toward parasitic smugness—and, at the same time, their partners who contribute to this by providing help, frequently free of charge and without insisting on an equal benefit. The numerical increase of "dargi" (chiefs) and the bureaucratic apparatus is alarming people. Among them is a multitude of foreign "advisors", "plenipotentiaries", "ministry representatives", etc., who are not answerable for anything and who live in the capital under privileged conditions, permitting the local civil servants to shift the blame for failures in the economy to them. Something is really happening! In defining processes, the Mongols have rejected the term "shenzhlel" ("renewal"), which was accepted in the beginning, and have preferred "oorcholon bayguulalt"—the analog of our "restructuring."

The identical nature of the terms is justified by the common nature of our destinies and the similarity of circumstances, including sad ones.

Those victims of the Choybalsanov repression of the Thirties and Forties, who had survived and who had spent many years in "black yurt tents" (prisons) and

camps in Kolyma, Siberia and the Far North, talked your head off. Their high placed dargi had sent them there—frequently at the instigation of Stalin's and Yezhov's emissaries. In their own way, these people sealed the friendship of our peoples with blood that was shed jointly. The investigation of the crimes is continuing and already 34,000 victims of the repression have been identified. They attacked the participants in the 1921 revolution, the creative and scientific intelligentsia, many cattle-breeders, and especially the clergy. Among the lamas, there were philosophers, medical men, writers, artists, and enlighteners. Approximately 700 Buddhist monasteries (almost 4,000 temples), outstanding monuments of Eastern culture, were converted into crushed stone. Ancient silk books with gold pictures of Buddha on the title pages and in rosewood cases, which had preserved the wisdom of the centuries, were thrown onto bonfires throughout the Great Steppes. Thousands of monks were shot. They threw them into the beds of dried up rivers. The water carried the bodies to the lakes during the rainy season and the corpses rocked on the waves. The lakes were red from the monk's bright clothing. Choybalsan reported to the 22d Small People's Hural on the "destruction of the counterrevolutionary remnants of the Japanese secret service, traitors and betrayers of the motherland: Thus, comrades, in 1937 we managed to defend our people's independence...."

The public evil corrupted weak persons, shoving them into time-serving and allowing them to seek comfort in power over such as themselves. They told me about D. Senge, the writer: He went to work in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, insuring his success by denouncing his luckier colleagues with his pen. As everything is known....

The nomads were not afraid of a nighttime knock on the door. They entered the tents without knocking, having tied their horses to the tethering post. Fear strengthened the people's secretiveness and estrangement from each other. One can imagine what changes were needed in the surrounding world for Mongols, who had been trained into submissive hopelessness, to talk their heads off about the fact that yesterday they were afraid to talk in a whisper. Today's unbraking process is taking place amazingly quickly—and one should not be surprised if young people display this quite sharply and ask questions for which an older person cannot find an answer.

New thinking has touched upon all aspects of Mongolian life, intensifying the spirit of doubt in society. More and more rarely do you notice in meetings the past unanimity against general indifference. The people are talking. The figure of a yawning person who mechanically raises his hand will soon call to mind bureaucrats with a yearning for past times. The public is making a noticeable impact on the political and spiritual atmosphere. At its urgent request, D. Namdag's story "Boy Starogo Volka" [The Battle of the Old Wolf]—a truthful picture of the illegality in the country—was finally published. The author, who did not wish to cooperate with the apparat of

violence, was subjected to repression and did not live until today (he died in 1984). Today, cattle-breeders, who rock on camels, are reading his book.

What has become of the Mongolian imperturbability when the play "At the Crossroads" appears on the stage of the State Drama Theater? The authorities banned these pictures of the revolutionary days of 1921 eight times; they did not wish to accept the fact that not a true orthodox believer with firm purposes but a thinking individual, who was defending the right to choose, was at the center of events. For a long time, they demanded a "positive hero" from the theater, who was depicted for armchair ideologists. However, they nevertheless allowed the play because the writer and actors had seen it. In a situation of a general craving for civilization, the theater has achieved the right to decide for itself the fate of its works, entrusting the last word to the artistic council. N. Suvd, a beautiful movie and theater actress and a student of Boris Babochkin, said to me: "Little victories of restructuring." They have elected her the theater's artistic director.

Public awareness is moving toward a rapprochement with the common sense of the people who are demanding guarantees that the changes be irreversible. You do not hear speeches against restructuring—but, on the other hand, criticism of the management staff for the slow pace of restructuring is everywhere and is rather sharp.

They are expecting even more drastic changes in the relations between the church and the state. The Buddhist religion, which was spread here even before our age and which was declared the Mongols' official religion in the 16th century, has exerted an enormous influence on the people's world outlook and spiritual make-up. Even though the people preferred after the revolution to avoid the only operating monastery in Ulan-Bator, Ganan-Tegchinlin, fearing to be noticed and suffer from this, they nevertheless assembled for services on Sundays, attracted by the beautiful spectacle. In the semi-darkness of the temple, which has been registered as a national ornament with its cast silver and bronze statues of Buddhist gods, monks in red orkhimzhi (capotes) thrown across their shoulders, blow into copper horns, beat drums, whisper prayers....

Today, the state is more tolerant towards the church and provides support for its social undertakings. Ulan-Bator has become the capital of the Asian Buddhist Conference for Peace—an influential international movement. Khambolama Gaadan, the head of the Mongolian Buddhists, told me in his monastery residence: "The renewal is leading us from the darkness of the past to the future. However, the road is not an easy one. It is difficult to dispel the darkness of night with one lantern...."

We have kept silent too long about the wrongs done to the Mongols whose right to follow their national customs has been infringed upon. At one time, a beautiful wedding ceremony existed in the steppes. The young people

circled the tent of the bride's parents three times on horseback and made their way to the bridegroom's tent. A horseman greeted them with refreshments, inviting them to pass between two bonfires as if being cleansed before their new life. The desire to get to know the culture of one's people and to answer for yourself where you come from and what you will worship, is a component part of the concept of national awareness." One can imagine the bitterness of old people observing how their children now—to Mendelssohn's march—get into a Volga covered with blue ribbons with crossed rings on the roof and a gutta-percha doll on the radiator. The wedding procession is no different from any other on the streets of Mytishch or Torzhok. When the Mongols, the most resolute of them, asked about the return of even elements of their national ceremonies that were dear to them, newcomers, frequently their own vigilant fellow countrymen, were found who perceived the phenomenon of "nationalism" in their persistence.

The psychological basis of prejudice is biasness. If you are attuned to discovering something that does not suit you, you will find it even if it does not exist. In view of the fact that the Mongols had been weaned for a long time from their own cultural traditions, they obtrusively demanded declarations of love toward other peoples and a constant demonstration of internationalist feelings and—neither before nor now—was any hint of national exclusiveness or a contemptuous attitude toward anyone noted in them. During one of the sessions of the Mongolian Revolutionary Youth Union, a youth movement activist, who is well known in the country, approached me: "Can you imagine that the main speaker and all those who spoke during the Komsomol congress called for instilling a spirit of internationalism in youth and not once—not once!—did anyone say that it is necessary to love one's own people also?"

They call the widespread phenomenon where a people's national self-awareness is growing on the threshold of the 21st century under the conditions of the scientific and technical revolution, the strengthening of the integration of many ties and the breaking down of many partitions between states, the ethical paradox of today—especially in the developing countries where independence was acquired not so long ago. However, how frequently have economic failures, the uncontrolled actions of control agencies, the—at times—infringement of national dignity, and the appeal to thoughtless imitation of others led to tension in the consciousness of the masses? The world-wide process has not avoided the Mongols. They demand respect for their national feelings, protest against mediocrity in the state hierarchy, and insist on social justice.

It is strange to see how other observers manage to treat the "nationalism" that has aroused in the Mongols an interest in their own history, culture and traditions under the conditions of emancipation and openness. If an MGU (Mongolian State University) student is enraptured by the Isaakiyevskiy Cathedral in Leningrad, they

will mark him as an internationalist. However, if he begins to praise the architecture of the Erdenz-Dzu Monastery in Kharkhorin (Karakorum), the former capital of Genghis Khan's empire, someone will twist it around: "That has a fishy smell...." Confusion in one's head leads to a lack of mutual understanding and frequently to alienation; it leads to the Mongols' distrust of those who do not feel an interest in them, taking drinking toasts as the friendship of peoples.

Previously, the Mongols avoided expressing claims against foreign specialists, being careful not to pull down their authorities. Their steadfastness toward any newcomer strengthened the euphoric absent-mindedness that he was in a different country and that it is just as impermissible to violate its laws as to display arrogance or familiarity, which are equally insulting to the local population.

The largest foreign colony in Mongolia consists of our 60,000 fellow-countrymen. A complicated interlacing of the destinies of Mongolia and Russia, which has been engraved in the historical memory of both peoples who are equally sensitive to past great events and who are prepared to look the truth fearlessly in the eye considering the facts and without infringing on the dignity of those now alive, stretches from the darkness of the centuries. In today's steppes, memorials to the Soviet people of the Thirties, who helped to build the first enterprises and defend the sovereignty of Mongolia, sharing with the Mongols the unsettled life of their poor motherland, have become relics. How were the Mongols able to support their neighbor? During the war years, they sent the Soviet army 500,000 choice horses who pulled weapons over Europe's roads. Even today, they are sharing their resources—copper concentrates, fluor-spar, meat, wool, animal hides, leather footwear, carpets, sheepskin coats, sheepskin jackets, mittens, ... and they are not shipping a surplus. For all the sharp turns in international affairs, they invariably stand beside us. We very frequently only recall our help, seemingly not noticing the other's shoulder on which we ourselves are leaning. This has created in public opinion a one-sided impression that offends both sides. Inherent delicacy does not permit the Mongols to talk about this.

Previously, the Mongolian leadership made a fetish of our relations, promoting them as the natural ecstasy of impeccable Soviet activity. There was the persistent fear of "offending friends." I recall one story. A bus was moving about the nighttime capital picking up workers after their shift. A truck hit the bus, turned around and stole away. The bus, however, caught fire. A young Mongol, who had received injuries, pulled those who had lost consciousness from the fire. He saved everyone, but he himself died in a hospital. The workers continued to list him in his brigade and gave his wages to his mother. The newspapers reported this and there was a radio broadcast on it. The question of what happened to the truck that hit the bus did not come into anyone's head. The powers that be, however, suddenly remembered that

a Soviet driver was behind the truck's wheel. Why wasn't there a feature story on the lad and this infringement on inviolable friendship? With the scandal, they removed the authors, editors and censors from their work and sent them to the steppes as conscript labor.

Our restructuring has stirred up the Mongolian steppes. The confessional tone of the discussion about the past and the present, the recognition of mistakes, and the firmness when turning the wheel toward realism and the truth are finding a response in the people. In Ulan-Bator, I saw long lines for Soviet newspapers—especially those with articles by our well known publicists. Their names are on the lips of the Mongols. Here is something interesting. When our fellow-countryman, who lives here, talks about what has been written in the newspaper, the sharpest judgments emerge from his lips as quite reasonable. However, if a Mongol retells the same thing, someone frowns: What is this attitude.

Of course, the increase in national self-awareness is not doing without the costs that—at times—let themselves be known as warnings or distorting rumors of ethnic discrimination. They arise during the struggle against the deformations in society's life and are most frequently caused by the stagnation in the economy and in the distribution of social benefits. It is not necessary to dramatize the situation by tracking down the far-fetched negative trends in it. Mongolia is creating conditions for renewing the party, its political policy and all aspects of life.

There is a monument to Stalin in the capital's center in front of the State Public Library building. Yu. Tsedenbal once told me that immediately after the 27th CPSU Congress, N. S. Khrushchev asked why the Mongols endured the monument to the butcher. The reply was in the spirit that this name continues to embody the Soviet people for the Mongols and that they are grateful to the generalissimo for his resoluteness in defending sovereign Mongolia. It is not known whether the reason convinced Nikita Sergeyevich, but he never returned to the question.

Today, the Mongols are themselves raising their voices against monuments to Stalin and Choybalsan. The majority of UNEN readers have been in favor of eliminating the monuments. Meanwhile, according to data from a survey that was conducted by Mongolian radio, part of the population prefers to keep the statues as works of art: "Monuments to tsars and military leaders stand in European capitals, without anyone interfering." A completely new argument provides something else to help understand the special Mongol situation: One must not hurry to remove the monuments so that the haste will not be considered as the next rapid imitation of other countries.

[7 May 89 p 5]

"We want to make Mongolia a genuine Mongolia!" In this way did Ts. Namsray, Politburo member and Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party secretary, define

goals during our discussion. In his words, the Mongolian people are capable of entering world civilization with their own accent, inflection and nuances. In the country, there are two million people and in the steppes a million hectares of arable land, and 23 million sheep, goats, horses, camels, and cattle. There are enormous raw material resources. We have everything, he continues, but we are not using our capabilities. The USSR and other states are helping us. However, what are we ourselves doing? Why are we worse off than others....

It is not only in the party Central Committee, Academy of Sciences and Union of Writers that the air is impregnated with the craving, which has embraced everyone, to become independent. You even detect this in tents far from the capital. After the ritual questions ("How did you reach here?", "How are you feeling?", "Are your children healthy?"), the livestock-breeders—without a transition—suggest topics for discussion, which they recently avoided. Their leave-taking of myths is freeing their energies—including the most widespread myth that the country, having moved from feudalism to socialism avoiding the stage of capitalism, setting it hopes on foreign aid, without bothering to strain itself, and having an ideologized economy, is doomed to prosperity.

At the beginning of the Thirties, agitators rushed about the steppes and forcibly drove the livestock-breeders into "artels" and "communes", depicting them as festive occasions of collective labor. The cattle were forcibly taken away from the well-to-do, and those who were slow or had doubts disappeared for a long time; others—forever.

In the spring of 1932, tens of thousands of Mongols participated in an uprising that was stirred up by former lamas on a considerable portion of the country. The insurgents were defeated by aviation, tanks, artillery, and regular forces. The Ninth Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Congress had to denounce the "leftist deviation" and barely quieted the steppes.

The old men remember bitter 1940 when a new grandiose task, which was posed to the country by the bureaucratic staff that had bowed to a foreign idol, resounded from the podium of the 10th Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Congress: "Great Stalin in a conversation with Comrade Choybalsan, a marshal of our republic, said that 26 million cattle is very little for Mongolia as a livestock-breeding country. Comrade Stalin has advised us to see to it that there are no fewer than 200 million on the livestock-breeders' farms" Let us picture the Kremlin office, its master with a pipe in his hand and how he—having screwed up his eyes—looks into the unblinking eyes of the Mongolian marshal: "Why shouldn't the Mongols... have, for example, 200 million head of livestock?!"

From the resolution of the 10th Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Congress according to the political report: "The congress instructs the Central Committee

to implement great Stalin's instructions on increasing livestock herd from 26 million to 200 million in a Stalinist fashion."

They planned to complete the task by 1953. At its conclusion, there was barely 23 million head in the Mongolian herd.

Today's increase in the nomads' self-awareness (there are 180,000 of them) is demonstrated in their readiness to discuss problems with the country's government as an equal. The industrial construction, which was carried out in accordance with sweeping plans that assumed the boundlessness of the steppes, has seriously reduced the spaciousness of pastures. Today, the livestock-breeders are insisting on moderating the plowing up of land for crop-growing. On many already loosened fields, wind erosion of the soil has begun and more and more land is dying and becoming unsuitable for any use. The increased concentration of livestock on the remaining pastures is leading to the trampling down of pastures. Livestock-breeders are leaving the steppes—the number of townspeople already exceeds half of the population....

Nevertheless, we found a herdsman who had returned to his native steppes near Baganur from Ulan-Bator. He had worked for three years in a shoe factory, pining for the steppes: "There, I went out of my tent, mounted my horse and traveled where I wished. In the city, however, I boarded a trolley bus—immediately paid...." Luvsanzhavyin Tamba is 45 years old and he has 11 children. The chairman of the local agricultural association, which has 85 of these nomad camps, had brought me to him.

The herdsman's wife was bustling about an iron stove with a pipe that went from the center of the tent toward the sky. The children looked at us from the semi-darkness with damp almond-shaped eyes. The conversation concerned the contract between the livestock-breeder and the association—this has appeared as the new form of cooperation between the herdsman and the artel's administration. If a herdsman keeps more cattle for the wintering than the contract stipulates, all of this "overage" is transferred to his own herd.

I did not understand everything in the herdsman's argument with the chairman; however, noticing how the chairman cast embarrassed glances in my direction, I guessed that he was not very happy with the presence of a stranger. The herdsman, not paying any attention to the guests but also not violating the laws of hospitality, persistently demanded what was due him. I had not had an occasion before to observe such forcefulness from usually quiet and reserved livestock-breeders. Evidently, having agreed (or not having agreed?), the chairman and the herdsman began to drink tea. One can imagine what a change in mind was required for a people of nomadic disinterested persons, who were strangers to trade, to put into their active vocabulary the words that you hear in tents today—"profit", "loss", "balance." In recent years, it had become unimaginable to encounter a farm which

would reject a tractor, combine or motor vehicle. The prestige of the chairman depended on the amount of equipment. After three-four years, a tractor, which was supposed to plow for seven-eight years, broke down and smoked; they left it on the steppes like carrion. Today, the farms prefer to manage with very simple equipment, which does not require fuel, spare parts and increased care. They are learning to think—here is what is new.

In Ulan-Bator, you will not meet youth lounging about near hotels where foreigners live; their inborn tact keeps them from temptation. However, just as in other developing countries, you sense a growing contradiction between the needs of the people, especially the youth who are reaching for fashionable clothing, radio equipment and domestic articles, and the modest capabilities of any firm, even the most well known, to satisfy their needs. At one time, there was a moral precept among the postulates in the Mongolian steppes: The highest wealth consists of knowledge, the average wealth—of children, the lowest—of things. The folk wisdom of today's children evokes a smile. On a modern scale of values, the lowest is equal to the average, overtaking the highest. Youth want to live not only for the future but also for today, assuming that it is a pity to spend time in lines during a short earthly existence.

Mongols are sensitive to new ideas, and they are quick on the uptake and skillful. In many tents, women sew clothing of such excellent taste for their grown-up children using old clanging sewing machines following magazine pictures that a newly arrived individual is surprised: From what European collections do they come?

In the Ulan-Bator tannery that was built by Yugoslavs and equipped with Western equipment, 1,500 workers—basically, young women—have begun to work under cost accounting conditions, and Europe's best trading houses are purchasing the factory's products. A third of the sewing goes to the USSR. The labor collective council has supported the workers' recommendation to sew jackets and sheepskin coats out of the leather pieces that remain after the patterns are cut out—on the terms: He sewed five items—one is for him. I saw how carefully the workers now treat the pieces that were swept out with the trash into the factory's yard yesterday.

A Mongolian unique city.

This is the last inspection area where one can observe the transition process of a nomadic culture into an urbanized one. The young workers of steppe extraction are poignantly overcoming the slow rhythms. Sociologists are finding high production activity among 30-40 percent of the young workers. At the same time, their social needs are the same as those of experienced workers. For example, they protest together against the privileges of the authorities. When they changed the red license plates on government cars to common white ones, they mockingly asked each other: "Do we have restructuring or repainting?"

The jokes, which were being picked up there and then, taking a walk about the city and being carried off to the steppes, are becoming a form of accentuated independent conduct accessible to all. I will not begin to affirm that a relaxed attitude is already in the nature of Mongolian society. I have encountered people who are rather cautious, sometimes guarded and even alarmed by signs of change. Other important functionaries, when retiring, give interviews and write letters with unexpected enthusiasm, justifying to their countrymen that they are less guilty than others. They are not known to the population from portraits that have hung for decades on fences. They grew up in view. The genealogy of each one, his family and even the sins of his youth are known. The Mongols have no need to ask them to talk about themselves—they know each one.

Perhaps I am not correct but it now seems that after the dragged out political muteness, the need to demonstrate emphatically the right to evaluate independently is awakening in many. My ear caught the beginning of a phrase, which previously was unused here but which is now frequently repeated: "Why, in fact?" Why has the excellent glass factory produced only bottles for 30 years—mountains of green bottles—but the country imports window glass from eastern Siberia? Having heard this for the first time in the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Supply, I was convinced that it would disturb the planners, economists and financial experts—if not more than that. However, when leaving the Ulan-Bator Hotel in the morning for the new building that was being built near the State Opera and Ballet Theater, I talked with the builders and immediately heard again: Why, in fact, do we not have window glass?

You well understand the yearning to be "in the right" in conversations with friends. With a guilty smile and constantly mentioning that this is a special case not typical of fruitful cooperation, they mention Bor-Ukder, a joint Soviet-Mongolian enterprise for mining fluor-spar (fluorite). The Mongolian side has invested a billion tugriks (almost 250 million rubles) in this mine and has sent 4,000 workers there—and there is no profit. The cost of a ton of concentrate is 830 tugriks and the foreign trade price is 483 tugriks. Prior to 1986, the Mongols covered the losses from their own modest budget. During the last three years, the losses have been covered from the Soviet share of the profits in the Erdenet Mining and Enrichment Combine. It would be better to think together and in a friendly way about how to change the situation or even close the mine. It was necessary to begin the restructuring of our foreign trade policy so that the Mongols would talk about the unprofitable enterprise. Having ventured to conduct a dialogue, they will feel themselves to be true partners and find an understanding of the Soviet side. The controversy over the direction of searches, which is colored by the subject "experience" that evokes sharp arguments, occupies a large place in the present mental situation of Mongolian society. Recently the invocation "adopt the experience of our friends" is galloping about everywhere as a

universal and unqualified one. The rigid obligation to borrow, which is so convenient for a command system that is freeing itself of responsibility, has placed the bearers of experience themselves in an awkward position. UNEN recently wrote that the Mongolian party was compelled from its very beginnings to copy the experience of the Bolshevik party directly. Its own political leadership practices, personnel for state administration, etc., were lacking. Everything had to be learned: the establishment of public organizations, the development of democracy, and economic and cultural organizational development. The newspaper points out: "As a consequence, the custom of attempting to copy any models and forms mechanically and to rewrite or translate Soviet documents word for word during the work on key management questions, was preserved for a long time."

The trust in the freedom and worth of the individual, which has begun today, assumes a humanizing of the social environment where the people themselves adopt the experience which they want and from whom they want. Today, the Mongols have made up their minds to increase their role in the international socialist division of labor and to organize integrating ties with the countries of the Far East and the Asian-Pacific region. In the spirit of new thinking, the republic is looking closely at the experience of South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong which have been able to make effective use of subsidies from the developed capitalist countries for their rapid economic growth.

Our Mongolian friends would not condone the fact that I remained silent about the fact that restructuring is running up against resistance by part of the bureaucratic staff. It is difficult for some of the retinue in power during former times to learn to think in a new way; they are not able to give up their official privileges voluntarily and yield their positions to those who are younger, more educated and more intelligent. The prospect of one day finding themselves in front of half-empty counters in stores which neither they nor their families had dropped into for a long time, frightens them. It is annoying to present their appearance in the steppes as a darg accompanied by a retinue whom they are awaiting and whom they will solemnly greet—but as a simple traveler who has dropped into the first tent, which he has encountered, for a cup of tea. This mental disturbance of officialdom at a time of painfully hurting changes does not depend on state borders.

In antiquity, Eastern thinkers created a model for a "fortunate state" being little concerned about the fortunate individual. The new thinking puts the individual at the center of attention, based on historical experience; happy societies will not be formed from unhappy people. Although the political and general educational level of the population in Mongolia is still not high, the awakening of the masses' social activity is occurring at almost the same speed as in the more developed countries. They see the main instrument for change here to lie in democratization, frankness and glasnost. More and more people are aware that this is the only opportunity to elevate themselves to everything that is genuine. I would briefly define the Mongolian situation at the juncture of the centuries this way.

Economic Aspects of Namibian Settlement Viewed
18070176 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
27 Mar 89 First Edition p 7

[Article by V. Tyurkin, PRAVDA's own correspondent, Luanda: "Fates of Treasures"]

[Text] Namibian lobsters are delivered live to kitchens of Parisian restaurants. The "Sea Flower" catches these big ocean crayfish from the shallow water adjoining the African Namib Desert. In the city of Luderitz (named after the German conqueror of South-West Africa) at the firm's factories lobsters are placed in special containers with cooled water, in which they live 3 or 4 days. During this time the live cargo is transported to the capital city of Windhoek and then is flown by SAA—South-African Airlines—to Frankfurt-am-Main. From the FRG tons of the exotic delicacy are transported in refrigerators to fashionable West European restaurants. W. Guring, head of the "Sea Flower," evaluates this intercontinental operation as extremely profitable and promising.

The waters washing Namibia are the richest storeroom of the Atlantic Ocean, one of the zones of the world ocean most generously endowed with the "gifts of the sea." Nor have the mineral resources of this country been cheated out of their share. On closer examination the flourishing "Sea Flower" turns out to be no more than a dwarf, a small fish in the swarm of transnational businessmen and firms. Neither more nor less than 238 companies—mainly English, American, and South-African—earn their living in this semidesert corner of Africa.

There is something to take here: uranium and rare-earth metals—strategic raw materials for the West's military and atomic industry. Diamond placers occupy the entire southern part of the Namib Desert. A significant part of the stones are suitable for jewelry. The diamonds cut from them are noted for rare qualities—they are first-class and often have a special luster. Silver, copper, zinc, lead, and tin add to the list.

According to estimates by economists, in Namibia in 1987 the per-capita gross domestic product totaled 1,088 dollars, which is one of the highest indicators for Africa to the south of Sahara. The fact that a significant part of the products produced in Namibia are transferred abroad both in natural form and in the form of profits of foreign dealers is another matter. Furthermore, the share of the income taken away by them is virtually unlimited. What remains inside the country is spent in an extremely uneven manner. A total of 80,000 white people live according to high world standards, at the level of the average American or Englishman. But 1.3 million black citizens are very far from abundance. Even according to the official data recently published in Windhoek, one-half of Namibia's black urban population lives below the poverty level.

Now, when the colonial regime, judging from everything, is living out its last days, when it is a stone's throw until 1 April—the date on which the implementation of resolution 435 of the UN Security Council on granting independence to Namibia will begin—everyone is interested in how the future government will handle the country's vast natural resources and wealth.

Opinions differ negligibly here. First, few are in doubt that the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) to one degree or another will be the basic force determining the policy course of the new state. Second, SWAPO does not make a secret out of its intentions. The documents on this score, in particular the special statement on economic policy published at the end of last year, quite clearly follow the line of ensuring control over the exploitation of natural resources to one extent or another and, at the same time, not doing damage to the economy. SWAPO leaders expect to organize cooperation with all organizations, firms, entrepreneurs, investors, and specialists, including white employees of the state apparatus, who will be loyal to the government and will fulfill their obligations to the new state.

As pointed out in the documents, SWAPO is convinced of the advantages of public property. The striving for equality forms the basis for the organization's ideas of a just social order. All-powerful capital will now be placed within the framework determined by laws. At the same time, however, it is considered that it would be unwise to carry out a hasty nationalization of land, mines, and factories, because this will surely cause a drop in production rates and an outflow of capital and specialists.

Therefore, SWAPO will strive for the creation of a multistructure economy, which includes state, cooperative, and private property. The basic goal lies in attaining a balance, which would make it possible to more correctly distribute national income among the population and, at the same time, would guarantee a reasonable profit for foreign and local owners. On this basis the present 25-fold difference between the income of the white minority and of the black majority will be eliminated gradually.

The mining industry, which forms the backbone of the economy, is a zone of special attention. Foreign capital fully dominates here. Raw materials and profits are taken out, this being done with a violation of the legal rights of the Namibian people.

The London journal *SOUTH* writes that a great deal depends on how the relations of such mining giants operating in Namibia as the South African Consolidated Diamond Mine, the British Rossing Uranium, and the American Tsumeb Corporation with the new government are formed. SWAPO does not recognize the concessions granted them by colonial powers. Some of them had already been formulated during German colonialism, that is, before World War I. The journal notes that in case of a conflict with these companies, for example,

the Consolidated Diamond Mine, which has an office in Oranjemund near the South African border, will be able to forward with comparative ease diamond mining equipment to the Republic of South Africa. However, it appears that it will be possible to solve this problem in a business-like manner for mutual benefit.

This is affirmed by reports on continuing business contacts with large mining corporations, including such a giant as the Anglo-American Corporation, which controls a significant part of the extractive and heavy industry in the region of South Africa. To this day the Namibian economy is mostly attached to the Republic of South Africa and this is its "Achilles' heel." Namibia's imports are 80 to 90 percent South African. They include foodstuffs, consumer goods, machines, equipment, spare parts, and fuel. Namibia enters the currency zone of the South African rand and the Reserve Bank of the Republic of South Africa performs the functions of Namibia's central bank. Pretoria has categorically declared the only deep-water port of Walvis Bay to be its property forever and categorically refuses to hand over this colonial enclave. The only railroad also leads to the south.

Taking these realities into consideration, it is assumed here that a sharp rupture in existing economic relations with the Republic of South Africa would have a negative effect on the process of the country's gaining economic independence. Judging from everything, it is impossible to do without compromises.

Especially as SWAPO assumes that Namibia has all the chances to get out of the snares of dependence in time, developing cooperation with European and American companies, international organizations, and friendly states, as well as actively participating in the plans of the South African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC).

In the political sphere SWAPO intends to fight for the establishment of a democratic state expressing the will of the entire nation. Attaining national unity and reconciliation and ensuring such rights as the right of assembly, freedom of speech, and political associations for all citizens irrespective of their skin color, ethnic affiliation, language, and political or religious views will be top-priority tasks.

Non-alignment and development of relations with everyone that is ready for this will be the basis for foreign policy.

In domestic policy it is intended to carry out an administrative reform, which will put an end to the country's colonial division on an ethnic basis, as well as to carry out an agrarian reform and to revise the judicial system.

South Africa's 'Black Bourgeoisie' Profiled

18070250 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 28 Apr 89 p 5 sb

[Article by S. Yuryev: "Pretoria's Fifth Column: 'Black Bourgeoisie' Serving Apartheid"]

[Text] "You don't have to have white skin to be a true patriot of the Republic of South Africa." The newspaper WELD, published in Johannesburg, recently made this sensational discovery. Its readers were surprised to learn that, besides the ruling "white class," a so-called "black bourgeoisie" has been in existence for more than 10 years, representatives of which include "coloreds" and "Asiatics."

The living conditions of these people, despite the "non-white" color of their skin and the policy of racial discrimination followed by the government of Pretoria, sharply contrast the poverty and squalor of the black ghettos. Luxurious automobiles and yachts, villas with golf courses, and bank deposits—all this has become an essential attribute of life of the modern "black" bourgeoisie in South Africa. In a country in which whites comprise only 5 million of the 35 million population, a new social stratum has appeared, representatives of which—Negroes, Indians, and also emigres from states of Southeast Asia and Latin America—are becoming increasingly active in the economic and political life of the Republic of South Africa.

The appearance of this heterogeneous but already quite influential social class in South Africa dates back to 1976, when the black youth student riots flared up in the ghetto of Sowetto. It was these bloody and tragic events that forced not only the country's government but also representatives of the "white" industrial and commercial circles to hesitate. That is when it was decided to help create among the blacks an affluent stratum which could serve as a sort of "valve" for venting people's anger and, at the same time, help the white minority preserve their privileges.

"We must give the blacks a little power in order to ensure stability of the entire society. But not only 'our' blacks," M. Stein, the mayor of Cape Town, stated. And the "black" bourgeoisie took advantage of the carte blanche granted it. It began to create "black" private enterprises, banks, and finance offices and buy up land sections. Many of the benefits, for decades intended "only for the whites" in South Africa, have also become accessible for the blacks. Now, no one is any longer surprised at black golf courses, automobile showrooms, and swimming pools.

The new class of "black" bourgeoisie in South Africa is growing and becoming stronger. According to statistical data, there were only 7,850 black dealers and merchants in South Africa in 1962. Last year, this figure already had reached 65,000. In Cape Town, the National Federation of Chambers of Commerce was created to promote the development of "black" business in the country.

This "black boom" in business activity has brought the government considerable dividends. In 1986, the "black" bourgeois contributed \$58 million to the national treasury in the form of taxes, and last year this figure increased almost sevenfold. According to data of the South African Bank, there is an active infusion of "black" capital in a number of industrial sectors, which is causing serious concern among white producers.

Thus, the newly appeared "black" bourgeois purchased property from a branch of the American Pepsi-Cola Company, and later acquired controlling interest in the South African Association of Taxi Drivers, which earlier belonged to whites. "If things go any farther, these blacks, whatever kind of 'ours' they may be, will simply squeeze us out," complains a merchant from Bloemfontein, a descendant of the Dutch Boers.

For many years, due the racial discrimination flourishing in South Africa, blacks were not permitted in leadership positions in agriculture, the processing industry, mining, and finance. Although the portion of companies belonging to black businessmen does not exceed 1 percent of

the total volume of industrial production in South Africa today, they are increasingly strengthening their positions both in the domestic market and in the foreign market.

"Black" business is especially actively developing its contacts with foreign companies. Foreign creditors are counting on gaining privileges and advantages for themselves in the "post-apartheid" South Africa.

Just what is the attitude of the "black" poor, which are the majority in South Africa, toward the "black rich" in the country? They set fire to the mansions where the rich live and throw rocks at their cars. Incidents of armed attacks on representatives of the "black" bourgeoisie have become more frequent. "The entire native population of South Africa is oppressed and has no freedom. And our absence of rights looks even more outrageous against the background of the appearance of a 'black' elite, who are entering into an alliance with the racists for the sake of their own prosperity," stated F. Makloyz, leader of the Alliance of Struggle Against Apartheid of Durban.

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